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1. Introduction   
In the last years we have seen an unprecedented 
surge in calls from Western countries to spur 
development in Africa.1 Academic studies, mass 
media campaigns promoted by celebrities and 
political decision-making have all contributed 
to increased efforts to help Africa develop 
(Easterly, 2009). This is for example reflected 
in the Millenium Development Goals set for 
2015 and repeated calls at the G8 summits 
by influential political leaders including Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown (Easterly, 2009). Africa 
is often singled out for obvious reasons. Africa 
is the poorest region of the world, has had the 
worst per capita growth rates, is notorious 
for its poor levels of institutional quality 
and has seen more incidents of civil wars 
than anywhere else in the world. Low scores 
on other social indicators including school 
attendance rates and performance indicators, 
health and infrastructure complement the 
picture that levels of well-being in Africa are 
significantly worse than in the rest of the world. 
Also, worldwide sample studies on economic 
growth nearly always report a negative sign for 
the ‘Africa’ dummy (e.g. Collier and Gunning, 
1993). 
Stylized facts as well as regression parameters 
thus point to Africa being significantly different 
from other regions. This has motivated 
scholars across disciplines to investigate the 
causes of underdevelopment. In other words, 
what does the Africa dummy really capture? 
The economics literature on this topic is vast 
and more often than not, inconclusive (Rodrik, 
2006). Three themes however have emerged 
that are believed to be associated with 
economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
today: foreign aid, institutional quality and civil 
warfare. Moreover, there are clearly indirect 
impacts on development, due to interactions 
between these themes. Figure 1 depicts the 
key relations and its interactions. 
1 ‘Africa’ in this dissertation strictly refers to Sub-Saharan 
Africa
1.2 Foreign aid, institutions and civil war at the 
macro level 
This section reviews the macro-economic 
literature on the three key themes.
1.2.1 Foreign aid
In its earliest stage, development was 
equated with increases in per capita GDP. 
This became the main policy objective for 
the new independent countries in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Investment in the modern sector 
was emphasized as a key driver of economic 
growth with analyses based on Harrod-Domar 
type aggregated one-sector models (e.g. 
Rostow, 1956). On the basis that most African 
countries lacked the necessary physical and 
human capital to attract investment, aid was 
considered as the necessary and only means 
to provide capital resource transfers to those 
countries to attract investment and “propel 
them into self-sustained growth” (Thorbecke, 
2000). These efforts were followed by paying 
attention to particular sectors through project 
interventions for these sectors (e.g. health, 
education infrastructure and agriculture); 
systematic intervention by means of 
structural adjustment loans in the 1980s; and 
a shift towards good governance in the 1990s. 
Although studies on the effectiveness of aid 
for economic growth are inconclusive to date, 
some key insights have emerged over time.2 
2  For studies on the aid-growth nexus refer to Collier and 
Gunning 1992; Bevan, Collier and Gunning 1993; Boone, 
1996; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Easterly, 1999; Hansen 
and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard and Tarp, 2004; Burnside and 
Dollar, 2004; Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2004; Radelet 
et al., 2006; Rajan and Subramanian; 2007. 
Figure 1.  Key relationships and interactions
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For one thing, the original idea that large 
injections of foreign exchange unambiguously help 
African countries arrive at a sustainable path 
of development should be rejected on the 
basis of simple empirical facts. The World Bank 
(2000) shows that not less than 19 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa had negative growth rates 
during the 1985-1995 period, while at the 
same time both absolute aid flows as well as 
the average ratio of aid-to-GDP was far higher 
than anywhere else in the world. Moreover, 
countries in South-East Asia, India and China, 
as well as several Latin-American countries 
had, and in some cases continue to have, high 
growth rates without (large) inflows of foreign 
aid.3 
1.2.2 Institutions
A second insight that has emerged from 
the macro-economic literature is that of 
interactions between aid, institutional 
quality, civil wars and development. This 
notion received considerable attention from 
academic scholars in recent years. Nowadays, 
the fundamental role of institutions in 
development seems uncontested (Acemoglu 
et al., 2005). Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Nunn 
(2008) address the question why institutions in 
Africa are on average of poor quality and how 
“bad institutions” affect development today.4 
Institutions are believed to positively affect 
development outcomes by providing 
incentives that are conducive to economic 
efficiency; by providing law and order, property 
rights and political stability that is needed for 
long term investment; and by ensuring basic 
3  Easterly and Levine (1997) report that in the 1980s 
average GDP per capita in Africa was about three to five 
times lower than average per capita GDP in Latin-America 
and East-Asia respectively. 
4  They respectively refer to two historical events that 
explain Africa’s underdevelopment today. One points 
to adverse climatic and health conditions, which kept 
colonizers from setting up strong institutions. Instead, 
colonizers conceived predatory states focused on extrac-
tion. The second refers to the Trans-Atlantic slave trades 
between1400-1900. The argument is that Africa’s internal 
warfare, kidnappings and raidings to supply slaves caused 
states to collapse, increased ethnic fractionalization and 
hence explains poor institutions and underdevelopment 
today.
needs including basic education, health care 
and infrastructure required for economic 
activities (Thorbecke, 2000). Considerable 
improvements have been made with respect 
to the latter, showing up in aggregate 
statistics. Gross primary school enrollments 
by the year 2000 were close to that of other 
developing countries outside Africa at about 
85 percent (World Bank, 2000).5 Also there 
has been a clear drop in child mortality since 
independence. In 1960 one out of every four 
children under five would not reach five years 
of age. By 2005 the ratio had dropped to about 
one out of six. Although this still outnumbers 
other developing countries by a factor six, 
health conditions did (on average) improve 
substantially (Easterly, 2009). Yet, these 
successes have failed to translate into higher 
economic growth rates. This may suggest that 
other (institutional) elements act as severe 
impediments to development.
In addition to public goods provision and 
legal rules, there are different elements that 
constitute the institutional framework. These 
include cultural norms and conventions 
among others attitudes towards corruption 
or work ethics. Several studies have focused 
on the role of these arguably ‘softer’, less 
persistent elements of a state’s capacity 
including Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 
1995; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Brautigam 
and Knack, 2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 
2007; and Djankov et al., 2008. Negative 
correlations between institutions and 
development are commonly attributed to 
rent-seeking behavior of government elites. 
Some of the above-mentioned cross-national 
studies have attempted to establish a direct 
link. For example, high levels of corruption 
may negatively affect development through 
reduced (foreign) investment. Others have 
associated rent-seeking government officials 
with foreign aid (e.g. Svensson, 2000) or, as 
discussed next, civil wars. 
5  Gross Primary School enrollment is measured as all en-
rolled primary students, including those under- or over-
aged, as a percentage of the primary school age-group. 
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1.2.3 Civil war
One of the most widely cited economic papers 
on civil war is the greed and grievance paper 
by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). The authors try 
to explain civil war outbreaks from a set of 
‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ variables and find that 
variables associated with ‘greed’ have much 
more predictive power than those proxying 
‘grievance’. Interpretations of the results 
however vary widely. While Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) attribute the correlation of war with 
poverty, slow growth and a strong dependence 
on natural resources indeed to rent-seeking 
or ‘greed’, Fearon and Laitin (2003) consider 
them as proxies for low institutional capacity, 
that may lead to both greed and grievances. 
These two influential papers have inspired 
scholars worldwide to test both direct as well 
as indirect relations between development 
and civil warfare (refer to Blattman and Miguel 
2009 for an excellent overview on the civil war 
literature in economics and political science).6
1.3 Cross-country regressions and its pitfalls
The literature review has so far only 
considered cross-country studies. Until 
recently, economists routinely used cross-
national regression analyses to investigate 
the determinants of (under)development. Its 
popularity, particularly since the 1990s is easily 
explained. Quantitative data till then was scant 
for most African countries. Insofar as it existed, 
the only information available was usually 
macro-economic data. These types of data 
were, and still are, relatively easy accessible for 
researchers, at no or low costs. 
By now, cross-country analyses are heavily 
criticized (e.g. Easterly, 2009;  Roodman, 2008). 
I will briefly discuss some of the pitfalls that 
are widely noted in he literature. First, and 
possibly foremost, there is selection bias in 
the available data. A quick look at popular 
databases like the World Development 
6  In recent years, some studies have even attempted to 
estimate the ‘costs’ of war to assess its impact on develop-
ment and concluded that civil wars are ‘development in 
reverse’ (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003).
Indicators, OECD statistics or Penn World 
Tables reveals that data for many African 
countries is missing at least once at some point 
in time. Unsurprisingly, missing data of this 
kind is often systematic. That is, countries that 
are facing extreme poverty, are involved in a 
civil war or (and) have a notoriously autocratic 
ruler are less likely to have a continuous flow 
of annual data available than others. In cross-
country analyses these observations are 
dropped, leading to sample selection bias. 
Second, even though academics and 
policymakers may only be interested in 
assessing the influence of aid on institutions, 
say, most of the variables can plausibly influence 
each other. This form of endogeneity (reversed 
causality) has received much attention in the 
literature on aid, institutions, civil war, and 
their relation(s) to development. Instrumental 
Variable (IV) techniques are commonly used to 
address the problem at hand. One of the most 
famous cases in for example the cross-country 
civil war literature is the study by Miguel et 
al., (2004) that uses (exogenous) variation in 
annual rainfall as an instrument for economic 
growth. They find that negative income 
shocks significantly increase the risk of civil 
war in Africa. While weather conditions such 
as rainfall indeed are arguably exogenous, 
many of the cross-country analyses fall short 
of credible instruments (see e.g. Roodman, 
2008 for a discussion). 
Third, it is often unclear which specification 
to use. The influence of for example time-
invariant variables can lead to considerable 
variation in outcomes as I show in Chapter 3 
below. But also the omission of important time-
varying control variables can lead to a wrong 
interpretation of a significant effect. 
Fourth, confidence in cross-sectional 
estimates may be subverted if parameter 
heterogeneity is likely to be present and not 
(adequately) controlled for (Temple, 1998). 
That is, the relation between for example aid 
and institutions is arguably different for Ghana 
than the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Finally, although the cross-country literature 
has provided important insights on aggregate 
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determinants of development, it has little 
to say about the underlying mechanisms 
at work. Moreover, due to its aggregate 
nature if offers little guidance on individual 
or household incentives that may explain 
within-country variation of development. As 
a result, cross-country regressions these days 
are often viewed with a skeptical mind at 
best. The increased availability of micro-level 
data, through detailed surveys or randomized 
control trials, also plays a role here. 
1.4 Foreign aid, institutions and civil war at the 
micro level 
The next section reviews recent empirical 
studies on the three key themes (aid, 
institutions and civil war) executed at the 
grassroots level. 
1.4.1 Foreign aid
Household level surveys have been executed 
in Africa since the beginning of the 1980s. 
They range from large-scale initiatives from 
the World Bank such as the Living Standard 
Measurement Surveys (LSMS) to efforts much 
smaller in scope, by individuals or teams of 
researchers. The aim of these micro-level 
surveys is, put generally, to better understand 
household decision-making processes in a 
particular context at (a) particular time(s). 
Cross-sectional data is commonly used for 
these purposes but has well-known problems 
of omitted variables. Some are unobserved 
and thus unknown to the researcher; others 
may be observed but cannot be measured 
adequately through survey questions. Besides, 
households are only surveyed at one specific 
point in time, thus behavioral dynamics cannot 
be identified (Alderman et al., 2000). 
The last few years have seen a steep rise 
in quantitative data collection efforts to 
overcome these problems. A well-known 
extension of household surveys is to include 
experiments of some sort, to measure attitudes 
towards risk, trust, and cooperation.7 Another 
7  See Glaeser et al., (2000) for a discussion on the diver-
gence between survey and experimental outcomes on 
trust and trustworthiness. 
extension is the construction of panel data 
sets through two or more rounds of survey 
waves.  This serves to study dynamics over 
time and control for household unobserved 
characteristics. Examples include Dercon 
(1996) for Tanzania and Verwimp (2005) for 
Rwanda. Most recently attention has shifted 
to randomized trials and (quasi)-natural 
experiments (see e.g. Banerjee, 2007). 
True randomized control trials are now 
routinely used to evaluate the impact of 
small-scale aid interventions, including the 
provision of malaria nets, schoolbooks, school 
uniforms, medicines, agricultural extension, or 
microfinance loans. Examples are numerous 
(see e.g. Duflo et al., 2008), but a notable one is 
the study by Miguel and Kremer (2004) on de-
worming medicines in Kenya. They find that 
not only the program works but there are also 
substantial positive externalities from reduced 
disease transmission. This led to a dramatic 
increase in the programs’ cost-effectiveness. In 
spite of many successes however, there is also 
a considerable number of projects that have 
zero or even negative impacts (Rodrik, 2008). 
More importantly, the reasons why certain 
projects fail in some areas and not in others are 
often unknown. The role of local institutions 
therein seems obvious. Not only in and of 
itself, but also by providing the context in 
which small-scale (aid) projects or households 
operate (Chaudhury and Hammer, 2004). 
1.4.2 Institutions
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) investigate 
how institutions affect local development 
(i.e., schools and private firms respectively) 
and provide interesting insights into possible 
mechanisms. One of their studies deals with 
“leakages” of public sector spending on schools. 
They empirically test the hypothesis that 
local government officials capture the funds 
instead of delivering them to the intended 
beneficiaries (schools). Results suggest that 
on average 87 percent of annual per-student 
government grants were used for private gain 
or spend on non-educational purposes. The 
degree of leakages systematically varied with 
school size, socio-economic status of pupils’ 
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parents, and shares of unqualified teachers, 
suggesting that intended beneficiaries have 
some bargaining power over the distribution 
of funds. In another study Svensson (2002) 
studies the determinants of bribery across 
firms in Uganda and finds that the degree of 
bribery systematically varies with policies and 
regulations. Firms with more ties to public 
officials were more likely required to pay 
bribes than others. Moreover, these firms have 
lower growth rates than those who do not pay 
bribes.8 
These two examples address the direct link 
between the quality of local institutions and 
development. Others explicitly attempt to 
relate the local institutional environment 
to aid and development (Olken, 2008) or 
combine all three themes (Annan et al., 
2006; Fearon, 2009). Olken (2008) shows that 
the introduction of democratic decision-
making on aid projects in villages increases 
villagers’ contribution and contentment with 
the project. Fearon et al., (2009) investigate 
whether community driven reconstruction 
(CDR) programs (the establishment of new 
local institutions to address community needs) 
have an impact on social cohesion in the post-
war context of Liberia. They find that villages 
that received the CDR program contribute 
more in a public-goods game (used as a proxy 
for social cohesion) than the control villages. 
The research by Annan et al., (2006) was a 
large-scale project on war-affected youth in 
Uganda. The authors tentatively conclude that 
the success-rate of post-war reconstruction 
programs depends on the institutional context 
beneficiaries operate in. 
1.4.3 Civil war 
Annan’s and Fearon’s studies illustrate the 
importance of micro-level research to arrive 
at the right answers for what works best 
in particular (post-war) countries under 
particular circumstances. Randomized control 
8 A recent paper by Rajan and Subramanian (2007) re-
lates to this finding. In their study on the effects of aid 
on governance they find that more aid is associated with 
slower growth rates in highly government-dependent in-
dustries. 
trials may be relatively easy to implement to 
assess the effectiveness of aid programs or the 
importance of institutions, as shown above. 
This technique is however of limited use 
when assessing the impacts of warfare since 
researchers cannot randomly assign civil war 
to some, and not to others.9 
Perhaps because civil warfare cannot be 
randomly assigned by researchers, much 
effort has been devoted to finding plausible 
identification strategies. Some studies credibly 
take the view that civil war can be considered 
a natural experiment, thereby providing key 
insights into explaining its occurrence and 
its consequences. For identification Blattman 
and Beber (2010) for example exploit the near 
randomness in the abduction of child soldiers 
in Uganda to study the organization of rebel 
organisations. Lyall (2009) uses random 
incidents of Russian counterinsurgency 
artillery attacks in Chechnya as a natural 
experiment to test whether indiscriminate 
violence incites insurgent violence. 
An important question within the civil war 
literature is what drives people to go to war. 
Bazzi and Blattman (2008); Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2008); Dube and Vargas (2007) 
; Kalyvas (2006); Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2004); 
and Hafez (2003) are notable examples that 
investigate the determinants of rebellion or 
counter-rebellion. 
On the other hand, scholars are concerned with 
the consequences of civil warfare. Guerrero-
Serdán (2009) and Bundervoet, Verwimp and 
Akresh (2009) for example exploit exogenous 
variation in war exposure of children, (resulting 
from differences in years of birth and locations) 
to determine the impact of civil war on 
children’s health outcomes and find that civil 
war has strong negative impacts on children’s 
height-for-age scores. Kondylis (2008) 
examines the impact of the Rwandan genocide 
on human capital formation and also reports 
a strong negative impact. Related, Rodriguez 
9  Of course this does not imply that randomized control 
trials cannot be implemented in a post-war environment. 
The study by Fearon et al., (2009) is a prime example of 
this.  
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and Sanchez (2009) examine the impact of the 
Colombia conflict on the probability of school 
dropout and labor decisions and find that 
war-affected children are more likely to drop 
out early. Finally, Bellows and Miguel (2009) 
and Blattman (2009) estimate the effects of 
civil warfare on political participation and 
community cooperation, and find this to be 
much higher among victims of civil war than 
non-victims.     
1.5 Problem statement and objective 
Reviewing the literature shows a clear trend 
from identifying general patterns across 
countries to the near other end of the spectrum: 
examining under which specific conditions specific 
development interventions may or may not 
work in Africa. Additionally, researchers are 
increasingly concerned with assessing causal 
relationships at varying degrees of success. 
Macro-economists usually use instrumental 
variables while micro-economists rely on 
natural or quasi-natural experiments. 
A key gap in current economic scholarship on 
Africa however is the general lack of attention 
to underlying mechanisms that explain a 
significant correlation or causal relation. 
This applies to both macro- as well as micro-
empirical studies. For example even when we 
have established that there is a causal relation 
running from aid to growth, in order to design 
better policy we need to know what causes 
this effect, and whether it is a direct or indirect 
effect. Along similar lines, controlled or natural 
experiments may be useful to assess causality. 
However unless economic and (or) institutional 
conditions are also varied within treatment 
and control groups, not much may be learned 
about the underlying mechanisms that makes 
the program into a success or failure. 
The main objective of the study is to increase 
our understanding of three themes that are 
believed to play a key role in development: 
foreign aid, institutions and civil war. In addition 
I will examine their various interactions, and 
attempt to explain the underlying mechanisms. 
The sub goals are defined as follows:
1) ‘Unpack’ significant correlations by 
providing an increased insight into the various 
interactions between the three themes.  
2) Examine to what extent macro-and micro 
level research can converge in order to better 
understand underlying mechanisms. 
1.6 Methodology
I employ cross-country macro-economic data 
for a sample of Sub-Saharan African countries 
to analyze the impact of aid on institutional 
quality and civil war onset and duration 
respectively. Both papers have strong external 
validity by construction as they are concerned 
with Sub-Sahara Africa as a whole, instead 
of one particular country. They however are 
arguably weaker on internal validity, due to 
some of the issues discussed in section 1.3. 
I therefore complement the cross-country 
studies with three micro-level papers that 
focus on Burundi. These papers have a stronger 
internal validity, but one may argue that results 
do not necessarily extend beyond Burundi. 
I use national representative household and 
community level datasets in cross-section 
and panel regressions analyses. I attempt 
to contribute to a better understanding of 
the channels and directions of causality by 
investigating both (under)development as a 
cause as well as a consequence of civil war 
violence. I address the former by probing into 
the economic causes of rebel mobilization, 
and the latter by examining the economic 
legacies of civil warfare in the two final papers. 
The papers are organized in a methodological 
order, starting from cross-country macro-
empirics to micro-level case studies examining 
individual (household) behavior. 
1.7 Outline
In Chapter 2 I revisit the question of the 
impact of aid on institutional quality. Negative 
correlations between aid and institutional 
quality are often attributed to rent-seeking 
behavior by bureaucrats, moral hazard type 
of problems and weakened accountability 
16     Introduction
through a reduced tax base. Studies examining 
this phenomenon are conceptually related to 
literature on the presumed ‘resource curse’ 
(e.g. Auty, 1990; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Ross, 
2001; Alessina and Weder, 2002; Brautigam and 
Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008). There has 
been contrasting evidence as well however, 
including work by Tavares (2003); Dunning 
(2004); and Dalgaard and Olson (2008). We are 
interested in addressing the question what 
happens once aid money is in the hands of 
the recipient government. These effects, we 
argue, are likely to appear in the short rather 
than the long run. We use annual data from 
1985-2005 on corruption, bureaucratic quality 
and the rule of law to construct a measure 
of governance quality for a sample of 30 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Fixed effects 
instrumental variable regressions as well as 
dynamic GMM specifications are employed 
to assess causality. We find that aid affects 
governance positively and significantly in the 
short run. This provides some confidence in 
the data as well as in the estimation strategies; 
the result does not seem to be driven by 
particularities in the data nor by a specific 
choice of model specification.   
The paper in Chapter 3 examines whether aid 
affects civil warfare on-set and (or) duration. 
The paper builds on earlier work by Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002) who examine the effect 
of aid on war start-ups.  We empirically test 
two hypotheses; the first states that aid 
augments governments’ access to financial 
resources thereby increasing the size of the 
prize to be gained upon overthrowing the 
government. This may induce rent-seeking 
behavior among (potential) rebels and as 
such increases the chances of violent uproar. 
The second hypothesis conceives that under 
the assumption of fungible aid, governments 
may use the money to increase their army 
surplus and gain so much strength that this 
has a deterring effect on rebellion. Rebels 
wage their chances and will not fight if the 
chances of winning are sufficiently small. The 
paper extends Collier and Hoefflers’ work in 
at least two ways: 1) we explicitly deal with 
the problem of reversed causality using 
variation in GDP levels of major aid donors as 
a credible instrument for foreign aid flows, and 
2) we separate determining factors on a civil 
wars’ start-up from those that may influence 
its duration, including state and duration 
dependence. Results show that there is no 
effect of aid on war start-ups, but that aid does 
tend to shorten its duration. Although not 
explicitly accounted for, it is speculated that 
sustained or even increased aid flows during 
war enable governments to increase their 
military strength and hence induce a “quick” 
victory. 
In Chapter 4 I try to shed more light on the 
question of what causes people to go to war. 
Armed with a nationally representative panel 
dataset on Burundi we test whether reduced 
coffee prices in Burundi provide incentives to 
join a warring faction, using unique village 
level recruitment data. The few other empirical 
micro-level studies include Deiniger (2003) 
who finds that communities with lower levels 
of human capital were more prone to civil 
strife in Uganda between 1992 and 1999 than 
others; Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan (2004) who 
find a correlation between unemployment 
and low levels of literacy and local conflict 
in Indonesia; Do and Iyer (2006) who report 
positive correlates between poverty levels and 
illiteracy prior to the outbreak of the Maoist 
insurgency; Dube and Vargas (2007) who 
find that increased coffee prices in Colombia 
decrease the probability that conflict takes 
place in coffee areas while increased oil prices 
have the opposite effect; and Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2008) who examine individual 
determinants of participation in rebellion and 
counter-rebellion for a large sample of ex-
and noncombatants from Sierra Leone. They 
find that grievances are not an important 
motivation, but poverty levels and community 
pressure are, both for individuals joining 
rebel groups and for those who involve in 
counterinsurgencies. 
We use information about recruitment and 
violence, collected at the village level. This 
clearly overlooks individual incentives to 
fight, and hence can only partially address the 
question whether reduced opportunity costs 
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are conducive to fighting.10 Nevertheless, a 
systematic pattern at the village level already 
provides important insights into the possible 
mechanisms that promote recruitment. The 
paper exploits cross-section data to test proxies 
of reduced opportunity costs and historical 
grievances that may explain recruitment 
activities. We find that historical grievances 
proxied by incidents of armed violence in 
1972 and 1988 respectively, cannot predict 
recruitment during the civil war some years 
later. We however do find a positive significant 
correlation between recruitment and the 
incidence of drought. Communities with more 
than average occurrences of drought are 
more likely to have recruitment activities than 
others. We subsequently use panel data to test 
the hypothesis that reduced opportunity costs 
explain recruitment into rebel organizations. 
We find partial support for this idea. A decrease 
in coffee prices has no robust relation with a 
higher probability of recruitment in coffee 
regions. By contrast, we show that negative 
rainfall shocks are associated with a higher 
probability of recruitment. This is consistent 
with recent observations in the cross-country 
literature. 
Chapter 5 examines the legacies of the Burundi 
civil war for households’ decision-making with 
respect to entrepreneurship and investments 
in public goods. In this paper I investigate to 
what extent civil strife affects farmers’ activity 
portfolios in the aftermath of violence.  As put 
forward by Collier (1999) civil war tends to 
‘push’ economic activities towards subsistence 
level or autarky for various reasons. For one 
thing, subsistence level activities are typically 
less sensitive to damages caused by civil strife. 
For example, subsistence agriculture is not, 
10  Excellent studies by Blattman(2009) and Humphreys 
and Weinstein (2008) however do provide extensive infor-
mation about recruitment using samples of ex-combat-
ants alongside non-combatants. We have a slightly dif-
ferent focus though. We are not interested in comparing 
participants to non-participants and hence investigate to 
what extent initial conditions such as schooling or poverty 
systematically vary between ex-fighters and non-fighters. 
Yet, we want to know under which circumstances farm-
ers decide not to farm anymore but to take up arms and 
only then distinguish themselves from those that remain 
as farmers.   
or, arguably less, dependent on the presence 
of well-functioning roads, nor does it need 
to rely on a strong social network, for the 
provision of loans, clientele, and inputs. Civil 
war devastates the economic environment 
people are operating in, due to the physical 
destruction of infrastructure and institutions. 
Civil warfare can however also disrupt social 
ties as a result of displacement, migration, or 
mistrust, and hence have a (double) negative 
effect on diversification of income. On the 
other hand, recent evidence shows that 
civil war not necessarily has a detrimental 
impact on social networks and community 
cohesion, nor does it need to ruin individual 
ambitions to leap forward in life. We study 
crop-portfolios over time and compare war-
affected households to households not 
directly affected by the civil war in Burundi. The 
paper focuses exclusively on crop portfolios 
because in Burundi over 90 percent of all 
rural households rely on agriculture as their 
main source of income. Yet there is substantial 
variation in agricultural portfolios (subsistence 
versus cash crop farming including coffee, tea, 
or tobacco). In contrast to other empirical 
micro-level studies on this topic (including 
Deiniger, 2003 and Bozzoli and Brück, 2009) 
we do not find that households revert back to 
subsistence agriculture. Households exposed 
to violence in their community are more likely 
to have become cash crop farmers after the 
war ended and have larger shares of cash 
crop income than those not exposed. Also, 
civil war exposure is positively associated with 
investments in public goods like schools and 
soil conservation measures suggesting that 
social cohesion increased as a result of the war. 
The latter result is interpreted as a possible 
channel through which increased cash crop 
adoption may have occurred. 
In chapter 6 I present a study that reflects 
a recent trend in development economics; 
(natural) experimental design to infer the 
causal impact of (a) shock(s) on human 
behavior. Based on the aforementioned survey 
data from Burundi we rely on a (quasi-) natural 
experimental design to determine how civil 
war experience (re)shapes human behavior 
18     Introduction
and possibly preferences. Although we could 
not randomly ‘allocate’ exposure to violence, 
the nature of the violence in Burundi allows us 
to treat exposure to violence at the village level 
as exogenous, meaning that the chance that a 
village got attacked does not systematically 
vary with observed or unobserved individual 
or household characteristics. The quasi-
experiment finds that individuals directly 
exposed to civil war violence display more 
altruism, are more risk-seeking over gains, 
and have higher rates of time preference. 
This provides tentative evidence of shifting 
preferences as a result from war. The paper 
moves beyond current scholarship by 
complementing the standard collection of 
survey data with data from behavioral games.
The concluding chapter 7 reviews the results, 
and aims to integrate them in order to flesh out 
the thesis’ contribution to the current debate 
on development. Moreover, it offers guidance 
for future research and policy.  
2
Can Aid Improve Governance
 in the Short Term?11
Abstract
We estimate the short-term impact of aid on the quality of governance using yearly panel data of 30 sub-
Saharan African countries for the period 1985-2005.  Unlike many earlier studies, our estimates show that 
aid has a positive effect on the quality of governance, at least in the short run.  Our results are robust to 
alternative specifications and different measures of aid dependency.  We speculate these effects are due to 
income and conditionality effects, increasingly so in recent years. Aid specifically seems to be effective in 
decreasing corruption and improving the rule of law.
11  This paper was co-authored with Maarten Voors, Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, 6706 KN 
Wageningen, the Netherlands
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1. Introduction
Over the past 50 years, sub-Saharan Africa has 
been the largest recipient of foreign aid. In 
many African countries aid makes up a large 
share of the government budget.  Moss and 
Subramanian (2005) report that 16 African 
countries (classified as low-income countries) 
receive aid flows to at least 50 percent of total 
government expenditure. In ten countries 
classified as “poor” the ratio was even 75 
percent or more.  Yet, the region suffers 
from more political instability, civil wars and 
stagnant economic development than any 
other continent.  While these phenomena 
need not be related in any causal sense, the 
observation of a negative correlation between 
aid and development outcomes has motivated 
vast amounts of research in recent years.  It 
is hard to overstate the relevance of such 
research now that global aid flows have fully 
recovered from the 1990s post Cold War drop, 
and are expected to increase substantially 
in the coming decade (Riddell, 2007).   The 
overall picture of research efforts linking aid to 
economic growth appears inconclusive (e.g. 
Boone,1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2004; Easterly 
et al., 2004 amongst others).  The literature is 
replete with methodological pitfalls, including 
multicollinearity issues and endogeneity 
concerns (Roodman, 2008). However, research 
has progressed and is increasingly able to 
capture such concerns. Interestingly though, 
as the degree of econometric sophistication 
increased, conclusive evidence has become 
scarcer.  The most recent studies find no 
evidence of any effect of aid on growth (e.g. 
Rajan and Subramanian, 2007).  
The absence of an aggregate growth 
effect does not imply that aid is neutral to 
development.  Evidence suggests foreign aid 
might contribute to important causes such 
as poverty alleviation (e.g. Collier and Dollar, 
2002) and the promotion of peace (de Ree and 
Nillesen, 2009). Another lively field of research 
concerns the impact of aid on institutional 
quality.  Scholars now widely acknowledge the 
pivotal role of institutions in development (e.g. 
Mauro ,1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and 
Levine, 2003; and Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi, 2004). A natural question then is 
whether development assistance influences 
institutional quality, thereby affecting 
development indirectly. 
To date, empirical results in this field have 
been mixed. Many of the early studies on the 
aid-institution nexus found a negative effect 
of aid on institutional quality. For example, 
Knack (2001) demonstrated for a sample 
of developing countries that aid decreased 
institutional quality for the period 1982-1995. 
Bräutigam and Knack (2004) examined aid 
and institutional quality in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
again concluding that aid reduces institutional 
quality, arguing that high aid inflows may 
create moral hazard type problems, impede 
budget reforms and weaken the development 
of local pressures for accountability and 
reform.  Aid may also undermine institutions 
by poaching of qualified staff, or fragmentation 
of recipient countries’ policy agendas.  Their 
study is based on a cross-section analysis 
regressing the change in institutional quality 
over the period 1985-1997 on average (scaled) 
aid flows.  Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2008) explain institutional variation 
for an extended period of time. They account 
for shorter-term influences on institutions 
by decomposing the sample period into 
blocks of 5 years. The authors show that aid is 
negatively associated with political freedom 
and checks on government, and attribute 
the negative effect to rent-seeking activities 
of bureaucrats.  A related channel by which 
aid may reduce the quality of governance 
is through corruption. Alesina and Weder 
(2002) use a yearly panel (1984-1995) and 
report that aid increases corruption. Svensson 
(2000) reports similar results but finds that the 
negative effect of aid is limited to ethnically 
fragmented countries.12  
There is, however, contrasting evidence as 
well.  Tavares (2003) finds that aid actually 
decreases corruption. He provides two reasons 
for this result. First, aid flows may temporarily 
relax binding budget constraints. Increased 
salaries for example, may reduce incentives 
12  His explanation is that countries that have more com-
peting social groups are more likely to get involved in 
rent-seeking activities for aid.
Can Aid Improve Governance in the Short Term?     21
for corruption by civil servants (Tavares, 
2003).  Second, many of today’s aid flows are 
earmarked and conditional on fulfilling specific 
donors needs. Monitoring aid disbursements 
to recipient institutions decreases possibilities 
for corruption.  Similarly, incentives for 
corruption are attenuated as current 
institutional performance serves as a condition 
for continued assistance.  These findings are 
corroborated by Dalgaard and Ollson (2008) 
who also find that aid decreases corruption. 
They too speculate that this may be due to 
increased conditionality in aid disbursements. 
The conditionality argument is developed 
further by Dunning (2004). Using a yearly 
panel he shows that following the end of the 
cold war, aid decreased corruption.  Dunning 
concludes that the collapse of the East-West 
divide caused recipient governments to lose 
their bargaining position so that withholding 
future aid flows became a credible threat.  This 
allowed large donors to allocate aid more 
selectively, based on performance rather 
than geopolitical alliances.  At the same time, 
institutional improvement has become an 
objective of aid. From the 1990s on, bilateral 
donors and the international financial 
institutions (such as the World Bank and IMF) 
have begun to actively pursue the reduction 
of corruption, improvement of rule of law, and 
administration in recipient countries. 
In sum, the literature on aid and institutions 
has produced inconclusive results. In part, 
these conflicting findings are due to the 
simple fact that the exact interpretation of 
the term “institutions” is open to debate. 
Institutions refer to a broad spectrum of social 
constructs, ranging from ‘deep and durable’ 
rules governing decision-making in societies, 
such as norms, mores and traditions, to more 
transient institutional arrangements reflecting 
policy choices and contracts (Williamson 
2000). The former view, associated with 
Glaeser et al. (2004), sees institutions as 
durable features of economies – reasonably 
permanent and relatively unchanging. The 
latter view sees institutions as stock variables 
in a state of constant flux with dynamics 
governed by policy choices (as argued by 
Knack and Keefer 1995; and Rodrik et al., 
2004).  We take the latter view and focus on 
the analysis of governance (i.e., the most 
transient segment of the institutions universe) 
using annual governance data.  We emphasize 
that this does not preclude the fact that other 
institutional elements are more persistent and 
tend to change much more slowly in response 
to outside pressures, but rather that both are 
present. We focus our attention on the quality 
of economic institutions – such as rule of law 
and the quality of bureaucrats – as there are 
arguably distinct from political institutions – 
i.e., democratic or autocratic regime. In fact, 
there is little evidence that suggests positive 
feedbacks between political and economic 
institutions (see Przeworski and Limongi, 
1993; Barro, 1996; and Durham, 1999). Work 
by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Clague 
et al. (1996) presents convincing evidence to 
justify this distinction.13  
In this paper we investigate whether variation 
in annual governance data can be explained 
by foreign aid flows.  We create a yearly 
panel to capture any short-term impacts of 
aid, possibly obscured when the focus is on 
average values over longer time frames.14 
Using panel data allows us to hone in on 
within-country-variation in certain variable(s) 
of interest by controlling for unobserved 
persistent particularities of recipient countries. 
We hereby substantially reduce the potential 
danger of falsely attributing significance to 
our findings.  We extend upon existing studies 
by looking at the effect of aid on institutions 
along four dimensions.  We (i) increase the 
time frame of the analysis, (ii) use fixed effects 
estimators to control for unobserved country 
characteristics correlated with aid flows as 
well as the quality of governance, (iii) employ 
a broader measure of governance, and (iv) 
address the looming endogeneity issue by 
using a set of appropriate instruments. 
We focus on Sub-Saharan Africa as the 
continent is by the far the largest recipient of 
13  We include regime type as a control variable.
14  There appears to be substantial annual variation in 
governance quality. Liberia for instance in 2001managed 
to curb corruption and moved from a score of 2 to 5. A 
year later however, the government loosened the reigns 
and fell back to a score of 2. By contrast, Ethiopia knew a 
brief period in which the rule of law dropped three levels 
and returned five years later.
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foreign aid and poses the greatest challenge to 
improve governance.  Also, there is substantial 
evidence, specifically within the aid-growth 
literature, that sub-Saharan African countries 
are unique, a point testified by a typically 
negative and significant sub-Sahara Africa 
dummy in many growth regressions. Collier 
and Gunning (1999) argue that Africa’s slow 
growth is partly explained by the often low 
levels of growth regressors. If the continent 
is distinct from other regions, a focus on Sub-
Saharan Africa then enables us to address 
issues of parameter heterogeneity present in 
world wide samples, as we explain variation 
in aid and governance within the region (see 
Moss, Petterson and van der Walle 2006).  
Our results are strong and robust. We find a 
positive and significant impact of aid on the 
quality of governance in the short run. Our 
results are robust across several specifications, 
using alternative measures of aid dependency 
(e.g. aid per capita and aid over government 
budget) and various instrumental variables. 
Following Tavares (2003) and Dalgaard and 
Olssen (2008), we speculate these effects 
are likely due to income and conditionality 
effects, especially in recent years. We too 
find that the positive influence of aid on the 
quality of governance is indifferent to regime 
type.  We decompose our institutional quality 
variable into its three indicators (i) corruption, 
(ii) rule of law and (iii) bureaucratic quality, to 
account for potential differential impacts of 
aid that may be obscured by looking at the 
composite ICRG index.15 Running separate 
regressions on these variables, we find the 
governance results are driven by  substantial 
improvements in corruption control and the 
rule of law. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly 
outline our empirical strategy and discuss 
our data.  Section 3 presents the main OLS 
and 2SLS estimates as well as some additional 
15 Interestingly, Olken (2009) finds that ‘subjective’ mea-
sures of corruption (i.e., reported individual perceptions), 
show little correlation with more ‘objective measures (i.e., 
actual missing expenditures in an Indonesian road-build-
ing project). Also, conditioning variables (e.g. ethnic het-
erogeneity and participation in social activities have a dif-
ferent relationship with corruption perceptions, than they 
do with objective measures. This suggests that we should 
be cautious in our interpretation of the data.
specifications which suggest that increases 
in aid result in improvements in institutional 
quality.  Section 4 concludes.
2. Estimation Framework 
2.1 Identification strategy 
We assess the impact of (lagged) aid flows on 
institutional quality in country i , at time t  using 
annual data.  We start with specification (1):
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is the lagged aid to GDP ratio in
logs, 1, −tiG  is the level of governance quality at 
1t − , 1, −tiX  is a vector of time-variant country 
characteristics lagged one year, tλ  are time 
dummies and ti ,ε  is a normally distributed 
error term.
We expect unobserved country-specific 
effects including colonial history, ethnic and 
religious fractionalization, and culture to be 
correlated with governance quality and the 
regressors. OLS estimates of equation (1) then 
leads to biased estimates. In other words, 
when 
€ 
E α i xit[ ] ≠ 0  the random effects (FGLS) 
estimator will provide inconsistent estimates 
and the “within” estimator should be used. 
This is confirmed by a Hausman test, which 
rejects the random effects model in favor of 
a fixed effects specification.16 We therefore 
look at variation within countries across time, 
by including country dummies (fixed effects). 
In all regressions standard errors are robust 
to both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation (HAC). Equation (2) presents 
the fixed effects model:
16 Results for the Hausman test: Chi2(9) = 35.36***
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Where iα denotes the country-specific 
intercept.  Figure 1 shows that within countries 
more aid in proportion to GDP is associated 
with a higher quality of governance. Note that 
this positive and significant correlation has no 
causal interpretation as we merely remove the 
country- and time- fixed effects here. Yet, this 
result provides an interesting starting point 
for our analysis. 
While fixed effect estimation partially controls 
for omitted variable bias, it does not address 
potential reverse causality concerns. Aid 
may influence a recipients’ country level 
of governance, but donors may also direct 
aid to countries that already demonstrated 
to have sound institutions, i.e., a selectivity 
effect.17 Most existing work has either ignored 
endogeneity concerns, or tackled it via 
instruments that capture recipient country 
initial conditions.  For example, Alesina and 
Weder (2002) argue that reverse causality “is 
not problematic” as corrupt governments are 
unlikely to attract more aid. However, this 
conjecture is not supported by our data.  Also, 
aid may be endogenous due to measurement 
17  Dollar and Levin (2006) for example find suggestive 
evidence for increased selectivity amongst donors over 
time. Our identification strategy however prevents us to 
shed further light on this issue. 
error and omitted variables, necessitating 
an instrumental variables approach.  Most 
subsequent papers (e.g. Bräutigam and Knack 
2004, Djankov et al. 2008), employ instruments 
commonly used in the growth literature: initial 
population and income, infant mortality, 
literacy, and variables that reflect historical 
relations and strategic interests of donors 
(e.g., colony dummies).18  We however, argue 
against the use of these variables as they ‘drop 
out’ in a fixed effects model specification. 
Also, research has shown that (at least some 
of them) are likely endogenous to institutional 
quality. La Porta (1999) for example, argues that 
infant mortality and literacy may serve as valid 
proxies for the quality of governance, thereby 
suggesting a direct linkage with governance. 
A direct link would invalidate the exclusion 
restriction and hence render these types of 
instruments inappropriate. Tavares (2003) 
uses the sum of total aid flows dtAid  from ten 
important OECD donors d in year t  multiplied 
by characteristics of each donor-recipient 
country pair (e.g. the inverse of geographical 
distance, common religion, common language, 
shared border and colonial ties).  This yields a 
time-variant and country-specific instrument 
for foreign aid.  Along similar lines, Rajan and 
Subramanian (2007) use total aid outflows 
multiplied by variables that capture strategic 
interests (current and past colonial relationship 
with the donor and a common language) and 
recipient needs (proxied by relative population 
size), divided by the GDP level of the recipient 
country. To our knowledge the instrument by 
Rajan and Subramanian is, to date, the most 
appropriate instrument for aid available.  For 
our model we use a slightly revised version 
of      their instrument as some of the variables 
are not applicable to our African sample. 
The instrument is constructed as follows (3): 
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where tdAid ,  is the total aid outflows of donor 
18  See for example Burnside and Dollar (2000); Hansen 
and Tarp (2001); Clements et al., (2004); and Easterly et al. 
(2004). 
Figure 1.  Residual plot of OLS regressions of aid and gov-
ernance quality on a full set of country- and time dum-
mies
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country19 d in year t, iθ  represents dummies 
for colonial relations and donor population 
size relative to recipient population size 20, 
tiGDP ,  measures recipient country GDP levels 
in year t.  
2.2 The data
We use data from 30 sub-Saharan African 
countries for the period 1985-2005.21  Table 1 
summarizes our key variables.  For a detailed 
description of our data and sources see the 
appendix. 
A key variable in the analysis is our proxy of 
governance. Over the last few decades several 
indicators have been developed aiming to 
capture the quality of institutions. The most 
often used index is the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), which has data for the 
post 1985 era. The ICRG is constructed and 
published monthly by the Political Risk Services 
group, rating information on political risks for 
overseas investors and lenders. Glaeser et al., 
(2004) show that the ICRG index reflects short-
term changes in governance, such as policies 
to reduce corruption, maintain the rule of law 
and invest in human capital of bureaucrats. 
Other studies have related the ICRG data to 
income (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001; Knack and 
Keefer, 1995); aid effectiveness (Bräutigam 
and Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008) and 
aid allocation (Alesina and Weder, 2002; and 
Dollar and Levin, 2006).  
The ICRG index is a composite measure of 
three variables: rule of law, corruption and 
bureaucratic quality, measuring institutional 
quality in a scale ranging 0-18, where higher 
19  We use five important donors to sub-Saharan Africa: 
USA, UK, France, Belgium and Portugal.
20  Common language is excluded as it stands in a close 
relationship to our colony dummy. There are also no cur-
rent colonial relationships between western donors and 
sub-Saharan Africa countries.
21  We initially included South Africa, and Somalia as well, 
covering all sub-Saharan Africa countries for which the 
ICRG index is available. However, South Africa received no 
aid until the year 1993 and for Somalia hardly any data for 
our control variables are available. We therefore exclude 
these countries from our final estimations. Results are 
qualitatively the same, albeit less strong if these countries 
are included.
scores reflect a higher quality or governance. 
We also use these indicators separately as 
dependents, each measured on a 6 point 
scale. January ratings are used for each year 
between 1985 and 2005.  There are only a 
few countries that have high ICRG at the 
beginning of our sample period; South Africa 
and Botswana had a 1985 score of 12.5 and 12 
points respectively.  By contrast the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, 
Sudan and Uganda all had 1985 scores below 
4. Mean ICRG score for our sample is 7.3 with a 
standard deviation of 2.75 (see Table 1).
The 1985 and 2005 values of the ICRG (start 
and end-points in our sample) do not differ 
much when looking at the sub-Saharan Africa 
averages.  However, focusing on these values 
alone, as one would do in a cross-sectional 
specification, obscures the variation of 
institutional quality for the years in between. 
Indeed, simple graphs as depicted in Figure 2 
confirm that there is considerable  variation of 
this type. 
Our main explanatory variable is the ratio 
of aid relative to GDP, measured in current 
PPP adjusted US$. Our measure of foreign 
aid is Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
in proportion to recipient countries’ GDP in 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics
Note: Countries included in our sample are Angola, Bo-
tswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Dem. Rep., 
Congo, Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagas-
car, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Obser-
vations 
Governance quality 7.34 2.97 619 
Corruption 2.50 10.5 619 
Rule of law 2.79 1.17 619 
Bureaucratic quality 2.05 1.43 619 
Aid to GDP (%) 11.85 10.32 619 
Aid per capita (current US 
$) 3939.44 3136.35 630 
Aid to government 
expenditure 108.60 105.88 511 
Population (mln) 16.29 20.62 630 
GDP per capita growth 0.02 5.98 620 
Violence (% observations 
that had violent conflict) 0.23  672 
Regime type (% 
observations that had a 
democratic regime) 
0.32  630 
Primary exports to GDP 0.19     0.16           613 
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current US dollars.  About 75% of ODA flows 
consist of bilateral aid. Some countries are 
highly aid dependent, and countries like 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique and 
Somalia received on average over 50% of 
their GDP as aid during some years of the 
sample period.  As bilateral aid makes up the 
lions’ share of ODA, countries may be strongly 
dependent on particular donors. 
The aid to GDP ratio reflects the magnitude 
of aid flows relative to other resources at a 
governments’ disposal.  Sudden spurs of GDP 
growth can influence this ratio.  If aid flows are 
stable over time, increasing levels of recipient 
GDP translate to a smaller ratio.  We control 
for this potential effect by using an alternative 
measure of aid dependency.  We include per 
capita GDP growth levels lagged one year to 
account for a potential income effect of aid 
on institutional quality. A plausible channel 
through which increased economic activity 
may positively affect institutional quality is 
through the development of commercial 
codes and their associated contracting and 
enforcement. Furthermore, Bräutigam and 
Knack (2004) argue that where corruption, 
bureaucratic quality and rule of law are less 
observable for the ICRG surveyors, they may 
partially impute its value from a countries’ 
economic performance. We therefore include 
per capita growth to control for the influence 
of income growth on governance.  Population 
levels are included to capture potential effects 
associated with the size of a country; (i.e., 
smaller countries receive relatively more aid 
than larger countries and governments in 
smaller countries may be held accountable 
more easily. See Bräutigam and Knack (2004).  
As additional controls we include a measure 
of political violence (civil conflict) from the 
PRIO-Uppsala database, a primary export 
dependence variable and a measure of 
political institutions. Conflict can attract 
aid flows for humanitarian needs and post-
conflict rehabilitation, or temporarily put aid 
on hold if a country is in conflict. Conflict can 
simultaneously affect governance (e.g. by 
overthrowing the government currently in 
power, through destruction of the bureaucratic 
apparatus or high levels of corruption in a 
state of chaos). We use a dummy variable 
which is unity when a country experienced 
more than 25 battle-related deaths during a 
particular year. Primary exports relative to GDP 
are included to capture resource-curse type 
effects. We include rents from oil separately 
as oil is claimed to have particular properties 
associated with less democracy that does not 
necessarily hold for other minerals (Djankov 
et al., 2008; Ross 2001). Aid may potentially 
have a different impact on institutional quality 
under various regime types (Goldsmith, 2001; 
Dunning 2004).  We use the Polity IV database 
and include a dummy in our model, taking 
unity if a country in a given year was governed 
under democracy, and zero for autocratic rule.
3. Results
3.1 Regressing governance on aid
We present our main regression results in 
Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) show the OLS 
estimations, where we regress change in 
governance on aid flows and a full set of 
country and time dummies. We find a positive 
correlation between our governance index 
and the aid inflows a country receives.  Our 
results hold up when we include country level 
controls (column 2). As is well known, the 
OLS results are likely to be inconsistent due 
to potential reverse causality, i.e., significant 
results have no causal interpretation but rather 
reflect (conditional) correlations between aid 
and governance.  Indeed, the null hypothesis of 
Fig 2. Governance (ICRG) data, annual percentage 
change of ICRG levels
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consistent OLS estimates is strongly rejected.22 
We however present OLS results nonetheless 
to show that our significant findings in the 
preferred 2SLS regressions are not due to the 
instrumentation strategy. 
Column (3)-(5) present our 2SLS results. 
Aid is associated with positive changes in 
governance.  Aid increases the quality of 
governance. More specifically in column (3) 
we find that a 2.2 percent increase in the aid-
to-GDP -ratio leads to, all else equal, a one level 
improvement in ICRG.23  Our results are similar 
to Tavares (2003) and Dalgaard and Olsson 
(2008), who find that aid decreases corruption. 
Both authors contribute the positive effect of 
aid on countries’ institutions to conditionality 
effects. Increased donor scrutiny may decrease 
the possibilities for clientalism, bribery or poor 
service. As we employ a broader measure of 
governance, we extend upon their findings 
and state that aid increases the quality of other 
elements of governance as well.  We will return 
to this issue below.  
In column (4) we include the initial level of 
governance quality. We find the initial level 
of governance is negatively correlated with a 
subsequent change in governance, indicating 
regression to the mean effects (i.e., the 
tendency of the governance score to revert to 
some equilibrium value).24  
Note that the coefficients in our IV-estimates 
are larger than those in the OLS regressions. 
This is consistent with the empirical finding 
that donors do not systematically allocate 
more aid to countries with good institutions, 
which introduces a downward bias in the OLS 
results.25  Also, measurement error in the aid 
to GDP ratio may cause OLS estimates to be 
22  We use a common Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, p-value 
= 0.000 
23  As most cross-country regression results appear to be 
sensitive to specification changes (see Roodman, 2008) 
for extensive discussion and empirical evidence) we check 
for outliers using the commonly applied method of Hadi 
(2004). Outcomes are qualitatively the same (results not 
shown).  
24  We also estimated our baseline specification in levels. 
Results are reported in Appendix B.  
25  On the other hand, one would neither expect donors 
to allocate more aid to countries whose governance they 
anticipate to deteriorate. The larger 2SLS coefficients are 
therefore interpreted as a result of measurement error.
attenuated towards zero.  However, Pande 
and Udry (2006) note that if the included 
instruments are positively correlated with 
omitted variables and have the same sign 
as the endogenous (aid) variable, IV may 
overestimate the true effect. In this light we 
view our 2SLS results as an upper bound.
Consistent with earlier studies we also find 
that per capita growth is associated with 
improvements in governance (see Helliwell, 
1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; and 
Chong and Calderon, 2000 for empirical 
evidence).26 One hypothesis is that in order 
for judiciary systems to adequately protect 
property rights they require growth in trade and 
industry, which facilitates institutional creation 
and development. Furthermore, governance 
quality may be overstated in countries with 
strong growth: i.e., experts rating governance 
assign a high score to countries experiencing 
rapid growth (Mauro, 1995; Chong and 
Calderon 2000).27   Additionally, Mauro (1995) 
argues that good economic performance may 
increase institutional efficiency irrespective of 
how institutional quality is assessed.28 We also 
find that political institutions have no effect 
on institutional quality, resonating findings 
elsewhere (e.g. Mauro, 1995; Glaque et al., 
1996; and Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). 
Column (5) presents the results for an 
alternative measure of aid dependency: aid 
as a fraction of government expenditures. The 
result confirms that the positive effect in our 
base specifications is not due to changes in 
GDP levels,  (i.e.,  if aid or other factors  would 
affect a country’s national income level, the aid 
to GDP ratio would “mechanically” drop (rise) 
as the denominator would increase (decrease) 
while aid flows may have stayed the same.  
26  Though consistent with theory and several empirical 
findings, per capita growth is likely endogenous to gov-
ernance quality and we therefore put too much weight 
on this result in isolation. Rather, the variable has been 
included to control for potential omitted variable bias. 
27  See also Fearon and Laitin (2003) for a similar line of 
reasoning: they interpret GDP per capita as a proxy for the 
state’s overall financial and administrative capabilities.  
28  See for example also North (1990) who, amongst oth-
ers, argued that considerable economic development oc-
curred prior to the creation of democracies, the bureau-
cracy, and rule of law. 
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We check for the appropriateness of our 
instruments using a standard  test  of 
overidentifying restrictions.29 To this end we 
require an additional instrument.  We here 
follow de Ree and Nillesen (2009) who plausibly 
argue that aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa are 
likely to be related to the GDP of important 
donors.30 Including the log of donor GDP of the 
US shows that our instruments easily pass the 
overidentification test at conventional levels, 
confirming that our instruments indeed satisfy 
29  We use a Sargan test which is included in the IVREG2 
Stata package developed by Baum et al., (2003)
30  The intuition is as follows. Donor GDP is likely to be 
correlated with aid flows as many donors commit to of-
ficial development assistance as a certain fraction of their 
income Following the recognition that aid is a prerequisite 
for development, donor countries at the end of the 1960s 
agreed to allocate 0.7% of GNI to development assistance. 
Even though only a couple of countries actually meet or 
exceed the agreed target (e.g. Denmark, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, donors do commit to a certain 
fraction).
the required orthogonality conditions.  To 
further investigate our instrumental variables, 
Table A in the appendix presents the first 
stage regressions for our model. F-statistics 
are all well above 10 suggesting that our 
instruments are strong. In other words, the 
total supply of aid by Africa’s most important 
donors is highly correlated with the average 
level of aid allocated to the individual African 
recipient country. 
3.2 Regressing sub-indices of governance on 
aid 
We continue our analysis by regressing our 
aid variable on each of the three sub-indices 
that make up the ICRG composite index, 
corruption, bureaucratic quality, and rule of 
law. Limiting our analysis to the ICRG index 
alone could potentially mask a differential 
effect of aid on these components. Column (1) 
shows, similar to Tavares (2003) and Dalgaard 
and Olsson (2008), that a higher level of aid 
reduces corruption. Increased aid inflows often 
come with greater donor scrutiny, thereby 
reducing the scope for corruption. Also, as aid 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 FE FE 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable: change in governance  
      
Aid per GDPt-1 (ln) 0.144** 0.117** 0.360** 0.466***  
 (0.057) (0.060) (0.160) (0.153)  
Aid to government 
expenditurest-1 (ln) 
    0.405** 
     (0.162) 
Governancet-1    -0.198*** -0.180*** 
    (0.031) (0.031) 
Per capita growtht-1  0.020*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.016** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Population sizet-1 (ln)  -0.034 -0.036 -0.029 -0.020 
  (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) 
Primary exports per GDPt-1  -0.001 0.069 -0.122 -0.223 
  (0.084) (0.521) (0.527) (0.697) 
Oil rentst-1 (ln)  0.005 0.029 0.066 0.060 
  (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.041) 
Civil wart-1  -0.070 -0.078 -0.064 -0.097 
  (0.119) (0.124) (0.124) (0.120) 
Regime typet-1  0.078 0.053 0.095 0.108 
  (0.117) (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) 
Constant 0.483 0.592 1.629* 2.424*** 1.206* 
 (0.317) (0.624) (0.955) (0.903) (0.661) 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 586 578 566 566 541 
Number of countries 30 30 30 30 30 
Hansen/Sargan p-value   0.41 0.41 0.39 
 
Table 2. 2SLS Regressions of governance quality on for-
eign aid
Note: HAC Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Robust 
standard errors for OLS regressions.  Hansen J test in col-
umn (3)-(5) uses log GDP of USA as an additional instru-
ment, and a time trend instead of time dummies. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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often increases salaries of civil servants, it may 
lessen the demand for illegal payments, such 
as bribes by government officials (see also 
Knack, 2001). Aid also increases the rule of law 
in recipient countries (column (3)), reflecting 
legal reforms, increased enforcement of 
property rights and contracts.
The next two columns (4) and (5) present 
the analysis for two different time periods. 
Following the end of the cold war aid levels 
dropped severely until the late-nineties. 
However, as a consequence of the pledges 
stemming from the Millennium Development 
Goals in 2000, aid levels began to rise at the turn 
of the century.  At the same time, improving 
institutions became an important condition of 
aid flows (UN, 2005). There are hence a number 
of reasons to suspect that the positive impact 
of aid on institutions increased after 2000. 
Indeed, we find that the positive effect of aid 
on governance quality is mainly driven by 
the years after 2000 when both aid levels and 
quality of governance were on the increase. 
While aid significantly increased institutional 
quality before 2000 also (e.g. our coefficient is 
positive), the coefficient is smaller.  
To attenuate possible concerns that yearly 
data may not capture the impact of aid shocks 
on institutions, in column (6) we re-estimate 
equation (2) on two-years periods. We find 
that the results are qualitatively the same as 
before, although our coefficient is slightly 
larger as the effects of aid have had a longer 
time to ‘sink in’.   
In our estimations we find a positive effect 
of aid on institutions in the short-run. In the 
literature, several time dimensions have been 
used, ranging from the yearly panel data 
(Dalgaard and Olsson, 2008) to relatively long 
time frames of over 15 years (Bräutigam and 
Knack 2004).  One recent study, by Djankov et 
al. (2008) looks at the change in institutional 
quality over five year periods.  In contrast to our 
findings above they report a negative effect 
of aid on the quality of political institutions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable ∆ corruption 
∆ 
bureaucratic 
quality 
∆ rule of law ∆ governance ∆ governance ∆ governance ∆ governance 
    1985-1999 2000-2005 2 year 5 year 
Aid per GDPt-1 (ln) 0.110* 0.070 0.185** 0.473** 0.760** 0.737** -0.387 
 (0.058) (0.064) (0.091) (0.190) (0.367) (0.312) (1.23) 
Dependentt-1 -0.222*** -0.142*** -0.219*** -0.228*** -0.623*** -0.290***  
 (0.035) (0.027) (0.033) (0.041) (0.100) (0.047)  
Initial governance       -0.782*** 
       (0.12) 
Per capita growtht-1 0.008 0.003 0.006* 0.018** 0.016 0.024 0.113* 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.021) (0.062) 
Population sizet-1 
(ln) 0.000 -0.016 -0.014 -0.033 -0.045 -0.034 0.250 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.036) (0.038) (0.069) (0.42) 
Primary exports per 
GDPt-1 
-0.033 -0.063* -0.134*** -0.202** 0.823 0.232 0.0727 
 (0.063) (0.036) (0.045) (0.094) (1.065) (0.715) (0.89) 
Oil rentst-1 (ln) -0.001 -0.002 0.026 0.153 -0.173 0.077 -0.239 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.030) (0.097) (0.230) (0.071) (0.19) 
Civil wart-1 0.071 0.014 -0.129** -0.124 0.092 -0.141 0.0362 
 (0.080) (0.056) (0.057) (0.160) (0.210) (0.225) (0.89) 
Regime typet-1 0.011 0.038 -0.006 0.122 0.230* 0.267 1.020** 
 (0.061) (0.057) (0.051) (0.173) (0.138) (0.198) (0.41) 
Constant 0.306 0.844* 1.443*** 2.792*** 7.399*** 3.808** -1.430 
 (0.377) (0.455) (0.557) (1.047) (2.723) (1.808) (8.98) 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 551 551 551 400 178 288 90 
Number of 
countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
 
Table 3. 2SLS Regressions of governance quality sub-indi-
ces on foreign aid
Note: HAC Robust standard errors in parentheses. The cor-
ruption variable is scaled 0-6. Higher values reflect less 
corruption. First stage in appendix.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In column (7) we replicate their approach for 
sub-Saharan Africa and estimate equation (2) 
on blocks of five years.  Though insignificant, 
the sign of the aid coefficient is now negative 
as well.  This suggests that the positive effect 
of aid on institutions is limited to the short 
term.  One possible explanation is, that when 
aid levels are high, training of staff and donor 
scrutiny improves government accountability 
and performance.  However, when donors 
leave, these institutions may again break 
down (Knack, 2001).  The positive effect of 
aid in institutions may hence not show up in 
analyses with a larger time dimension. 
4. Robustness 
As an additional robustness check we 
use dynamic GMM estimations. Although 
dynamic panel bias introduced by the fixed 
effect will disappear if T is sufficiently large, 
the literature is inconclusive as to what large 
T is. 20 years may arguably not be enough to 
entirely remove the bias (see Roodman, 2008 
for a discussion on this point). We therefore 
perform two-step system GMM to test for 
the robustness of our results. For a detailed 
discussion of the advantages of using system 
GMM over difference GMM refer to Roodman 
(2008; 2009). For comparison we use the same 
dynamic specification as used by Coviello and 
Islam (2006). They regress ICRG levels on one 
and two-year lags of aid, its own lag, and a 
one-year lagged per capita income measure. 
We replicate their model in table 4.31 
There are two differences with respect to 
the data when compared to ours. First, they 
employ data from a world-wide sample of aid-
receiving countries (although they mention 
robustness checks where only Sub-Saharan 
African countries were used).32 Second, they 
use data from 1984-1995 in their baseline 
specification with annual data, following 
Alesina et al. (2002). The results are reported 
in Table 5. Contrary to Coviello and Islam we 
find tentative support for a positive short term 
31  Note however that we, as in our baseline specifica-
tions, use per capita growth while they use per capita 
income.   
32  These results are however not reported in their pa-
per. 
effect of aid on institutions. Increased levels 
of last years’ aid flows are associated with 
increased levels of the ICRG index (column 
1). The aid term becomes insignificant for 
the second year, but testing for their joint 
significance reveals a positive two-year effect 
for aid as well. The effect however disappears 
when the governance sub-indices are used as 
dependent, except for the impact of aid on 
corruption (column 3). The test-statistics at 
the bottom of table 5 show that there is no 
second-order autocorrelation in the errors and 
the instruments are valid. Roodman (2008) 
suggests that in small samples the use of many 
instruments can ‘overfit’ the instrumented 
variables and bias results towards OLS/GLS. 
We therefore reduce the set of instruments as 
suggested in Roodman (2009). 
Table 6 presents results excluding the second 
year lag of aid. We still find a positive result of 
lagged aid on ICRG scores, although the effect 
is smaller and only marginally significant at 
10% (column 1). The other columns show no 
significant effect of aid when subindices of 
governance are used (p-values range from 
0.18 for corruption to 0.57 for bureaucratic 
quality).  Summarizing all of the above, we 
find that more aid is associated with positive 
changes in the quality of governance, in the 
OLS and IV models. Recognizing the potential 
bias created by our lagged dependent, we 
use the commonly employed Arellano-Bond 
two-step system-estimator. The results are 
less conclusive here. There appears to be a 
short-term positive effect of aid in improving 
governance but a significant effect is confined 
to the replicated (parsimonious) model of 
Table 4. Aid and institutions (specification in levels)
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
 (1) (2) (3) 
 RE FE 2SLS 
    
Dependentt-1 0.919*** 0.817*** 0.807*** 
 (0.014) (0.026) (0.031) 
Aid per GDPt-1 (ln) 0.038 0.160** 0.584*** 
 (0.029) (0.063) (0.225) 
Per capita growtht-1 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Constant -0.315 2.052***  
 (0.302) (0.303)  
Fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 579 579 578 
R-squared  0.76 0.74 
Number of countries 30 30 30 
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Coviello and Islam. The question however 
arises as to what extent GMM is appropriate in 
our study, given that it is particularly suitable 
for small T and large N, while our data are large 
in T and small in N.  The relatively large number 
of time-periods in our dataset virtually makes it 
impossible to credibly use internal instruments 
without imposing (arbitrary) restrictions such 
as a limit to the maximum number of lags 
and collapsing sets of instruments (which in 
turn have an impact on the efficiency of the 
estimator). We therefore rely more on our IV-
estimates that are subject to less arbitrary 
assumptions than the GMM models in this 
case.33   
33  We also use our own OLS/2SLS specification in a GMM 
framework but effects, although positive, appear insignifi-
cant. The closest to being significant is (again) when the 
index for corruption is used as a dependent (p-value 0.19). 
Not reported but available upon request. 
5. Discussion 
We explore the short-run effect of aid on the 
quality of governance for the sub-Saharan Africa 
region using annual data for the period 1985-
2005.  We extend earlier work by controlling 
for time-invariant country characteristics that 
may affect both aid flows and the quality of 
governance in the recipient country.  We also 
correct for potential simultaneity bias, and 
use a longer time frame.  Our within-country 
results suggest that quality of governance, as 
measured by the ICRG index, captures changes 
in policy choices, and shows that restricting 
analyses to medium-term impacts only may 
mask potential short-run effects of aid.  The 
outcomes may be important to donors and 
policymakers especially when considering the 
time frame to assess the effectiveness of aid
Our 2SLS-regressions suggest a strong positive 
effect of aid on the quality of governance – aid 
‘works,’ and it works in the short run. Increasing 
aid levels with 2.2 percent will, all else equal, 
lead to a one-point increase in governance 
quality. Results extend somewhat to dynamic 
GMM estimations, although they are not very 
robust. On the other hand, as Roodman (2009) 
states, dynamic GMM models are most suited 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ICRG Rule of law Corruption Bureaucratic quality 
     
Aid per GDPt-1 (ln) 0.42** 0.04 0.18* 0.04 
 (0.20) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) 
Aid per GDPt-2 (ln) 0.11 0.02 -0.08 0.02 
 (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) 
Dependentt-1 1.04*** 1.08*** 1.07*** 1.01*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) 
Per capita growtht-1 0.05 -0.02 0.08* -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) 
 (0.20) (0.11) (0.15) (0.02) 
Constant 0.85 0.05 -0.22 0.13 
 (0.63) (0.26) (0.35) (0.17) 
     
Observations 555 555 555 555 
Joint significance of 
2 3
0! !+ =  0.09 0.88 0.15 0.68 
Observations 579 579 579 579 
2!  2167.43 4731.94 2113.79 27012 
Number of instruments used 27 27 27 27 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences (p-value)  0.21 0.48 0.61 0.43 
Hansen test of joint validity of instruments (p-value) 0.65 0.62 0.25 0.13 
Table 5. Aid and Institutions (System GMM)
Note: all estimations are two-step System GMM. Standard 
errors using the Windmeijer (2005) correction in paren-
theses. Year dummies included in all models.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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for small T and large N samples, which we 
arguably have not. With T large enough, the 
dynamic panel bias, due to the correlation of 
the lagged dependent with the fixed effect, 
will be removed in fixed effects models. 
Nonetheless we do want to report GMM 
results here if only for comparison to our own 
OLS/2SLS estimates and other recent studies. 
Our findings suggest that results are driven 
by substantial reductions in corruption and 
improvements in the rule of law, especially 
since the turn of the century. The outcomes 
resonate with Tavares (2003) and Dalgaard 
and Olsson (2008), who also find a positive 
effect on aid on governance.  Our results 
contrast some other publications on the issue, 
who have found that aid decreases the quality 
of recipient countries’ institutions or has no 
effect at all.  Though puzzling at first sight, 
these findings may not be in conflict with our 
results.  First, some of the studies use a world 
wide sample, whose estimation coefficients 
may not readily extend to sub-Saharan Africa. 
Second, the positive effect of aid may be 
confined to short time intervals (up to two 
years) and may even become ‘development 
in reverse’ in the medium or long run when 
donors leave, and necessary, but not sufficient 
conditions are met. Third, most studies on the 
topic use data up to the mid-1990s, while ours 
extend up until the year 2005. The contrasting 
results with for example Coviello and Islam 
(2006) may well be explained by the use of 
different time-periods. Indeed, the stronger 
positive effect of aid on governance after the 
year 2000 is suggestive of this. 
In conclusion, our results support the need 
for donors and policymakers to place greater 
emphasis on sustained monitoring of aid 
activities and to provide incentives and 
conditions for aid to be beneficial in the long 
run.  
Appendix - Data definitions
Governance quality. January ratings of ICRG 
institutional quality on an 18-point scale, 
with higher scores indicating higher levels of 
institutional quality. The index composes of 
three ICRG indicators: rule of law (6 points), 
corruption (6 points) and bureaucratic quality 
(6 points, transformed from a 4 point scale by 
multiplying with 3/2). 
A detailed description is available at http://
www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_methodology.aspx
ODA (Official Development Assistance) aid 
levels at t-1. 
Source: OECD statistics table 2a. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/
GDP levels (ln, t-1) are from the World 
Development Indicators 2007 (WDI). 
Per capita growth (t-1) data are from the WDI 
2007. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ICRG Rule of law Corruption Bureaucratic quality 
     
Aid per GDPt-1 (ln) 0.33* 0.07 0.13 0.02 
 (0.20) (0.11) (0.10) (0.04) 
Dependentt-1 1.03*** 1.07*** 1.02*** 0.90*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.16) (0.08) 
Per capita growtht-1 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 
Constant 0.43 0.08 0.08 0.14 
 (0.51) (0.28) (0.45) (0.13) 
     
Observations 579 579 579 579 
2!  4842.74 3106.06 2884.58 10718.62 
Number of instruments 26 26 26 26 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences (p-value) 0.12 0.47 0.77 0.24 
Hansen test of joint validity of instruments (p-value) 0.85 0.61 0.12 0.97 
 
Table 6. Aid and Institutions (System GMM)
Note: all estimations are two-step System GMM. Standard 
errors using the Windmeijer (2005) correction in paren-
theses. Year dummies included in all models.  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0
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Government final consumption expenditure 
data are from the WDI 2007. 
Population (ln, t-1) data are from the WDI 
2007. 
Data on civil conflict is from the Armed Conflict 
Database available at http://www.prio.no. 
Oil prices. Oil prices were taken from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/
Primary exports share of total primary (mineral 
and natural) exports relative to GDP. Source: 
WDI 2007
Regime type is based on scores for political 
institutions of the Polity IV project, available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.
htm
Table A. First stage regressions OLS
Notes:  HAC Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent 
variable Aid/GDP Aid/GDP 
Aid/Gov 
budget Aid/GDP Aid/GDP Aid/GDP Aid/GDP Aid/GDP Aid/GDP Aid/GDP 
Adjusted aid 
outflows to GDP 
(ln) 
1.024*** 1.093*** 1.091*** 1.092*** 1.102*** 1.107*** 0.954*** 1.132*** 0.981*** 0.658** 
 (0.126) (0.116) (0.147) (0.116) (0.118) (0.114) (0.103) (0.157) (0.139) (0.312) 
Per capita 
growtht-1 
0.080 0.121** 0.091 0.114** 0.124** 0.139** 0.124* 0.034 0.027* 0.046 
 (0.063) (0.057) (0.060) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.064) (0.081) (0.014) (0.034) 
Population 
sizet-1 (ln) 
0.013*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.007** 0.010 0.018*** -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (.0200) 
Primary exports 
per -0.004 -0.009 0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.028* 0.023 0.022 0.0281 
GDPt-1 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.024) (0.027) (0.133) 
Oil rentst-1 (ln) 0.107** 0.129** 0.326 0.128** 0.114** 0.130** 0.132** 0.104 0.377 0.280 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.463) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.536) (0.454) (0.246) 
Civil wart-1 -0.121*** -0.100*** -0.081** -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.097*** -0.228*** 0.046 -0.119*** -0.127 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.046) (0.175) (0.038) (0.073) 
Regime typet-1 -0.152** -0.129* -0.178** -0.134* -0.129* -0.130* -0.034 -0.333** -0.157* -0.185 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074) (0.063) (0.166) (0.094) (0.322) 
Governancet-1  0.021* 0.009 0.041 -0.007 0.082*** -0.001 0.021 0.131* -0.043 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.034) (0.024) (0.026) (0.013) (0.043) (0.075) (0.196) 
Constant 9.067*** 9.644*** 11.77*** 9.656*** 9.793*** 9.693*** 8.655*** 8.669*** 7.923*** 4.533 
 (1.479) (1.350) (1.733) (1.349) (1.381) (1.326) (1.223) (2.316) (1.667) (4.367) 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
Observations 589 551 514 551 551 551 373 178 288 90 
R-squared 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.94 
Partial F statistic 87.41*** 88.12*** 32.66*** 79.88*** 77.90*** 85.01*** 87.74*** 33.35*** 41.91*** 4.45** 
First stage to 
regression: 
Table 2, 
column 
(3) 
Table 2, 
column 
(4) 
Table 2, 
column 
(5) 
Table 3, 
column 
(1) 
Table 3, 
column 
(2) 
Table 3, 
column 
(3) 
Table 3, 
column 
(4) 
Table 3, 
column 
(5) 
Table 3, 
column 
(6) 
Table 3, 
column 
(7) 
 
Table B. Regressions of governance quality on foreign aid 
(levels)
Notes: HAC Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS  OLS 2SLS 
    
Dependentt-1 0.906*** 0.812*** 0.793*** 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.032) 
Aid per GDPt-1 (ln) 0.031 0.181** 0.738*** 
 (0.029) (0.068) (0.264) 
Regime typet-1 0.122 0.120 0.065 
 (0.097) (0.138) (0.121) 
Per capita growtht-1 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.019** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Population sizet-1 (ln) -0.031 -0.028 -0.023 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.031) 
Primary exports per GDPt-1 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Oil rentst-1 (ln) -0.017 0.036 0.101** 
 (0.010) (0.029) (0.051) 
Civil wart-1 -0.112 -0.067 -0.043 
 (0.094) (0.119) (0.125) 
Constant 0.339 2.438***  
 (0.564) (0.492)  
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 578 578 577 
R-squared 0.759 0.762 0.736 
Number of countries 30 30 30 
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Aiding Violence or Peace? 
The Impact of Foreign Aid on the Risk of 
Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa34
Abstract
This paper considers the impact of foreign aid flows on the risk of civil conflict. We improve on earlier 
studies on this topic by addressing the problem of the endogenous aid allocation using GDP levels 
of donor countries as instruments. A more structural addition to the literature is that we efficiently 
control for unobserved country specific effects in typical conflict onset and conflict continuation 
models by first differencing. The literature often overlooks the dynamic nature of these types of 
models, thereby forcing unlikely i.i.d. structures on the error terms implicitly.35 As a consequence, 
malfunctioning institutions, deep-rooted political grievances, or any other obvious, yet unobserved 
and time persistent determinants of war are simply assumed away. We find a statistically significant 
and economically important negative effect of foreign aid flows on the probability of ongoing civil 
conflicts to continue (the continuation probability), such that increasing aid flows tends to decrease 
civil conflict duration. We do not find a significant relationship between aid flows and the probability 
of civil conflicts to start (the onset probability).
34 This paper was co-authored with Joppe de Ree, Utrecht University, Janskerkhof 12, 3512 BL Utrecht, The Netherlands. 
Published as: De Ree, J. and E. Nillesen. 2009. “Aiding violence or peace? The impact foreign aid on the risk  of civil conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.” Journal of Development Economics 88: 301-313.
35 i.e., i.i.d. error structures in linear models, or conditional independence of observations in non-linear probit/logit type 
models.
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1. Introduction  
Between 1946 and 2002 not less than 1.37 
million battle-related deaths occurred in 47 
civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa (Lacina and 
Gleditsch, 2005). Civilian casualties resulting 
from civil wars even outnumber these figures 
by far. During the Rwandan genocide for 
example, at least 800,000 people were killed, 
foremost civilians. These statistics illustrate the 
importance of research trying to understand 
the causes of civil conflict. Whereas reducing 
the likelihood of conflict is obviously 
important in its own right, it may also have 
strong positive effects on the economic 
environment. Lowering the risk of conflict 
consequently reduces the risk on capital 
investments. Collier (1999) elaborates: ‘the 
sheer scale of capital flight from capital-hostile 
environments suggests that its effects on 
economic performance are likely to be large’. 
It is likely that household decision-making 
is also positively affected as investments in 
small scale businesses or education become 
increasingly profitable. In a recent book Collier 
(2007) identifies the ‘conflict trap’ as one out of 
four important traps plaguing a large part of 
the developing world. 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004a) were among 
the first to emphasize the interplay between 
economic factors and civil conflict. Rebel 
organizations may be regarded as businesses 
of some sort that make efficient financing 
decisions in order to sustain their own viability. 
From that perspective, low per capita income, 
badly performing institutions, dependence 
on primary commodity exports have 
been associated with higher risk of civil 
conflict. These studies are illustrative for 
the increasing interest to relate a range of 
economic and political factors to civil war 
occurrence.36 Studying the effects of foreign 
aid flows contributes to this line of research. In 
accordance to the rebel-financing argument, 
aid resources may be a good ‘prize’ for rebels 
to capture and hence feed instability. As a 
consequence, aid may contribute to pushing 
(already conflict ridden) societies (deeper) 
into misery. On the other hand, when aid 
flows somehow decrease the likelihood of 
conflict, development assistance will help 
breaking conflict traps. Effects of foreign 
aid flows on civil war have only incidentally 
been discussed, notwithstanding the fact 
that the average sub-Saharan African 
country receives a substantial 5% of 
official development assistance (ODA) as a 
percentage of GDP. 
The fundamental argument for aid donation 
is to improve upon economic conditions 
for growth. Over the years an extensive 
body ofliterature has been studying this 
relationship. Much cited examples include an 
influential paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
that claims that aid works predominantly in 
countrieswith good economic policies, and 
reactions to this result, by amongst others 
Collier and Dollar (2002), Easterly (2003) 
and Dalgaard et al. (2004). One of the 
robust findings in the empirical literature 
on civil conflict however, is that poorer 
countries (as opposed to richer countries) 
suffer more from civil conflict. Aid flows may 
therefore be related to conflict through its 
effects on economic conditions. Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998) argue that increasing 
income per capita is expected to decrease 
the probability of conflict when economic 
alternatives for potential rebels evolve and 
36 Other empirical studies include those by Miguel et 
al. (2004a) who explore the causal impact of economic 
shocks on the incidence of civil conflict and find a nega-
tive statistically significant effect of economic shocks; 
Fearon and Laitin (2003b) studying the effect of ethnic 
and religious diverse states on risk of civil war effect, and 
finding that not countries that are more ethnically or 
religiously diverse are associated with a higher risk of 
civil war but weak military states, characterized by low 
per capita income, large populations, rough terrain and 
political instability; and Hegre (2002) testing and con-
firming the theory that both solid democratic and harsh 
autocratic regimes are associated with less civil war than 
those that are considered to be at an intermediate level 
of democracy.
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improve. Moreover, the increased income 
reduces a country’s dependence on primary 
commodity exports which marginalizes 
looting opportunities for rebel groups and 
hampers their chances of survival (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1998).37 Fearon and Laitin (2003b) 
on the other hand offer another explanation 
for the well-known negative correlation 
between GDP per capita and civil conflict, 
by interpreting GDP per capita as a proxy for 
the state’s overall financial, administrative, 
police and military capabilities. In spite of 
these theoretical arguments, the transmission 
mechanisms from aid to GDP are still 
under debate. In this paper we therefore do 
not assess the importance of these and other 
possible indirect channels through which 
aid might impact on conflict. The objective of 
this paper is to estimate the direction and 
size of a direct impact of aid flows on the risk 
of civil conflict. Potential indirect channels are 
controlled for in our regressions. 
Studies that analyze direct relationships 
between foreign aid flows and civil conflict 
build on two fundamental hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis argues that foreign aid 
augments the government’s access to 
financial resources, thereby inducing 
rent-seeking behavior by rebel groups. 
The extended budget increases the 
rebels’ incentives to try and appropriate 
these resources by reallocating time 
from production to insurrection. This 
mechanism proposes a destabilizing effect 
of foreign aid flows as it increases the risk 
on conflict. Examples of models that have 
been developed and analyzed following this 
line of argument include those by Grossman 
(1991, 1992). 
The second hypothesis claims that aid flows 
relax the government budget constraint, 
such that military expenditure (as a normal 
good) increases. Collier and Hoeffler (2007) 
recently found empirical support for 
this relationship and estimate that about 
40% of foreign aid transfers into military 
37 Note however that Fearon (2005) claims that this re-
sult is not robust, and, to the extent that there is an effect, 
this only holds for those countries where oil production 
comprises a large share in primary commodity exports.
expenditures. A powerful government army 
may discourage rebel groups from pursuing 
a violent course, such that foreign aid, as 
a result, decreases the risk of civil conflict. 
Note that the validity of this argument 
is conditional on the assumption that 
aid is sufficiently fungible into military 
expenditure.38 Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
develop a model formalizing the idea of an 
increased government budget, translating 
into military expenditure, but fail to find 
an empirical relationship between aid 
and conflict onset.39 By contrast, this 
paper provides empirical evidence in favor 
of their argument aswe improve on their 
identification strategy by recognizing 
the importance of fixed effects and the 
endogenous properties of aid allocation. 
Aid flows are likely to be endogenous with 
respect to conflict. Donors may predict 
changes in the likelihood of conflict outbreak 
or conflict ending by observing changes in 
rebel movement or government action, and 
re-optimize the allocation of aid funds. 
Parameter estimates on aid flows, or even 
lagged aid flows, in a conflict regression would 
therefore capture a mix of effects. These 
parameter estimates would fold together the 
causal impacts from aid to conflict, with 
correlations due to the endogenous aid 
allocation mechanism. We propose ‘donor 
GDP’ as a new and powerful instrument for 
foreign aid flows in the conflict regression 
to separate out both effects. Aid flows are 
often defined as a percentage of Donor’s 
GDP, hence both are strongly correlated. 
Almost by construction, changes in donor’s 
GDP are not related to the endogenous aid 
allocation process at the recipient country 
level. 
The main empirical finding is as follows: foreign 
aid is directly affecting the probability of civil 
conflict continuation (i.e., the probability of 
having conflict at t, conditional on having 
38 Devarajan et al. (1999) for example study aid fungibil-
ity in sub-Saharan Africa and indeed find that aid is at least 
partially fungible.
39 Collier and Hoeffler (2002) study a world wide sample 
and do not find a direct effect of aid flows on the onset 
probability.
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conflict at t−1), negatively and significantly. 
Aid flows therefore reduce the duration 
of civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. A 
10% increase in foreign aid is estimated to 
decrease the probability of continuation 
by about 8% points (the unconditional 
probability of conflict continuation is about 
90%). We do not find a significant effect 
of aid flows on the onset probability (i.e., 
the probability of having conflict at t, 
conditional on having peace at t−1). The 
question whether our empirical results 
have normative interpretations remains 
however unanswered in this research. Foreign 
aid typically supports any leadership, 
hence also leadership that is unwarranted 
by the majority of the population. Van 
de Walle (2001) notes that African 
regimes are surprisingly durable (i.e., less 
leadership turnover than in any other 
continent) despite economic stagnation 
and other problems that are associated with 
the continent. One of his explanations for 
this phenomenon relates to the large amounts 
of aid that flow into many of these countries. 
Van de Walle (2001) argues that the political 
elites of some African countries allow just 
enough reformto satisfy donors, but 
subsequently utilize the ‘residual’ funds in 
a predatory fashion to maintain themselves 
in power. From a normative perspective, 
suppression of rebel groups is therefore 
ambiguous. The positive effects of keeping 
death and destruction under control might be 
simply outweighed by the negative effects of 
having an unwarranted government. 
In Section 2 we discuss the data set and 
some important stylized facts. In Section 
3 we discuss the identification strategy and 
report our regression outcomes. Section 3.1 
considers different identification strategies 
as well as its underlying (implicit) assumptions. 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 report regression results 
of models in levels and in first differences 
respectively. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data description 
For the empirical exercise we use data on 
civil conflict from the Armed Conflict 
Database, recently developed by the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the 
University of Uppsala, henceforth referred 
to as the PRIO/Uppsala data set. Work on the 
data set was supported by The World Bank’s 
Development Economics Research Group 
as part of its project on The Economics 
of Civil War, Crime, and Violence. The 
data set has been widely used since it was 
made available (Gleditsch et al., 2002). The 
PRIO/Uppsala data set defines civil conflict 
as ‘a contested incompatibility which concerns 
government and/or territory where the 
use of armed force between two parties, 
of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths.’40 A dummy variable that is unity in 
case of civil conflict of this type is the primary 
dependent variable in the regression analyses. 
Even in sub-Saharan Africa, civil conflicts 
(N=25 battle deaths) are relatively rare as 
about 23% of our observations report civil 
conflicts of this type. 
Selecting the appropriate dependent 
variable in empirical analysis is important. 
Collier (2007) argues that aid flows matter in 
different ways for different kinds of rebel 
violence by hypothesizing that the possible 
destabilizing effects of aid are less credible for 
rebellion as it may take many years for rebels 
to get their hands on the money that they 
are after. The potential of aid raising the risk 
of coups d’etat is much higher: “a coup is 
virtually over as soon as it has begun, and if 
it is successful, the aid is there for the taking” 
(Collier, 2007; p. 105). Coups however are 
not specifically coded by PRIO/Uppsala in this 
data set and are not considered in this study. 
The focus of this paper is on the N=25 battle 
deaths civil conflict variable as opposed to the 
high threshold variable of N=1000 battle 
deaths. This decision is obviously subject to 
taste. To our judgement however, studying the 
40 Note that although often used interchangeably, ac-
cording to the definition in the PRIO/Uppsala data set ‘civil 
wars’ are different from ‘civil conflicts’ as ‘conflict’ also in-
cludes minor and intermediate conflicts with a threshold 
of at least 25 but fewer than annual 1000 battle-related 
deaths, whereas the term ‘civil war’ refers only to those 
cases where there are at least 1000 annual battle-related 
deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005).
Aiding Violence or Peace?     37
lower threshold variable is more appropriate 
for this sample as the median conflict in 
sub-Saharan Africa is of the smaller type. This 
type of civil conflicts therefore causes death 
and destruction, but reports less than 1000 
battle-related deaths per year. 
It is nevertheless important to be careful 
when interpreting these conflict 
variables and hence the outcomes from the 
empirical exercises. It is not obvious that a 
zero after a one implies the ending of a civil 
conflict. A zero after a one may also indicate 
that conflict intensity drops temporarily, in 
order to flare up one or two years later (this 
argument holds for both high and low 
thresholds). The PRIO/Uppsala data set has 
just recently tried to account for this issue 
by coding whether a particular conflict has 
ended. We do not use this information in 
this paper but instead argue that the standard 
conflict dummy variable has a simple and 
consistent interpretation in our analysis: 
the onset/continuation probabilities we 
estimate in this paper are interpreted as 
the probability that a conflict crosses the 
25 battle deaths threshold conditional on 
whether there was such a conflict the year 
before. Conflicts may have ended or they may 
not. This careful interpretation of the conflict 
variable relates quite well to the military 
financing argument as strong government 
armies might suppress rebel insurrection 
rather than solving underlying grievances. 
The primary explanatory variable of interest 
in this study is foreign aid, measured as 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 
proportion to GDP.41 This measure reflects 
the magnitude of aid flows relative to other 
resources at a government’s disposal. We 
calculate the foreign aid variable as a 
five year average of official development 
assistance flows relative to recipient GDP up 
to period t−1. Both quantities are measured 
41 Official Development Assistance relates to aid flows 
originating from countries belonging to the OECD Devel-
opment Assistance Committee, including grants or loans 
to developing countries undertaken by the official sector, 
with the promotion of economic development and wel-
fare as the main objective at concessional financial terms 
excluding grants, loans and credit for military purposes 
(OECD, 2006).
in current US$. We have constructed log’s of 
the ratio such that the estimated coefficients 
are easily interpreted. A percentage change 
in the variable translates to a percentage point 
change in the probability.42 
GDP data that we use to instrument aid flows 
were drawn from the Penn World Tables 
and the World Development Indicators. 
We construct log’s of five year averages of 
donor GDP measured in current US$, to 
instrument the log of the five year average of 
aid to GDP ratio of the recipient country. We 
are using current GDP as an instrument which 
is the appropriate measure to instrument a 
ratio of which both factors are measured in 
current US$. 
The remaining data includes a set of country 
control variables similar to those used 
by Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Miguel et al. 
(2004a), and Fearon and Laitin (2003b). Data 
on controls are obtained from Fearon and 
Laitin (2003b) and Fearon (2005).We control 
both to cover indirect channels through 
which aid affects conflict, and to rule out 
potential violations of the exclusion 
restrictions on the instruments. Control 
variables include: peace and conflict duration 
dummies (using the PRIO/ Uppsala 
data on conflict dated back to 1973); a 
ratio of primary commodity exports to 
GDP (both linear and squared) to proxy 
natural resource dependence; the log 
of real per capita income measured at 
t−1; real per capita growth measured at 
t−1; measures of democracy calculated 
from the Polity IV data set; ethnolinguistic 
and religious fractionalization; a dummy for 
oil exporters; the log of the proportion of a 
country that is mountainous; the log of the 
national population measured at t−1; time 
trends (linear, squared, cubic); trade as a ratio 
of total GDP (only included for a robustness 
check, because this variable is not available 
for all observations); a dummy that is unity in 
the cold war years; and oil prices measured 
in 1982 US$. The resulting data set covers 39 
sub-Saharan African countries from 1981 to 
42 When we include the aid to GDP ratio, without taking 
log’s, as one of the explanatory variables, the results are 
qualitatively similar.
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1999, providing 699 observations. For more 
detailed description of our data the reader 
is referred to Appendix A. 
2.1 Stylized facts 
In order to anticipate the classical mistake of 
confusing lack of variation for the absence 
of causal relationships, we have a closer look 
at some key properties of our variables. Fig. 
1 summarizes the correlation between cross-
country averages of the log aid to GDP ratio, 
log real GDP per capita, and the conflict rate. 
The data is constructed by averaging over 
the available time period (the conflict rate is 
the time average of the dummy variable 
that is unity when a country is having civil 
conflict). Each observation is accompanied 
with its World Bank country code. 
Fig. 1A reveals no obvious relationship 
between the aid to GDP ratio and the 
conflict rate in cross-country averages. In fact, 
the correlation between the aid variable 
and the conflict rate is close to zero and 
insignificant. Excluding outliers (countries 
that receive less than 1% of ODA as a 
percentage of GDP, i.e., South-Africa, Gabon 
and Nigeria) still yields an insignificant 
correlation. The absence of significant 
between country correlations may result from 
the extreme complexity of the matter. Both 
aid-giving procedures and emerging civil 
conflicts are subject to many influences such 
that correlations in averages are easily 
blurred with noise. Neglecting the influence 
of these unobserved forces is generally a 
source of bias as they are likely to affect both 
aid flows and conflict simultaneously. 
Whereas there is no between country 
correlation between the aid to GDP ratio and 
the conflict rate, we do observe correlation 
between real GDP per capita (in log’s) and the 
conflict rate that is significant at the 10% level 
(Fig. 1C). Excluding the relatively rich countries 
(i.e., South-Africa and Gabon) identifies 
an even stronger negative correlation that 
Fig. 1. Between country correlations between aid and 
conflict (A and B) and between GDP per capita and con-
flict (C and D).
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is significant at the 5% level (Fig. 1D).43 These 
outcomes indicate that poor countries are 
experiencing more conflict than rich countries. 
Clearly, this correlation alone is insufficient 
to infer causality, whereas causality surely 
is plausible as better economic conditions 
provide more and better alternatives to 
fighting. However, the possibility that the 
direction of causality is reversed, or that for 
example (unobserved) institutional matters 
affect both, should not be ignored. 
Fig. 2 presents averages over time for the 
whole sub-Saharan African region and 
reveals some other interesting patterns. GDP 
per capita (in log’s) is normalized to fit into 
Fig. 2.44 The aid to GDP ratio, as well as GDP 
per capita, remain relatively stable over the 
sample period. Conflict rates however, have 
increased over time. After the stable eighties 
we observe increased activity around the end 
of the cold war. Where conflict rates seem to 
settle down around 1995, violence picks up 
again towards the end of the century. 
Nevertheless, both Figs. 1 and 2 do not 
show any clear relationship between aid 
flows and the conflict rate. Both between 
country variation and aggregate time series 
variation may not be the type of variation 
you would want to look at. Apparently, 
relationships between aid and conflict (if 
any) should be identified from the within 
43 South-Africa is relatively rich, but has serious problems 
with civil conflict arising from the Apartheid regime.
44 log GDP per capita is normalized with three times the 
sub-Saharan African average.
country variation over time. Fortunately, 
there is considerable variation of this type. 
The within country (unconditional) standard 
error of the aid to GDP ratio is about 
0.03 such that on average 95% fluctuates 
between +/−0.06 of the country specific 
mean. Despite the absence of between 
country and time series correlation, within 
country correlation between aid and conflict 
is significantly negative [see Fig. 3].45 
Fig. 3 shows that within countries, more 
aid (in proportion to GDP) is associated 
with less conflict. The negative within 
country correlation however is not easy 
to interpret as we only remove the country 
and time specific effects. The negative 
correlation may be due to a conflict offsetting 
effect of aid that has been hypothesized 
in the Introduction. However, the same 
correlation could also result fromaid rationing 
when countries are at war. Furthermore, 
the correlation is also inconclusive about 
whether aid flows are associated with shorter 
conflicts (as it is related to the duration 
of conflict), or that aid flows prevent wars 
from even starting (when it affects the 
onset of conflict). In Section 3 we present 
our solutions to solving these, and other 
problems concerning the interpretation of 
45 The OLS regression that is associated with Fig. 3 re-
gresses conflict dummy on log aid to GDP ratio (averaged 
over 5 years up to period t−1) and a set of country and 
time dummies. The parameter estimate associated with 
aid which is negative and significant at the 1% level.
Fig. 2. Sub-Saharan African averages over time.
Fig. 3. Within country correlations are identified by re-
gressing both the aid to GDP ratio as well as the conflict 
dummy on a full set of time and country dummies. The 
residuals of both regressions are plotted against each 
other.
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these raw correlations. We report conditions 
under which we can identify causal, 
interpretable, effects. 
3. The empirical analysis of conflict 
The objective of this paper is to identify and 
to estimate causal effects of aid flows on 
both onset and the continuation probability 
of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Identifying 
causal effects from non-experimental data 
depends, as always, on specific sets of 
identifying restrictions on the data (i.e., 
modeling assumptions). For example, 
to identify a causal effect from aid on 
conflict onset Collier and Hoeffler (2002) rely 
on conditional independence of observations, 
or on its counterpart in linear models: i.i.d. 
assumptions on the errors. To our belief, 
these assumptions are implausible as both 
random and fixed effects are ruled out, 
as well as any other serial correlation in 
the unobserved component. In addition 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) assume that 
aid allocation is exogenous with respect 
to future conflict (i.e., they assume that 
donors do not anticipate the likelihood of 
future conflict outbreak). We argue in this 
section that neglecting these issues may 
bias the estimated parameters and could be 
the reason why they fail to find correlations 
between aid flows and onset. 
In our opinion, the analysis of the relationship 
between aid and conflict depends critically 
on modeling three concepts explicitly: 
Dynamics (state and duration dependence). 
The importance of modeling dynamics is 
typically picked up by the literature as many 
papers distinguish between onset and duration 
models. Time invariant effects (either fixed 
or random). An issue that has been largely 
neglected by the empirical literature on 
civil conflict, whereas political, cultural, or 
other (partly) unobserved factors are likely 
to be important determinants of conflict. The 
problem with neglecting time invariant factors 
is that they are also related to the amounts of 
the aid countries receive. We finally advocate 
the use of instrumental variable analysis to 
address the endogenous process of aid 
allocation. Donors are likely to anticipate 
increased likelihood of conflict outbreak, 
for example when they observe increased 
rebel activity, and reallocate aid flows 
elsewhere. We incline to the explanation 
that aid flows are reduced when countries 
are more likely to end up in conflict. A priori 
however, there is no reason why donors 
would not increase aid flows to war-prone 
countries for strategic reasons (e.g., Alesina 
and Dollar (2000) and Alesina and Weder 
(2002) discuss the importance of strategic 
interests of donor countries). After all, some 
of the most conflict ridden societies are also 
some of the largest recipients of aid. The 
working of endogeneities in dynamic models 
as we use here is not straightforward and 
will be discussed when we interpret the 
empirical results in Section 3.3.1. Either way, 
this type of mechanisms creates correlations 
between aid and conflict that we would like 
to eliminate in our empirical analysis. 
Dynamic concepts as state and duration 
dependence seem important, because 
long sequences of conflict years take turns 
with long sequences of peace years. The 
probability of having conflict next year 
is therefore positively (cor)related with having 
conflict this year. Death and destruction 
intensifies hatred among civilians, who then 
may be more easily recruited by rebels, 
and also among soldiers, who then may be 
more determined to continue fighting. The 
alleged state dependency is an important 
reason why the empirical literature tends to 
focus on onset and duration separately. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004a,b) however point 
to another reason of studying onset and 
duration separately. Many factors that tend 
to explain onset do not explain duration, and 
vice versa. It makes sense for example that 
aid flows transfer into military expenditure 
more rapidly when a country is at war than 
when it is in peace. In accordance with 
the military financing argument (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002), aid flows may not prevent 
civil conflict from starting, yet it may shorten 
its duration. This is in fact what we infer from 
our empirical findings. Moreover, parties that 
are now fighting may, as war continues, and 
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more destruction takes place, update beliefs 
about whether it is all worth the sacrifices 
and how likely it is that there are going to 
win (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002). This 
learning mechanism changes from year to year, 
and is likely to be a complicated function 
of duration. It is therefore important to be 
flexible in modeling duration dependence. 
We model both conflict and peace duration 
dependence by including duration dummies. 
In addition to modeling the dynamic 
structure we emphasize the need to 
account for unobserved time invariant factors 
(either correlated46, or uncorrelated47 with 
the vector of regressors xit). These factors 
concern measures of political grievances, 
culture, poverty, institutions and the like. It is 
likely that some of these unobserved factors 
affect both aid flows and the likelihood of 
conflict simultaneously, such that we would 
like to get rid of these factors in estimation. 
However, even when there is no correlation 
at all between the unobserved effects 
and xit, the parameters of standard onset 
or continuation models are estimated 
with bias. This is because onset and 
continuation models are essentially dynamic 
models, such that by construction, time 
invariant effects are correlated with the 
lagged dependents. In a typical onset model 
all lagged dependent variables are zero and 
hence drop out in estimation. The effects on 
the estimated parameters however, is often 
overlooked. This study is the first that we 
know of that efficiently eliminates the fixed/
random effects in onset and continuation 
models by first differencing the regression 
equations. 
We would like to stress here that if fixed 
(or even random) effects matter, they are 
correlated with lagged dependent variables 
– this includes duration variables – by 
construction. We argue in this section that 
lagged dependent variables tend to pick up 
variation that should either be attributed 
to the regressors or to the fixed effects. We 
cite Griliches (1961) in this section as he has 
derived properties of these biases in standard 
46 Often called fixed effects.
47 Often called random effects.
linear models. Griliches (1961) comes up with 
an explanation why residuals (as estimators 
of the errors) appear less serially correlated 
than the true errors. It is known from the 
empirical literature on conflict that including 
a lagged dependent variables will erase 
most – or all – of the serial correlation from the 
residuals. The residuals however, are biased 
estimates of the true errors in this case, such 
that the absence of residual serial correlation 
is by no means evidence for the absence of 
serial correlation in the errors (e.g., as a result 
of fixed effects).48 Correlation between the 
fixed effect and the explanatory variables is 
an additional and probably important issue. 
We finally argue that the process of aid 
allocation is endogenous with respect to 
conflict. Failing governments or increased 
rebel activity urge donors to reconsider 
their commitments while these factors 
simultaneously affect the likelihood of 
conflict. So even when time invariant effects 
are controlled for, time varying unobservables 
in the conflict model are likely to be 
correlated with aid flows (i.e., omitted 
variable bias). Closely related to omitted 
variable bias is the issue of reversed 
causality (i.e., simultaneity). Donors tend to 
reduce monetary aid in countries that are 
actually experiencing civil conflict, and 
allocate aid flows elsewhere. Lagging aid flows 
will account for reversed causality bias, but 
may be insufficient to tackle omitted variable 
bias due to aid rationing in anticipation of 
conflict. 
There is some evidence for both anticipation 
and reversed causality as regressing a 
conflict dummy on current aid flows, lagged 
aid flows (a 5 year average up to period t−1), 
and a full set of time and country dummies 
yields both aid variables negative and 
significant (results not shown but available 
on request). Both during civil conflict and prior 
to civil conflict, aid flows are significantly 
48 To perform a meaningful test on error autocorrelation, 
one needs consistent estimates of the errors under the 
null hypothesis (no residual autocorrelation) and under 
the alternative hypothesis (residual autocorrelation). It is 
clear that under the alternative hypothesis the residuals 
are biased estimates of the errors (Griliches, 1961).
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lower than on average. Neglecting the 
endogenous properties of aid allocation 
leads to spurious inference when the 
suggested negative correlation would be 
wrongly interpreted as a risk reducing 
effect of aid. Our instrument, donor’s GDP, is 
strongly related to aid flows to the sub-Saharan 
African region, but not to the conflict causing 
factors within aid recipient countries.49 
3.1 Integrating onset and continuation mod-
els 
We follow Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) 
by modeling the probability of observing 
conflict cit conditional on a vector xit and 
a lagged conflict dummy ci,t−1.
50 This modeling 
approach integrates the separate onset and 
duration approaches. Our baseline, Eq. (1) 
models two out of three concepts discussed 
in Section 3 explicitly: dynamics (i.e., state 
and duration dependence) and it allows for 
fixed or random effects. The endogenous 
properties of the aid allocation process will 
be discussed in Section 3.3. For estimation 
we rely on Linear Probability Model 
specifications (LPM). 
We define the probability of observing 
conflict at period t conditional on a 
vector of regressors xit, peace duration 
(pdit), conflict duration (cdit), a lagged 
conflict dummy (ci,t − 1) and an onset and 
a continuation time invariant effect (αion) 
and (αicont). We condition the fixed effects 
conditional on conflict status thereby following 
the empirical literature where onset and 
duration (or continuation in this paper) are 
considered separate processes (e.g. Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004a,b) (1):51 
49 We solve for potential violations of the exclusion re-
striction by including other macro variables such as oil 
prices, trends (linear, quadratic, cubic), measures of trade 
(in a robustness check) and a dummy variable for the cold-
war years.
50 Fearon and Laitin (2003a) report estimates of a similar 
model in one of their additional regression tables.
51 Note, that the fixed effects need not be conditional on 
conflict status from a technical point of view.
The dichotomous conflict variable cit is unity 
when a country i is experiencing conflict 
at period t. xit typically contains all sorts 
of possibly endogenous covariates of which 
aid flows is the primary variable of interest in 
this paper. xit is defined as follows (2): 
xit contains a 1 to model a constant. zit is a vector 
of exogenous regressors. Aid flows ait-5, are 
defined as the log of a five year average of 
the aid to GDP ratio (3): 
pdit and cdit denote peace and conflict duration 
respectively. Duration is dependence is 
modeled with dummies. 
γjp and γ
j
c are parameters to be estimated. 
Duration dummies are coded 1 when a 
country has experienced peace/conflict for at 
least j years: 
Our regressions include both conflict duration 
and peace duration dummies for j=1, 2, 
5, 10.52 We have tested whether including 
the omitted dummies is significantly 
improving the fit, but it does not. 
We would like to stress that modeling 
onset and continuation in one model is 
in fact equivalent to estimating onset and 
continuation models separately on selected 
samples, which is normal practice in the 
52 j=1 duration drops out when modeling state depen-
dence.
Aiding Violence or Peace?     43
empirical literature on civil conflict. Our 
strategy here however facilitates imposing 
and testing parameter restrictions across 
onset and continuation parameters. For 
policy purposes for example, it would 
be interesting to know whether there are 
significant differences between the effects on 
onset and on continuation. The conditional 
probability of observing conflict contains two 
linear components that are multiplied by 
two indicator functions respectively (i.e., 
1(ci,t − 1=0) and 1(ci,t − 1=1)). These indicators are 
the data selection criteria that are typically 
used in standard onset and continuation 
models. Conditioning the probability of 
conflict on being at peace at t−1 yields an 
onset model (4):53 
Conditioning the probability of conflict on 
having conflict at t−1 yields a continuation 
model (5): 
The mechanical consequences for estimation 
of this selection are fundamental and are 
discussed in Section 3.2. 
The primary objective throughout the 
remainder of the empirical analysis is to 
estimate separate direct causal effects from aid 
flows on the conditional possibility of onset 
and continuation. The objectives of this 
paper are formally defined as follows: 
onset (6): 
53 The onset and continuation probabilities that we are 
interested in may be conceived in different ways. We es-
timate probabilities of getting into war, conditional on 
either being in peace or at conflict a period earlier. The 
probabilities may be interpreted as a hazard rates and re-
late to duration simply by integration. We could also inter-
pret these probabilities as the two probabilities we need 
for a two-state conditional Markov switching model.
continuation (7): 
From Eq. (1)we know that the parameter vectors 
βon and βcont are exactly the causal effects on 
onset and continuation that we are interested 
in. 
With introducing the linear structure of Eq. 
(1) we give up on more sophisticated, but 
computationally burdensome nonlinear 
specifications. Estimating nonlinear models 
of the probit/logit type are typically 
problematic when endogenous right hand side 
variables are combined with fixed effects. In 
nonlinear models, time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity cannot be eliminated by some 
simple transformation of the data. Allowing 
for these effects would require additional 
distributional assumptions. Moreover, we do 
not know of nonlinear models that account 
for fixed effects, endogenous regressors as 
well as serial correlation in the transitory errors 
that we seem to find using LPM’s. Hyslop 
(1999) however, shows that dynamic linear 
probability specifications with fixed effects 
produce rather similar outcomes as probit/
logit specifications.54 Moreover, LPM’s have 
the additional advantage that IV techniques, 
that we think are necessary to address 
the endogeneity problem that concerns 
aid allocation, are more easily applied. 
The key property of linear probability models 
is that the conditional expectation function 
of a binary outcome variable is assumed 
to be a linear function of the regressors. 
The fact that probit/logit and LPM’s often 
produce rather similar outcomes is because 
the conditional distribution function tends to 
‘look’ rather linear around its expected value, 
while at the same time most draws from any 
conditional distribution function are ‘close’ to 
the expected value. For estimating parameters 
we use the following baseline estimating 
equation derived from Eq. (1). (8): 
54 While our model and Hyslop (1999)’s model are similar, 
Hyslop (1999) studies labor force participation.
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modeled with dummies. 
γjp and γ
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Duration dummies are coded 1 when a 
country has experienced peace/conflict for at 
least j years: 
Our regressions include both conflict duration 
and peace duration dummies for j=1, 2, 
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the omitted dummies is significantly 
improving the fit, but it does not. 
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dence.
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εit is an error that is allowed to correlate over 
time. The subsequent sections estimate 
the β parameters under different sets of 
assumptions. Moreover, we discuss the 
potential pitfalls when parameters of the 
above model are (falsely) restricted. 
3.2 Regressions in levels and associated pit-
falls 
We are estimating the parameters of Eq. 
(1) under different sets of identifying 
assumptions. Likewise, the obtained estimates 
may be interpreted as causal effects only 
under these respective sets of assumptions. 
Not all of the identifying assumptions that we 
introduce are equally appropriate however. 
In this section for example, we do not control 
for the unobserved heterogeneity that is 
presumably important in conflict analysis.
Our claimis that these results are therefore 
difficult to interpret. We do however report 
these results as this identification strategy 
is commonly (and perhaps wrongly) accepted 
by the literature. These LEVEL regressions 
reported in Table 1 do not account for fixed 
or random effects and are the type of models 
that are often estimated in the literature. 
In Section 3.3 we get rid of the biases that 
distort the regression results of the models 
in levels. The IV-FD (Instrumental Variables-
First Differences) regressions reported in Table 
2 eliminate fixed effects by first differencing 
and use instrumental variables techniques 
to deal with biases due to endogenous aid 
allocation. 
We have argued that neglecting dynamics, 
fixed or random effects, as well as the 
endogeneity of aid allocation is likely to 
produce inconsistent estimates of the causal 
effectswe are interested in. Model LEVEL(1a) 
of Table 1 neglects all of these issues and just 
regresses the conflict dummy on a set of xit’s 
with OLS. Regressing the conflict dummy on 
a vector of explanatory variables xit, while in 
fact the true model is represented by Eq. (1) is 
effectively estimating the following LPM (9): 
where (10) 
which is a straightforward reformulation 
of Eq. (8). If and only if the following set 
of assumptions is satisfied, the LEVEL(1) 
parameter estimates are consistent estimates 
of the causal effects as defined by definitions 
(6) and (7), (11): 
Condition (11) is highly restrictive as it typically 
rules out all dynamic issues discussed before, 
as well as the correlation between the 
fixed effects and xit. No dynamics implies 
no discrimination between onset and 
continuation probabilities, which seems 
inconsistent with the data and the theory as 
we have argued before. 
Even though assumption (11) is restrictive, 
the LEVEL(1a) and LEVEL(1b) regressions 
from Table 1 produce some of the 
familiar correlations empirical studies on 
civil conflict tend to find (e.g., Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002). LEVEL(1a) reports a significant 
negative correlation with real per capita 
income, and a nonlinear relationship 
with primary commodity exports 
dependence. The nonlinearity in this study 
however, is different with respect to Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002)’s findings. Our estimates 
yield a U-shape, instead of the (expected) 
inverted U-shape. The effect is minimized when 
primary commodity dependence comprises 
about 20% of GDP, which is about the 
sub-Saharan African average. Allowing 
for error correlation within countries in 
LEVEL(1b) merely identifies the well-known 
and important empirical fact that poor 
countries experience more conflicts than 
rich(er) countries. The dependence on 
primary commodity exports is no longer 
significant at the 5% level. In accordance 
with Collier and Hoeffler (2002)’s findings, 
we do not find any significant correlations 
with aid flows, which is in line with the Fig.1 
correlations. Our results are rather similar 
to those of Collier and Hoeffler and indicate 
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that both data sets exhibit similar features. 
The regression results of Section 3.3, 
should therefore be attributed to differences 
in specification rather than to differences 
in data. It should be mentioned that Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002) use world data at five 
year intervals, and explain onset rather than 
incidence. 
As we have argued before, many authors 
explicitly recognize the importance of 
modeling internal dynamics of conflict 
and estimate onset and continuation 
(or duration) models separately. LEVEL(2), 
LEVEL (3) and LEVEL(4) of Table 1 are 
straightforward extensions of LEVEL(1) and 
extend dynamics bit-by-bit. LEVEL(2) includes 
a lagged dependent in the regression and 
allows for state dependence accordingly 
(i.e., the constant in the regression is then 
allowed to vary from onset to continuation). 
The lagged dependent variable is highly 
significant and LEVEL(2) explains about 
60% of the data as opposed to the 17% of 
the LEVEL(1) specifications. LEVEL(3) adds 
duration dummies to allow for peace 
and war duration. LEVEL(4) estimates our 
baseline regression model by allowing 
all marginal effects of xit to vary from onset 
to continuation. LEVEL(4) models dynamics 
and controls, yet does not solve for 
Table 1. Foreign aid and civil conflict (models in levels)
Note. LEVEL(1a), LEVEL(2), LEVEL(3), LEVEL(4) report ro-
bust standard errors in brackets allowing for heteroske-
dasticity. LEVEL(1b) reports clustered standard errors 
allowing for error correlation within countries and for 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 
5 and 10% level.
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unobserved heterogeneity as the unobserved 
country effects (either fixed or random) 
remain in the error term (12): 
where (13)
for causal interpretation of the OLS estimates 
of LEVEL(4) we need (14): 
To obtain consistent estimates of βon 
and βcontwe need the errors to have 
expectation zero, conditional on xit and, 
perhaps more interestingly, on  the  lagged 
dependent ci,t−1 and the duration variables. 
It is essential to note that this requirement 
rules out any autocorrelation in the error 
terms.55 The important conclusion from Eq. 
(14) is therefore that standard onset or 
continuation models in levels (implicitly) 
assume that malfunctioning institutions, 
deep-rooted political grievances, vicious 
rebel leaders or other fixed unobservables 
cannot be important determinants of civil 
war. Not to mention that these factors are 
likely to correlate strongly with measures of 
aid flows, yielding an additional source of 
bias in the LEVEL estimates. 
It stands out from the LEVEL regressions 
of Table 1 that the  xit’s seem to have 
very little explanatory power in addition 
to modeling dynamics. In fact, the    xit’s 
are jointly  insignificant in the LEVEL(4) 
regression. Moreover, we find that the 
residual autocorrelation is eradicated 
when state and duration dependence are 
both accounted for. These results have been 
a little puzzling at first as we did not find the 
familiar correlations that have been found in 
numerous other studies on onset,56 combined 
with residual autocorrelation due to the 
55 In a nonlinear environment, such as probit or logit, 
similar requirements can be defined.
56 Note that we do find these correlations in LEVEL(1).
unobserved effects. Even though we do not 
find any autocorrelation in the residuals of 
the LEVEL(3) and LEVEL(4) regressions, the 
absence of autocorrelation in the errors is 
hard to justify from a practical point of view. 
Without a doubt, the unobserved factors 
mentioned before (and there are many more 
of these factors) are important determinants 
of civil conflict. Estimating standard probit/
logit or linear probability models in levels 
however, require that these unobserved 
effects do not, in any way, relate to conflict. 
A consistent explanation for this phenomenon 
(i.e., no residual autocorrelation and 
weak explanatory power of the regressors) 
is reported by Griliches (1961). Griliches 
(1961) derives biases of the OLS parameter 
estimators in (stationary) dynamic models 
with autocorrelated errors. Errors that 
are positively autocorrelated (e.g. due to 
time invariant unobserved effects) yield 
attenuated parameter estimates associated 
with the xit’s, and blow up parameter estimates 
associated with the lagged dependent. A by-
product of the biased parameter estimates is 
that the implied residuals appear less serially 
correlated than the true errors. However, 
explicit formulas for this type of biases have 
not been derived in linear probability or 
nonlinear probit/logit models yet and is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Some of 
these properties however stand out from 
our regression results. 
Another potential violation of assumption 
(14) is due to correlation between the 
unobserved time invariant effects and some 
important covariates such as aid flows. 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) for example show 
that donors have all kinds of political and 
strategic motivations for giving country 
a more than country b, in addition to a 
recipient country’s economic need and 
policy performance. Whereas Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) have established correlations 
between aid flows and a lot of observables 
there are probably many more unobservable 
factors determining the size of aid flows. 
In relation to this study for example, we 
suppose that donors in general would prefer 
to support non-violent regimes in favor of 
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violent regimes (ceteris paribus). It seems 
likely that aid flows are correlated with at 
least some of the unobserved determinants 
of conflict. The empirical literature on 
conflict however, tends to neglect the 
effects of country specific unobserved 
heterogeneity on estimating parameters in 
onset and continuation models. 
Fixed effects in linear dynamic models are 
typically dealt with by applying a first 
difference transformation to the model 
in levels.57 First differencing estimating 
Eq. (8) eliminates the unobserved country 
effects, hence solves for both the correlation 
between the αi’s and the lagged dependents 
and the as well as correlation between the αi’s 
and the xit’s. 
3.3 Regressions in first differences 
The remainder of the paper is about models 
that are estimated in first differences, 
and more specifically on the effects of 
foreign aid flows on the onset and the 
continuation probability. First differencing Eq. 
(8) eliminates the fixed effects and yields the 
following regression model (15): 
Eliminating the αi’s  partly solves 
the endogeneity problems due to 
correlations between the xit’s, lagged 
dependents and the αi’s. OLS regressions on 
the Eq. (15) yield consistent estimates of the 
parameters of interest under the following 
assumption (16): 
With Eq. (15) we claim to have the framework 
right for estimating the effects we are 
interested in. However, we have argued that 
the endogeneity of aid flows is not only 
due to correlation with the fixed effects. 
57 An inconsistent way of dealing with the fixed effects 
would be including i dummies in the regression to esti-
mate them (i.e., FE/LSDV estimation). This identification 
strategy requires all regressors to be strictly exogenous 
and is violated by construction in dynamic models.
Rebel uproar or the temporary rule of 
violent leadership in recipient countries, 
all captured by εit, indicate increased 
likelihood of future conflict and urge 
donors to suspend or reallocate funds. If as 
a consequence war indeed breaks out, the 
observed correlations in first differences 
could be mistaken for a causal effect. Lagging 
aid flows in regressions solves this problem 
only partially. Increased rebel activity is not 
necessarily causing war outbreak immediately. 
Donors however, easily anticipate increased 
likelihoods of conflict (by observing 
increased rebel activity) and reallocate aid 
flows before conflicts actually flare up. In 
econometric terms, lagging aid flows solves 
for simultaneity bias (i.e., reversed causality), 
but not for omitted variable bias due to 
anticipation. We would indeed like to include 
variables measuring rebel activity. When the 
endogenous aid allocation mechanism is true, 
assumption (16) is untenable. 
The standard treatment procedure for 
endogenously determined variables is to 
use instrumental variables (IV) techniques to 
separate out the anticipation effect from the 
true causal mechanism that we are interested 
in. For this we use additional information 
(i.e., an instrument) that is correlated with 
aid flows, but not with the endogenous 
allocation mechanism. A proper instrument 
should therefore satisfy two properties: with 
all other important variables controlled for, 
the instrument should be correlated with 
the endogenous regressor (i.e., good first 
stage explanatory power), and uncorrelated 
with the error term of the regression model 
(i.e., the exclusion restriction should not be 
violated). 
We propose GDP levels of large western donor 
countries as instruments for aid flows. The 
intuition behind this idea is that the inflow 
of aid to the whole sub-Saharan region on 
average is a linear function of donor’s GDP. On 
24 October 1970, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 2626, The 
International Development Strategy for 
the Second United Nations Development 
Decade. With this resolution, developed 
countries agreed to increase their official 
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development assistance to developing 
countries to a level equivalent to 0.7% 
of their Gross National Product at market 
prices, and to do their best to meet these 
goals by 1975 (see paragraph (43) of the 
resolution). Even though only a small group 
of countries has ever reached the 0.7% it 
is likely that aid flows and donor GDP levels 
are correlated. Donor countries attempt to 
commit to a constant fraction of GDP for 
development assistance in total, independent 
of anywar in any individual recipient 
country. The distribution among recipient 
countries however is subject to the political 
situation in recipient countries and perhaps 
to the strategic interest of the donor and 
is therefore endogenous. Some authors 
have constructed instruments for foreign aid 
building on a similar rationale (see for example 
Tavares, 2003; Rajan and Subramanian, 2005; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2007). 
Good first stage explanatory power in the 
above model means simply that donor’s 
GDP is partially correlated with our measure of 
aid (i.e., correlation after controlling for other 
factors affecting conflict). The nonlinear fit 
between U.S. GDP levels and the aid to GDP 
ratio’s of sub-Saharan African countries 
(based on the IV-FD(3) model of Table 2) is 
presented graphically in Fig. 4. Both curves 
are reasonably linear as well as increasing 
as we would have expected, and are in fact 
highly significant when a linear regression 
line is fitted (the F-statistics are above 10, see 
Tables 2 and 3). The positive partial correlation 
between donor’s GDP and the aid flows 
summarizes the first requirement for a good 
instrument. 
Table 2 reports our estimation results using 
GDP of the United States to instrument 
aid flows. U.S. GDP works particularly well in 
the first stage as it is by far the largest donor 
in absolute terms. As a robustness check we 
discuss our estimation results using GDP levels 
of the United Kingdom and Japan (Section 
3.3.2).58 
58 Using GDP levels of other major donors like Germany 
and France did not work as well in the first stage.
Satisfying the exclusion restriction is the 
other necessary requirement for a good 
instrument. In practice we need the error 
term of the estimating equation to be 
uncorrelated with the instruments. However, 
for a causal interpretation of the parameter 
estimates we need the stronger assumption 
of mean independency. Table 2 estimates 
the model in first differences, where aid flows 
are considered endogenous. The IV-FD 
regressions are consistent estimates of the 
causal parameters that we are interested in 
under the following assumptions (i.e., the 
exclusion restrictions) (17): 
DGDPt-5 is a vector of levels of donor GDP and 
is defined analogous to our measure of aid: 
we have averaged GDP of a donor country 
from period t−5 up to t−1 and calculated 
log’s subsequently. 
Whereas failing regimes or changes in rebel 
movement are omitted variables and 
cause trouble in the OLS regressions (in 
first differences), their influence also limits 
the choice set for potential instruments. 
Potential instruments that are specific 
characteristics of recipient countries, 
and are somehow related to aid flows, are 
quite easily correlated with some of the 
many factors causing conflict as well. 
U.S. GDP is unlikely to be systematically 
related to specific characteristics at the 
recipient country level and is therefore a 
good candidate for a proper instrument. 
This is also the reason why we chose not to 
interact our instrument with for example the 
cultural and geographical distance that are 
used by e.g., Tavares (2003) and Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005)59 in their studies. The 
exogeneity of cultural and geographical 
distance within our specific context is 
debatable. Cultural ties (common language, 
colonial ties etc.), geographical positioning, 
as well as civil conflict are highly clustered in 
a spatial sense. This empirical fact is likely to 
produce correlations between conflict and 
59 Whether an aid recipient country is a former colony of 
a donor may be regarded as a measure of cultural proxim-
ity.
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these interaction variables that we typically do 
not want to mix up with any potential effects 
of aid flows. Note that the above mentioned 
authors study phenomena different to conflict, 
such that their identification strategy may 
be appropriate for their particular purposes. 
The strength of our instrument however comes 
at a cost. Because our instrument is not 
specific to recipient countries it is impossible 
to include time dummies to capture sub-
Saharan African wide changes to the 
incidence of conflict. This would be problematic 
when these shocks are directly related to 
donor’s GDP and are not sufficiently captured 
by any of our conditioning variables. It is 
therefore essential to include variables 
as GDP, economic growth, dependence on 
primary commodity exports, dependence 
on world oil prices (especially when the 
country is an oil exporter), and a dummy for the 
cold war years as controls. Measures of trade 
flows would be another factor that could be 
related to U.S. GDP, and in one way or another, 
to conflict. Due to lack of available data on 
measures of trade data we did not include it 
in the baseline model. We have included 
measures of trade in one of the robustness 
checks, but it is not changing the results. 
Table 2. Foreign aid and civil conflict (IV models in first 
differences)
Note. Robust standard errors are in brackets allowing 
for heteroskedasticity. Etholinguistic fractionalization, 
religious fractionalization and log mountainous area are 
dropped (i.e., they are first differenced out). Instrumental 
variables used to instrument foreign aid flows: changes in 
log’s of five year averages of nominal US GDP, interacted 
with 1−ci,t − 1 and ci,t − 1 for the onset and continuation 
model respectively. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 
5 and 10% level.5 and 10% level.
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3.3.1 Main regression results 
We have estimated three versions of Eq. (15) 
using three different sets of controls. The 
regression results are reported in Table 2. IV-
FD(1) includes just our aid measure as well 
as a constant in order to pick up trending 
behavior in some of the key variables (see Fig. 
2). IV-FD(2) models duration dependence 
explicitly using dummies. IV-FD(3) adds a 
full set of controls to the duration dummies. 
Allowing both for dynamics, fixed 
effects and using IV techniques for the aid 
measure reveals some interesting and 
new empirical patterns that are otherwise 
blurred by hard-to-interpret between country 
correlations. 
All three IV specifications yield a significant 
and clear-cut negative, and economically 
important effect of foreign aid flows on 
the conflict continuation probability. A 
10% increase in aid relative to recipient 
GDP decreases the probability of conflict 
continuation by about 8% points in both IV-
FD(2) and IV-FD(3). The effect is significantly 
different  from the effect on onset at 
the 1% level (test results not shown). The 
stripped down model IV-FD(1) estimates the 
marginal effects of aid flows almost twice 
as large (a 10% increase in aid is associated 
with a 15% point drop in the continuation 
probability). This outcome suggests that their 
are indeed some indirect aid effects on the 
conflict probability that are subsequently 
picked up by the duration dummies or the 
controls. Whereas Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
only find indirect effects of aid on conflict 
(through its effect on output), we show that 
after correcting for various endogeneity 
issues aid has an important direct effect as 
well. Yet, Collier and Hoeffler’s results are 
not contradicted here as we also do not find 
a relationship of aid flows with the onset 
probability. We do however, have a different 
identification strategy by first differencing 
and instrumenting and therefore add to the 
empirical evidence on the effects on onset 
as well. 
We have also estimated Eq. (15) without 
instrumenting aid flows (results not shown, 
but available on request). Aid flows appeared 
only significant at 10% on the continuation 
probability in the OLS equivalents of models 
IV-FD(2) and IV-FD(3). The parameter estimate 
we find however, is about −0.17 and 
significantly smaller than in the IV regressions. 
The parameter estimates associated with 
the other regressors are not affected by 
instrumenting aid flows. Instrumenting aid 
therefore identifies a larger effect (in absolute 
terms) as compared to the OLS estimates in 
first differences indicating that endogeneity 
is important. The negative impact of the 
OLS estimates (not reported) indicates that 
relatively high levels of aid are associated with 
ending conflicts (i.e., the number of battle 
deaths dropping below the 25 threshold). 
When we instrument aid flows we find an even 
stronger negative relationship suggesting 
that donors direct aid away over the course 
of civil conflicts. Donors might lose confidence 
that their money is used for the ‘right’ 
purposes so when in the end conflicts 
terminate, donors are giving less than they 
Fig. 4. Positive partial correlation between the change in 
log average U.S. GDP and the change in the log of the av-
erage aid to GDP ratio in sub-Saharan African countries.
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would have done otherwise. Eliminating this 
reallocation effect identifies a stronger 
negative causal impact on the continuation 
probability of aid flows. However, it is typically 
hard to read the donor’s minds, moreover 
comparing IV and OLS outcomes requires 
speculation about all ‘endogenous 
mechanisms’. An equally valid explanation 
of our findings would be for example the 
presence of important measurement error 
in the foreign aid to GDP ratio. 
The negative effects on continuation are quite 
substantial. Whereas the unconditional 
continuation probability is about 90%, a 
structural increase in aid flows by 10% would 
decrease the continuation probability to 
about 82%. Predicting what a similar-sized 
drop in aid flows would do however is not 
straightforward to derive, as probabilities 
may not exceed 100%. We should keep in 
mind that by construction, marginal effects 
on probabilities are nonlinear (or zero) on 
the regressor’s domain, simply because 
probabilities are bounded between zero and 
one. The substantive magnitude of the 
marginal effects therefore flattens off in the 
neighborhood of 0 or 1. Linear Probability 
Models assume these nonlinearities away, 
merely for estimation purposes. A drawback 
of the linear probability approach is that 
the model is able to predict outside the 
permitted interval. We do not however, find 
any evidence for off the charts predictions. 
The predicted probabilities of the IV-FD(3) 
fall neatly within the −1 to 1 interval. The 
conflict variable in first differences is either 
−1, 0 or 1, such that predicting within the −1 
to 1 range is correct. We find that both onset 
and continuation is negatively related to the 
lagged economic growth rate, supporting 
the Miguel et al.’s (2004a) findings. The size 
of our estimates however, is smaller than 
theirs.60 More surprisingly perhaps, we find 
that lagged economic output per capita 
is positively related to both the onset and 
the continuation probability. This result 
is surprising as it drives into one of the 
most established findings in the literature 
on conflict: civil war is more likely in poor 
countries. Note that we do have these well-
known negative correlations in our data 
[see Table 1: LEVEL(1), LEVEL(2), as well as 
Fig.1]. The IV-FD findings on GDP per capita 
should therefore not be interpreted as 
a particularity of our data, but as a result 
from our identification strategy and an 
interesting subject for future research.61 
Models that neglect fixed effects typically 
report negative relationships with GDP 
per capita and find no relationship with aid 
flows. Our results suggest that unobserved 
fixed factors may therefore be held 
accountable for these typical findings. The 
unexpected positive  GDP per capita effect 
in both the onset and the continuation 
model in first differences can be explained 
by a build up of GDP levels in the peace 
years before conflict sets in, and decreasing 
GDP during conflict years, as a result from 
the destruction of human and physical 
60 We are able to use Miguel et al.’s (2004a) rainfall in-
struments in a stripped down version of our model in 
first differences, and replicate their substantive findings 
on economic growth (results not shown but available on 
request). The model we use in our regressions is more ex-
tensive in terms of dynamics, and therefore also a lot more 
demanding on the instruments.
61 Not instrumenting aid flows does not affect these 
findings.
Table 3. Foreign aid and civil conflict (first stage regres-
sions)
Note. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Robust t-
statistics are in parenthesis. For reasons of space the con-
ditioning variables are suppressed. Results are available 
upon request ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level.
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capital. A definitive judgement about this 
pattern requires more in-depth research and 
is left for future projects. 
The estimates on the duration dummies 
show an interesting patterns concerning 
periods of peace and conflict. Peace 
seems particularly fragile in the early years 
after civil conflict has ended, when the onset 
probability is significantly higher. This effect 
however may result from the fact that our 
conflict variable is not necessarily capturing 
peace, but perhaps only a relatively peaceful 
period in between two conflicts. However, 
when countries survive this unstable period, 
the onset probability becomes significantly 
smaller. The duration dependence seems 
to work in the opposite direction on the 
continuation probability. Especially in the 
early stages of conflict, conflicts have a 
relatively high probability to end. Here also we 
could think of a situation where civil tension 
is just there, and comes to an eruption every 
once and a while. However, when conflicts 
continue past this point, the probability of 
ending decreases. We have not included all 
possible duration dummies in the regressions 
in order to save on degrees of freedom. We 
have tested whether including the omitted 
dummies is significantly improving the fit, but 
it is not. 
3.3.2 Robustness checks 
We have verified the robustness of the IV-
FD(3) results by using different subsets 
of our instruments (i.e., GDP levels of 
other important donor countries) and 
by including measures of trade in the 
regression.62 We also include higher order 
trends in the regression addressing the 
possible trending behavior in both our 
measure of aid, our instruments as well as our 
measure of conflict. We pay extra attention 
to the period around the end of the cold war 
when a sudden increase in the number of 
civil wars is observed. 
Including GDP levels of two other large 
donors (i.e., Japan and the United 
Kingdom) separately in the instrument set 
62 We have not reported these results in our baseline 
model due to missing data. Results available on request.
works fine and yields similar outcomes. 
Including GDP levels of all three donors in 
the instrument set together also yield 
similar results. Moreover, we were not able 
to reject the over identification test on the 
additional instruments (Hansen-J test). Using 
GDP levels of other important donors such 
as Germany or France did not work very well in 
the first stage regression (e.g., using GDP of 
France would yield similar results, but only 
significant at 10%). 
We have included lagged measures of trade 
as it is another potential channel through 
which GDP of donor countries could influence 
the incidence of conflict. Nevertheless, 
trade measures are insignificant in the 
conflict regression and do not change the 
results qualitatively. The results of these 
regressions are not reported as about 15% of 
the observations were lost due to missing 
data. Clearly, our instruments do not allow for 
including time dummies in the regression (time 
dummies are not identified simultaneously 
with the other model parameters). We have 
included quadratic and cubic trends in order 
to anticipate spurious correlation due to 
trending behavior of some of the variables of 
interest. Including trends did not change 
the results quantitatively. However, the 
significant positive effect of recipient GDP 
on onset disappeared. Excluding the linear 
trend that is in our baseline specification, 
also did not change the results qualitatively. 
The sudden increase of civil conflicts around 
the end of the cold war may also be 
‘accidentally’ related to our instruments and 
aid flows. We have addressed this possibility 
by adding time dummies for this period (i.e., 
1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992) and by leaving out 
these years. Both strategies did not weaken 
the aid effects on continuation. In fact, the 
effects we find were a little stronger. 
4. Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that when endogeneity 
issues (i.e., random/fixed effects, the 
endogeneity of aid allocation process) are 
appropriately controlled for, foreign aid is 
found to have a direct negative impact on 
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the probability of an ongoing civil conflict 
to continue (the continuation probability). 
In other words, our results suggest that 
increasing aid flows decreases the duration 
of conflict. We do not however, find a 
relationship between aid flows and the 
probability of a civil conflict to start (the onset 
probability). The size of these effects is 
economically important. We estimate a 
marginal effect on the continuation probability 
of −0.8, implying that a structural increase in 
aid flows by 10% decreases the continuation 
probability by 8% points. 
To our knowledge this research is the first 
that efficiently accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity in onset and continuation 
models by first differencing the regression 
equations. The standard empirical approach 
on onset and to a lesser extent continuation 
(because scholars often model duration 
directly) is to presume i.i.d. errors in linear 
models, or conditional independence of 
observations in nonlinear probit/logit 
type models. This standard assumption is 
highly restrictive as widespread grievances 
or institutional issues are at least partially 
unobserved and simply assumed away. 
The elimination of fixed effects by first 
differencing and the use of donor GDP as 
a powerful instrument for aid flows base our 
results. 
We do not find our results directly at odds 
with those from earlier studies that 
have attempted to establish a relationship 
between aid and civil war [e.g., Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002)]. Like our study, Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002) do not find an effect on 
onset, but merely argue that aid impacts 
on conflict through its effect upon national 
income and reduced primary commodity 
dependence. They do not however, consider 
the probability of conflict continuation in 
their studies. Yet, our study is different as 
we explicitly attempt to solve some important 
endogeneity issues. We therefore add to the 
literature not only by identifying a significant 
effect of aid flows on continuation, but also by 
restating that there is no evidence for aid 
flows to have an effect on onset. 
Our results are supporting the theoretical 
hypothesis from Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
as well as some of the empirical results 
from Collier and Hoeffler (2007). Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002) reason that aid flows 
facilitate governments to develop a strong 
army due to fungibility of aid into military 
expenditure. Their recent 2007 paper finds 
empirical evidence for this mechanism and 
estimates that about 40% of foreign aid 
transfers into military expenditure (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2007). Our results suggest 
that aid translates into military expenditure 
more effectively when a country is at war, or 
when a country is experiencing increased 
likelihoods of war. It seems intuitive that the 
marginal benefits from investment in the 
military is larger during war than at peace. A 
government army suppressing violent rebel 
groups however, is not necessarily a good 
thing, as aid flows support any leadership, 
also those that are unwarranted by 
society. Nevertheless, foreign aid flows may 
be an important tool to policymakers and 
aid agencies in preventing future conflict.
Appendix  
Aid to GDP ratio. We construct a ratio of current 
aid to current GDP, both measured in 
current US$. In the regressions we use a five 
year average of the ratio and constructed 
the natural logarithm. 
Aid. (www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline). 
“usd-amount”.  This measure is derived by 
converting current aid flows in current US 
dollars, using current exchange rates (you 
attain the face value US dollar amount). 
Recipient GDP.  We have obtained current 
GDP in US$ from the World Development 
Indicators. When observations were 
missing we imputed current GDP measures 
from the PWT 6.1 
(
€ 
US$ = I $ * PPP t
xratt
* pop*1000 ). Both measures are 
highly similar when the data overlap. 
Donor GDP. Penn World Tables. We calculate 
GDP of the donor countries in current 
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US$, using the following transformation: 
€ 
US$ = I $ * PPP t
xratt
* pop*1000 . 
Per capita GDP for sub-Saharan African 
countries. The source for this was the Fearon 
and Laitin (2003b) Database. Per capita 
GDP has been measured in 1000s of 1985 
International (=PPP-adjusted) Dollars. The 
data set is available at http://www.stanford.
edu/ jfearon/..jprrepdata.zip. 
Civil Conflict. Data on civil conflict has 
been acquired from the Armed Conflict 
Database developed by the Peace research 
Institute Oslo, Norway and the University of 
Uppsala, Sweden and is available at http://
www.prio.no. 
Duration variables. We construct the variable 
from the civil conflict variable dating 
back to 1973 (if data is available). Peace 
duration calculates the number of peace 
years from the start of a peace period. 
Conflict duration calculates the number of 
conflict years from the start of a conflict. 
Primary commodity dependence. Fearon (2005) 
data set.  The missing observations are 
interpolated and extrapolated. 
GDP growth  t−1. Based on per capita GDP for 
sub-Saharan Africa, from Fearon and Laitin 
(2003b) database. 
Real oil prices. http://research.stlouisfed.org/. 
Federal reserve bank St. Louis. 
For all of the following variables we used 
data that were drawn from Fearon and 
Laitin (2003b). A description of the data can 
be found in Miguel et al. (2004b) and some 
additional information is available from 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/
workingpapers/ addtabs.pdf. 
Revised polity score. Levels of democracy 
are measured using an index from the 
Polity IV data set developed by the Center 
for International Development and Conflict 
Management (CIDCM) at Penn State 
University. Polity is the difference between 
Polity IVs measure of democracy minus its 
measure of autocracy. Values range from10 
to 10. A detailed description of the constructed 
index is available at http://www.cidcm.umd.
edu/inscr/polity/ Source: Fearon and Laitin 
(2003b). – Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
Ethnic-linguistic fractionalization based on 
the Atlas Marodov Mira. Source: Fearon and 
Laitin (2003b). 
Religious fractionalization. Data used from 
the CIA factbook. Source: Fearon and Laitin 
(2003b). 
Oil-exporting country. Data was drawn 
from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) on fuel exports as a percentage 
of merchandize exports, which is 
available forfive year periods from1960 
and annually from 1980. Missing 
years prior to 1980 and after 1960 were 
linearly interpolated where possible. 
Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003b). 
In mountainous Percent Mountainous Terrain. 
Available data from A.J. Gerard for the 
World Bank’s “Economics of Civil War, Crime, 
and Violence” project and own estimated 
values for those countries not included in 
Gerard’s work by making use of the difference 
(in meters) between the highest and lowest 
elevation points in each country as provided 
in the CIA factbook. Source: Fearon and Laitin 
(2003b). 
In national population t−1. Log of population 
lagged one year. Source: Fearon and Laitin 
(2003b).
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Grievance, Commodity Prices 
and Rainfall63
A Village-level Analysis of 
Rebel Recruitment in Burundi
Abstract 
Grievance, and reduced opportunity costs are two popular ideas within the civil war literature to 
explain participation in violent rebellion. We test both hypotheses at the village-level using data 
on recruitment activities during the civil war in Burundi. We use historical data on violent attacks in 
1972 and 1988 as a proxy for grievance. The cross-sectional analyses report no effect of grievance on 
the likelihood of recruitment. By contrast, they do show tentative support for the idea that reduced 
opportunity costs may promote recruitment. Villages that had above mean incidents of ‘insufficient 
rain’ were more likely to have recruitment activities than others. We find similar results when we use 
recall information on recruitment to construct a 13-year panel. Negative income shocks through 
adverse weather conditions are a strong predictor of recruitment. By contrast we find no effect of 
commodity price shocks. These findings are consistent with a recent conclusion from literature: 
commodity price shocks show no robust relationship with civil war violence while weather shocks 
do.
63 This paper was co-authored with Philip Verwimp, Fund for Scientific Research (Flanders, Belgium), University of Antwerp 
and Université Libre de Bruxelles
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1.  Introduction
The empirical analysis of the causes and 
consequences of civil war is the subject of 
study in a growing literature in economics and 
political science. This may in part be attributed 
to the empirical fact that since the end of the 
Second World War, intrastate violence is far 
more common than international wars. Of the 
34 armed conflicts listed in the Armed Conflict 
Dataset for 2001, all but one were civil wars 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002).  Despite increased 
scholarship on the topic the causes of civil 
warfare are still not well understood. The vast 
majority of the civil war research consists of 
cross-country analyses. While instructive, they 
can only explain part of the puzzle at best. They 
for example gloss over regional, household, or 
individual conditions by construction. That 
is, it cannot satisfactorily explain why some 
people actively participate in fighting war 
while the majority does not (Blattman and 
Miguel, 2009). 
Theories about why people participate in 
violent rebellion date back to the classic 
sociological literature on agrarian revolutions 
(Scott, 1976; Gurr, 1971). These theories center 
on the idea that grievances about economic 
or political inequality induce rebellion. While 
some economists and political scientists 
subscribe to this view, alternative sets of 
mechanisms have been identified. For example, 
these include the idea that individuals who 
join warring factions are motivated by private 
gains that only accrue to those that actively 
participate in the fighting. Incentives may 
stem from wages, looting opportunities, 
promises of future rewards or to be protected 
from violence from the rebel group itself as 
well as other fighting faction(s) (e.g. Olson, 
1965; Lichbach, 1994; Grossman, 1991; Besley 
and Persson 2008; Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2008). 
Since recent years scholars have used 
regional or individual level data to empirically 
test these seemingly rival explanations. A 
prime example of the latter is the study by 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) on Sierra 
Leone. They test to what extent grievances, 
selective incentives, and (or) social sanctions 
can explain participation in both rebel groups 
as well as local militias (counterinsurgents who 
want to preserve the status quo). Others use 
regional or district-level data to investigate 
under which conditions people are motivated 
to pick up arms. Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 
(2009), analyse local conflicts in Indonesia, and 
find a positive correlation between violence 
and unemployement, as well as violence and 
income inequality. Do and Iyer (2007) examine 
determinants of the intensity of civil war in 
Nepal, and find that higher rates of poverty and 
lower levels of literacy prior to the outbreak 
of the Maoist insurgency are correlated with 
greater conflict intensity within the district. 
Dube and Vargas (2007) present evidence for 
Colombia on the mechanism linking the price 
of export commodities to violence. They show 
that a drop in the price of coffee substantially 
increased the incidence and intensity of the 
civil war in coffee-intensive areas, whereas an 
increase in the price of oil has a similar effect. 
They attribute this to the lowering of the 
opportunity cost of joining a rebel movement 
(via depressed wages) in the case of coffee 
and an increase in local state revenue in the 
case of oil. 
Our paper is close in spirit to studies of the latter 
type. We use cross-sectional and constructed 
panel data from a sample of Burundian villages 
to examine the determinants of recruitment 
activities during the Burundi civil war. Our 
contribution is twofold: (i) we use novel data 
from large-scale nationally representative 
household and community surveys to examine 
village-level determinants of recruitment; and 
(ii) we complement the cross-sectional findings 
with (recall-based) panel data analyses to 
examine whether variation in recruitment 
activities systematically varies with changing 
economic conditions. We consider variation 
in the producer price of coffee and negative 
rainfall shocks to probe into the issue of when 
the risk of rebellion is at its peak. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
reviews the course of the civil war in Burundi. 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 and 
Section 5 present the empirical results. Section 
6 discusses and concludes. 
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2. The Burundi civil war 
Burundi has until recently been involved in 
long and a brutal civil war that left hundreds 
of thousands of people dead, maimed or 
displaced. Massive bloodshed took place in 
1972, where the armed forces slaughtered 
between 80.000 and 200.000 (mostly wealthy 
and intellectual) Hutu. In 1988, responding 
to a similar uprising where several thousand 
Tutsi were killed, “peace” was restored by the 
government forces killing 20.000 Hutu (HRW, 
1998). Although no formal investigation into 
the 1988 massacres was allowed, president 
Buyoya sought for means to reconcile Hutu 
and Tutsi rather than controlling the Hutu 
majority by repression. Several Hutu were 
appointed to government positions. Many 
Tutsi however viewed loss of ruling power 
and the resulting massacres in neighboring 
Rwanda as a warning sign for what would 
happen if they started sharing power with the 
Hutu. They therefore resisted Buyoya’s reforms 
with unsuccessful coups in 1989 and 1992. 
Despite internal opposition, elections were 
held in 1993 and on July 1, Melchior Ndadaye 
became Burundi’s first Hutu president. The 
newly installed president made important 
changes in the local administration and 
planned to reform the almost exclusively Tutsi 
army to increase ethnic and regional diversity 
(HRW, 1998). The attempts to reform however 
brutally ended with the killing of Ndadaye in 
October 1993.  
The eruption of Hutu-led violence following 
the killing of the president was retaliated 
by massive indiscriminate violence by the 
government forces. HRW reports: “The army 
responded with clashes on Hutu making no 
distinction between communities involved in 
violence against Tutsi and those that were not. 
In a period of only a few weeks anywhere from 
30.000 to 50.000 people were slain, roughly an 
equal number from each ethnic group.” Uvin 
(1998) elaborates: “On October 21, 1993, low-
level soldiers killed President Ndadaye and 
other dignitaries after only three months in 
office, with at least passive support from the 
highest levels of the army. Popular unrest then 
erupted throughout Burundi, and thousands 
of Tutsi were brutally killed, especially in the 
north and center. The army moved in to restore 
order, killing thousands of Hutu in the process. 
In total, it is estimated that 50,000 to 100,000 
persons were murdered in the three months 
after the coup; one million fled the country; 
and hundreds of thousands were internally 
displaced.” The scope and intensity of the 
violence was unprecedented and resulted in 
a gruesome civil war that lasted sixteen years, 
leaving the country and its citizens in ruins. 
3. Data 
3.1 Sample design and questionnaire
We use the 1998 and 2007 Burundi Priority 
Surveys including household and village level 
variables. The Burundi Priority Survey 1998 
was implemented by the Burundi Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies (ISTEEBU) in 
cooperation with the World Bank. The research 
was undertaken in all provinces across the 
country to be nationally representative and 
took place between October 1998 and March 
1999.64 In 2007, ISTEEBU collected the second 
wave of data for a subsample of the 1998 
households in cooperation with a team of 
academics. 
Household and individual data were 
collected foremost on socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics, income, 
consumption and assets, trust, social capital 
and subjective welfare measures. The 
community questionnaire entailed questions 
about infrastructure, violence, village-level 
clashes, and recruitment. For the community 
questionnaire we relied on a set of ‘key experts’ 
often the village level leader accompanied by 
elders. 
The questionnaires were designed in French 
but interviews were conducted in Kirundi. We 
trained 65 interviewers during a one-week 
64 Due to on-going violence in the provinces of Makam-
ba, Bubanza and Bujumbura rural no ‘second wave’ inter-
views were undertaken in these areas. In Makamba no 
interviews were held in 1998 either while in Bubanza and 
Bujumbura rural only a very small sample of households 
was interviewed then as a result of the war.    
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training. The questionnaire was pilot tested in 
an out of sample village and final corrections 
were made. 50 interviewers were selected in a 
competitive exam that included a case study 
on household composition, consumption and 
production as well as a range of questions on 
research ethics. Each team of five interviewers 
was supervised by a team leader. Two out of 
five team members were women. 
With the 2007 round we targeted 1.000 
households out of the 1998 sample that 
encompassed 3908 rural households in 
sixteen provinces. We randomly selected 
a subsample of 100 out of the 390 clusters 
(villages or ‘collines’ in French). In each cluster 
we then interviewed all households that were 
part of the 1998 sample 10 per cluster). Of the 
initial 1.000 households we were able to re-
interview 872, having an attrition rate of less 
than 13%.  This is reasonable considering that 
a civil war was going on in the years between 
the survey rounds; causing many deaths and 
massive displacements and hence led to an 
increased chance that entire households had 
completely disappeared.65 
The high rate of successful tracing was 
influenced by at the least the following three 
factors; first, the team of researchers spent 
much time to train local interviewers in tracing 
household members who were interviewed 
in 1998. If a household was not found the 
interviewer would approach neighbors 
and other people from the colline to get 
information as detailed as possible about the 
household, i.e. why it moved, and where it 
moved to. Our interviewers often managed to 
obtain information on, sometimes distinctly 
different, reasons for moving of the household 
head and the remaining members respectively. 
Second, the country is very small and people 
live isolated at the collines, where everyone 
knows about each others’ whereabouts. Third, 
in Burundi the pressure of land is extraordinary 
65  Alderman et al., (2000) discusses the problem of at-
trition. They report attrition rates for Sub-Sahara African 
countries up to 50%. On the other hand, they find that 
coefficient estimates are not significantly affected by at-
trition. Since we use village-level data we do not worry 
about attrition here. 
high (population density is the second highest 
on the African continent, after Rwanda). As a 
result people may have only have fled at the 
very last minute, if there was no other option, 
and return immediately after the violence as 
to ensure their claim to land. Most often, our 
survey team would find the households in the 
same location as in 1998. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics
This section describes first how key dependent 
and independent variables were constructed. 
These variables include recruitment, grievance, 
rainfall shocks, and ethnic heterogeneity. The 
second part presents the sample means for 
the dependent and all independent variables.
The recruitment variable was based on 
information from our community survey. The 
survey question asked whether recruitment 
took place in the village in a given year and 
whether recruitment was voluntary or not.66 
Unfortunately, the survey did not ask for the 
number of recruits for each year. We thus 
define recruitment as a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if recruitment activities had 
taken place in the village in a given year, and 0 
otherwise.  For grievance we rely on anecdotal 
evidence from Human Rights Watch reports 
(2003) and Lemarchand (1994) who describe 
the events and locations of violence in 1972 
and 1988 respectively. Rainfall shocks are 
based on data from our household survey. The 
specific question read as follows (translated 
from French): 
Could you please tell me if your household experienced shocks of 
insufficient rainfall between 1998 and 2007? 
The enumerator would write down the answer 
(yes or no) in a table that listed the years. 
Rainfall shocks can plausibly be regarded 
as covariate shocks in this context. Levels of 
rainfall do not vary within villages in Burundi 
because of their small size. We therefore 
66  In sharp contrast to for example recruitment during 
the civil war in Uganda, Sierra Leone or Sudan, recruit-
ment in Burundi had a predominantly ‘voluntary’ charac-
ter, meaning that people were rarely abducted or taken by 
physical or mental force.
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aggregate the household responses up to the 
village level. To reduce measurement error, at 
least half of the sampled households within the 
village had to indicate ‘yes’ for a given shock 
in a given year, to be assigned 1 (occurrence). 
One may however argue that variation in 
reporting may reflect variation in activities. 
That is, households that have for example non-
agricultural jobs may not consider ‘insufficient 
rainfall’ as a shock. They would hence not 
report it as a shock. If underreporting of rainfall 
shocks exhibits a systematic relation with for 
example village level wealth our results would 
be biased. The data however do not support 
this interpretation. More than 95 percent 
of the sample households rely on rain-fed 
agriculture for their income. Rainfall shocks 
would therefore plausibly affect (nearly) all 
households in the village.
Thus, 
€ 
S jt =1 if 
€ 
sijt ≥ 0.5n
i=1
n
∑ , and 0 otherwise, 
where 
€ 
sijt  is the response to a shock in year  
t by household i  in village j. We subsequently 
sum over t to obtain the total number of rainfall 
shocks for a given village j in the period 1998-
2005. We then create a binary variable that 
took the value 1 if the village had more than 
the sample mean incidents of ‘too low rainfall’ 
and 0 otherwise.
We use a continuous measure of regional 
rainfall shocks in the panel analyses. The 
constructed variable here reflects the annual 
deviation from long-run average rainfall 
levels. Regional rainfall levels are measured 
at weather stations across the country (16 in 
total).  
Given the important ethnic dimension of the 
conflict, we also want to control for ethnic 
heterogeneity. The Burundi government 
however had a very stringent policy after the 
war with respect to collecting ethnic identity 
information and the original questions had 
to be removed from the survey. We therefore 
cannot explicitly control for ethnic composition 
here but use the percentage votes for Ndadaye 
as a proxy. The intuition is as follows: Melchior 
Ndadaye was the first elected Hutu president 
and likely to be most popular among Hutu-
dominated villages. We therefore assume 
that a variation in percentage votes in favor 
of Ndadaye can plausibly resemble the ethnic 
mix within a village. We also partially tested for 
the validity of this assumption when we had 
new data from 2009 at our disposal. 
During our last visit to Burundi in spring 2009, 
we found that regulations were somewhat 
relaxed. As part of a new data collection 
effort we selected a subsample of 35 villages 
for purposes described in Chapter 5 and 6 of 
the dissertation. Household and community 
surveys now included a question on ethnic 
origin. We could thus check for 35 villages 
whether the percentage votes for Ndadaye 
indeed approximated the ethnic composition 
of a particular village. We found the correlation 
coefficient to be positive, reasonably high 
(0.48), and strongly significant at p=0.00. 
Although imperfect nonetheless, since there 
may have been changes in composition since 
the war started, it was the best alternative 
available. Besides, the 2009 data revealed that 
changes in composition were quite marginal 
(values for pre-war ethnic composition were 
based on recall so we could compare the 
two). 
Table 1 presents the means and standard 
deviations of all variables.
4. Cross-section models 
We start our empirical analysis by testing 
whether historical grievances can explain 
variation in recruitment activities between 1993 
and 2005. Table 2 presents the results. Column 
(1) reports the unconditional correlation 
between grievances from violent attacks in the 
past and the probability of recruitment during 
the civil war. The coefficient has the ‘wrong’ 
sign (positive) and is marginally significant at 
10%. The significance is clearly due to omitted 
variables; adding controls in (2) dramatically 
improves the models’ fit and the coefficient for 
grievance is now insignificant. The coefficient 
for coffee growing regions is marginally 
significant suggesting that recruitment was 
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more likely in these areas. Our proxy for Hutu-
dominated villages is a strong significant 
predictor of recruitment. This is unsurprising 
given that Burundi’s rebels were nearly all 
Hutu. 
Column (3) and (4) present the results for 
the alternative idea that low opportunity 
costs drives farmers into the hands of rebel 
organizations. 
Contrary to our grievances variable, we now 
find a positive and significant effect on the 
likelihood that this village had recruitment 
activities between 1993 and 2005. The 
positive effect remains when controls and our 
proxy variable for grievances (column 5) are 
included. The final column (6) includes the 
number of villagers that died as a result of 
violent attacks by the warring factions. Note 
that this represents the total number of people 
in the village that died as a result of the war. The 
coefficient is significant but does not affect the 
variables of interest. Cross-sectional estimates 
are however prone to omitted variables. We 
there do not draw any firm conclusions yet but 
proceed with the panel data analyses.     
5. Panel data models
5.1 Commodity price shocks and recruitment
In this section we test the hypothesis that an 
exogenous shock in export commodity prices 
(coffee) is a positive predictor of recruitment.67 
Income from coffee is an important source 
of revenue for coffee farmers because they 
receive a substantial sum (20 to 30% of their 
monetary income) once a year that can be 
used to cover expenses on durable goods, 
house construction, health and education. This 
sum is then injected in the local economy with 
effects far beyond the coffee sector. For years 
however, Burundian farmers have received a 
bad deal from their government. Compared 
to neighboring countries (e.g. Uganda and 
Rwanda), Burundian coffee producers have 
received very low prices for their produce. 
OCIBU (Burundi’s state-run coffee agency) 
set the producer price annually and was in 
control of marketing and export. Figure 1 
shows that the producer price of coffee set by 
the Burundian government is to some extent 
unrelated to the world market price of coffee. 
The binary variable for recruitment activities 
may arguably be too coarse to reveal a possible 
systematic relation with changes in coffee 
67  We cannot test grievances here as we did in our cross-
section analyses with a (time-invariant) constructed vari-
able based historical data on violent attacks in the 1907s 
and 1980s. In some of the panel specifications we how-
ever included “number of deaths” in the previous year as 
a measure of grievance. On the more speculative note, 
‘votes for Ndadaye’ could proxy Hutu grievances towards 
the former Tutsi government.
Figure 1 Annual development of (real) coffee prices (BUF)
Variable Mean Std. dev. 
Obser-
vations 
Panel A: Village characteristics 
Dummy for negative rainfall 
shocks above sample mean 0.60 0.49 100 
Annual deviation from long-
term average rainfall 0.01 0.28 100 
% Mothers literate in village 0.34 0.18 100 
log Distance to the capital (km) 4.37 0.39 100 
log Population density in 1990 5.38 0.51 100 
log Altitude (m) 7.37 0.75 100 
Dummy for Coffee area 0.83 0.37 100 
Main road in village (0/1) 0.13 0.34 100 
Distance to nearest market 
(scale 1-7) 2.67 0.83 100 
Distance to nearest drinking 
water facility scale (1-7) 1.62 0.61 100 
Distance to health nearest 
health center (scale 1-7) 3.21 0.90 100 
% Votes for Ndadaye 60.53 17.83 100 
Panel B: Civil war variables 
Dummy for historical 
grievances 0.08 0.27 100 
Dummy for recruitment 0.50 0.50 100 
# Deaths resulting from civil 
war violence 56.1 114.3 100 
Panel C: Economic variables 
Producer price of coffee in year 
t (real 1990 Burundi Francs) 120.15 - 100 
World market price of coffee in 
year t (real 1990 Burundi 
Francs) 
409.23 - 100 
 
Table 1 Descriptives
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prices. Nevertheless, in the absence of detailed 
recruitment data, it could still be informative. 
The producer price is related to the farmer’s 
opportunity costs of joining the rebels. We 
therefore expect high producer prices to be 
negatively related to recruitment activities. 
The negative effect may however extend to 
other households within the community, 
as low producer prices will distort the local 
(village) economy and hence spill over to other 
households that do not grow coffee. Simply 
put, farmers then have less money to spend 
on other products sold at the village market 
and hence affect other households as well. 
The panel models allow us to include village 
and year fixed effects. This is commonly 
considered to be a powerful technique to 
mitigate concerns about omitted variable bias, 
giving it a distinct advantage over the cross-
sectional analyses. We fit conditional logit 
models on our dataset. If t is relatively large, 
the conditional maximum likelihood estimator 
is consistent and asymptotically normal 
(Maddala, 1987). The model is formulated in 
terms of the underlying latent model (1):
* *j t t j j j t j tr p coffee Xγ β α λ ε= + + + +
1jtr =    if 
* 0jtr >     
     
0jtr =   if 
* 0jtr ≤
The disadvantage of fixed-effect logit 
models is that villages that did not have 
any recruitment over the given period, or in 
both periods, drop out in the estimation. The 
sample is thus consequently reduced to about 
half of the original sample. We report results 
with the random effects estimator as well. One 
reason for that is to compare the sensitivity of 
our results in the smaller sample to that of the 
full sample. The other reason is to shed more 
light on other village characteristics that could 
explain participation. The dependent variable 
jtr   is a binary variable taking the value 1 if 
village j had recruitment activities in year t and 
0 otherwise. Our key variable of interest is the 
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Opportunity 
 
 
Both 
 
 
Both 
 
Dependent: recruitment (0/1) ML ML ML ML ML ML 
       
Village attacked in 1972/1988 -0.272* -0.257   -0.240 -0.294 
 (0.162) (0.231)   (0.250) (0.238) 
Above mean drought    0.250** 0.236* 0.229* 0.298** 
   (0.098) (0.129) (0.130) (0.135) 
Mother is literate  -0.029  -0.219 -0.133 -0.080 
  (0.371)  (0.363) (0.378) (0.413) 
Distance to capital (log)  0.012  -0.036 0.020 0.145 
  (0.228)  (0.219) (0.227) (0.243) 
Population  (log)  -0.210  -0.254* -0.233 -0.268 
  (0.155)  (0.154) (0.158) (0.170) 
Altitude (log)  -1.054  -0.760 -0.835 -1.019 
  (0.719)  (0.747) (0.746) (0.790) 
Coffee region  0.305*  0.236 0.263 0.387** 
  (0.176)  (0.194) (0.188) (0.170) 
Main road  -0.149  -0.226 -0.205 -0.222 
  (0.206)  (0.197) (0.201) (0.226) 
Distance to market  -0.069  -0.037 -0.047 -0.043 
  (0.089)  (0.092) (0.093) (0.097) 
Distance to drinking water facility  0.107  0.087 0.067 0.051 
  (0.133)  (0.132) (0.132) (0.135) 
Distance to health centre  -0.082  -0.088 -0.088 -0.104 
  (0.081)  (0.081) (0.082) (0.088) 
Votes for Ndadaye  0.014***  0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
# Deaths in village      0.007** 
      (0.003) 
Log-likelihood -68.18 -50.61 -66.28 -49.52 -49.13 -44.33 
Pseudo-R2 0.02 0.21 0.04 0.23 0.24 0.31 
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 2 cross-section models of ‘grievance and ‘reduced 
opportunity costs’ for recruitment at the village level
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All models are estimated using Maximum Likelihood. Mar-
ginal effects reported at mean values.
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interaction between the producer price p and 
a time-invariant variable jcoffee that denotes 
coffee-growing areas. The latter has been 
constructed on altitude ranges that are most 
suitable for growing coffee (1800-2500m). jX
is a series of  other control variables, jα  are N 
village-specific unknown parameters, tλ are 
the year fixed effects and jtε is the error term. 
Naturally, the time-invariant controls jX drop 
out in the fixed effects estimations.  
In Table 3 we present the results for changes 
in coffee prices. Column (1) reports random 
effects estimates for our key variables of 
interest. Although the interaction is negative, 
it is not significant at conventional levels 
(p =0.163). The variable measuring the 
producer price of coffee drops out with year 
dummies. Its value does not vary across 
villages but is set by the central government 
and hence captured by the year fixed effects 
in our estimation. 
Column (2) presents random effects estimates 
including the relevant village controls. Again, 
the coefficient on the interaction term has the 
‘right’ sign, the p-value drops to less than 0.12 
but the effect is not strong enough to reject 
the null hypothesis that the effect is 0. Perhaps 
striking, we also do not find any of the village 
level controls to be a significant predictor 
of recruitment, safe for a marginal positive 
correlation with distance to the nearest health 
center. Column (3) is essentially the same as (2) 
except that we now include the percentage 
of votes Ndadaye. This does not change the 
results. 
Column (4) presents the preferred village fixed-
effect specification. All time-invariant controls 
are now captured by the village dummies, 
hence we are left with our only variable of 
interest; the conditional effect of coffee prices 
on the probability of recruitment. Also, the 
sample is nearly cut in half, dropping villages 
that do not change over time. The coefficient, 
though still not significant, is however not 
much affected. 
In Column (5) and (6) we check whether (past) 
violence is related to recruitment. The number 
of deaths as a result of violence was reported 
by the village leader for each year between 
1993 and 2005. We can therefore use it in our 
panel estimates, although we of course realize 
that this variable is also based on recall. 
We find that once we control for village and 
year fixed effects there is no significant effect 
of deaths on the likelihood of recruitment. This 
tentatively suggests that equating violence 
with recruitment may be inappropriate if 
one wants to explain recruitment. Given 
the low correlation between violence and 
recruitment we take the view that, in our 
context, violence does not proxy recruitment. 
We then subsequently test whether an increase 
in the world market price of coffee (instead 
of the producer price) leads to more violence 
at the village level. The intuition is as follows: 
the producer price of coffee in Burundi hardly 
follows changes in world market prices. 
Therefore, positive rents would accrue to the 
government if the world market price would 
increase.68 The growing government revenues 
would make it more attractive to fight, either 
to preserve the status quo (elites) or to 
change the status quo by overthrowing the 
government (rebels).69 The result is presented 
in column (7). An increase in the world market 
price of coffee has no effect on violence.  
5.2 Rainfall shocks and recruitment
Here we examine whether recruitment could 
also result from (negative) weather shocks, 
as implied by the literature (Miguel et al., 
2004). We construct a 13-year panel for the 
years 1993-2005 using data on recruitment 
activities based on recall questions from our 
community survey. We focus on negative 
68  An alternative explanation could be that grievances 
over the large divergence lead to conflict. This however 
would require farmers to have information about the 
world market price. This is unlikely to be the case for Bu-
rundian farmers.  
69  We assume that rents are not redistributed but only 
kept for private gains. The large divergence between the 
world market price and the price paid to Burundian pro-
ducers offer some support for this assumption.   
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rainfall shocks. In Burundi, more than 95 
percent of the rural population depends on 
rain-fed agriculture as an important source 
of income. Miguel et al., (2004) have shown 
that negative income shocks (instrumented 
by annual rainfall growth) increases the 
likelihood of civil war the next year. The results 
are presented in column 8.70 We find that 
higher levels of rainfall are associated with a 
70  The random eff ects models show similar results. They 
are not reported but available upon request. 
lower likelihood of recruitment. This suggests 
that the opportunity-cost mechanism may 
indeed be at work.  
6. Conclusions   
The paper tests two popular hypotheses 
to explain recruitment activities during the 
Burundian civil. We use new village-level data 
to analyze the effects of historical grievances, 
reduced opportunity costs and rent-seeking 
incentives on the probability of recruitment 
activities. The cross-sectional analyses report 
no effect of grievance on the likelihood of 
recruitment. 
By contrast, they do show tentative support 
for the idea that reduced opportunity costs 
may promote recruitment. Villages that had 
above mean incidents of ‘insufficient rain’ 
were more likely to have recruitment activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ML ML ML ML ML ML OLS ML 
        
Pt*Coffee regions -3.778 -3.926§ -3.469 -3.988§ -3.776§ -5.315§   
 (2.707) (2.720) (2.801) (2.738) (2.774) (3.361)   
Pwpt* Coffee regions       3.168  
       (51.852)  
Coffee regions 18.435 19.230 17.145      
 (12.931) (12.998) (13.389)      
Rainfall shocks        -1.627*** 
        (0.483) 
Population (log)  -0.072 -0.080      
  (0.346) (0.339)      
Altitude (log)  -1.097 -0.992      
  (1.772) (1.688)      
Distance to capital (log)  -0.824 -0.970*      
  (0.542) (0.516)      
Main road  0.045 0.525      
  (0.502) (0.516)      
Distance to market  -0.346 -0.262      
  (0.217) (0.204)      
Distance to drinking water facility  0.333 0.303      
  (0.290) (0.277)      
Distance to health centre  0.346* 0.239      
  (0.202) (0.193)      
Votes for Ndadaye   0.030***      
   (0.009)      
# Deaths in village t     0.004    
     (0.003)    
# Deaths in village t-1      0.003   
      (0.003)   
Constant -26.931*** (9.962) 
8.969 
(13.817) 
6.758 
(13.076)      
Village FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1188 1176 1116 660 660 572 1200 512 
Log-likelihood -412.20 -392.06 -369.58 -233.66 -232.19 -201.11  -171.26 
Pseudo-R2       0.03 0.07 
2!  19.39*** 36.06** 45.56*** 40.84*** 43.80**** 42.42***   
 
Table 3 Panel regressions for recruitment and the produc-
er price of coffee
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 §p<0.12
Columns (1)-(3) are random effects logit models. Column 
(4) (5) and (6) present conditional fixed effects results. Col-
umn (7) is estimated with OLS 
Dependent is 1 if recruitment activities took place in 
village j in year t and 0 otherwise, except in column (7) 
where the dependent is the # of deaths in village j in year t 
The model on rainfall (column 8) includes standard errors 
clustered at the province level to correct for intra-group 
correlation. . 
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than others. We also use recall information 
on recruitment to construct a 13-year panel 
and assess whether exogenous drops in 
the producer price of coffee increase the 
probability of recruitment. The coefficient 
is negative as we would expect, and in most 
specifications close to being significant at 10 
percent. This at the very minimum suggests 
that poverty or the opportunity costs of time 
indeed play a role in recruitment decisions, 
provided that recruitment is voluntary. By 
contrast, negative income shocks through 
adverse weather conditions are a very strong 
predictor of recruitment. This finding is 
consistent with a recent conclusion from the 
civil war literature: commodity price shocks 
show no robust relationship with civil war 
violence while weather shocks do. 
However, we caution against a somewhat 
common routine to equate recruitment with 
violence. Including measures of violence in 
our regressions showed that they were not 
(robustly) associated with recruitment. This 
speaks against the idea that recruitment and 
violence are one and the same and impact 
on each other. In fact, several scholars have 
argued that joining a rebel group may 
be a rational choice to ensure protection 
from violence (Goodwin, 2001; Kalyvas and 
Kocher, 2007). We however cannot rule out 
the alternative explanation that our binary 
indicator for recruitment is simply too 
coarse to identify the true relation.  Lastly, 
reduced opportunity costs may be one of the 
potentially many mechanisms at work, and 
that results do not necessarily extend beyond 
the context of Burundi. The majority of people 
will not risk their life, but some do. Individual 
data is needed to complement aggregate sub-
or cross-national studies. Fortunately, several 
scholars are now taking up this challenging 
task. 
. 
5
A Phoenix in Flames? 
Portfolio Choice and Violence 
in Civil War in rural Burundi71 
Abstract
This paper challenges the idea that farmers revert to subsistence farming when confronted with 
violence from civil war. Macroeconomic evidence on economic legacies of civil war suggest that 
civil wars, while obvious disastrous in the short run, do not need to have persistent effects on 
long-term economic outcomes. New micro-level studies are ambiguous about the impact of civil 
war for welfare. Several studies find long-lasting negative effects, particularly through reduced 
human capital formation while others for example report increased participation in collective 
action programs and the emergence of local institutions. We investigate to what extend individual 
incentives for investments are affected by civil war. Using several rounds of (panel) data at the farm 
and community level, we find that farmers in Burundi who are confronted with civil war violence 
in their home communities increase export and cash crop growing activities, invest more in public 
goods and reveal higher levels of subjective welfare in survey evaluations. We interpret this in the 
light of similar recent micro-level evidence that points to post-traumatic growth effects after (civil) 
warfare. Our results are confirmed across specifications as well as in robustness analyses. 
71  This paper was co-authored with Philip Verwimp, Fund for Scientific Research (Flanders, Belgium), University of Antwerp 
and Université Libre de Bruxelles. Submitted to the Journal of Conflict Resolution
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1. Introduction 
The incidence and consequences of shocks 
in developing countries is a topic of growing 
interest in economics and political science 
literature. Its appeal is obvious as countries 
in which people already struggle to make 
ends meet, also seem to be particularly prone 
to adverse weather conditions, epidemic 
disasters or civil wars. Sub-Saharan Africa is a 
prominent example as the continent has seen 
more incidents of wars, weather and health 
crises than anywhere else in the world. These 
phenomena are considered of key importance 
to explain Africa’s slow economic performance 
in the past decades, together with, or possibly 
as a result of, other, frequently noted factors in 
the literature, including ethnic fragmentation 
(Easterly and Levine, 1997), adverse geographic 
conditions (Sachs and Warner, 1997), (pre)
colonial legacies (Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; 
Nunn, 2004) and underdeveloped institutions 
Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
Shocks in developing countries, not necessarily 
confined to the African continent, often result 
in collateral damage including loss of livestock 
or land, or a decline in their respective values. 
In the absence of sound institutions and 
functioning credit and insurance markets, 
shocks can easily prevent household from 
making new investments or obtaining 
(new) sources of credit, hence many remain 
trapped in poverty. As a result, development 
efforts may be seriously disrupted or delayed. 
Jensen (2000) for example finds that school 
enrollment rates in Cote d’ Ivoire declined 
by one third to one half when households 
faced adverse agricultural conditions; Carter 
and Maluccio (2003) report that an increase 
in losses (ranging from family deaths to crop 
failures) leads to a 10 percent decrease in 
childrens’ nutritional status for households 
in the KwaZulu-Natal province; and Baez 
and Santos (2007) find that Hurricane Mitch 
affected childrens’ nutritional status and more 
than doubled their labor force participation. 
Reduced human capital formation clearly 
has persistent life-time effects. Hoddinot and 
Kinsey (2001) show that rainfall shocks in 
Zimbabwe reduce lifetime income by not less 
than 14 percent; Dercon (2004) demonstrates 
that the 1984/85 droughts in Ethiopia still 
affected households’ economic growth in the 
late nineties; and recent evidence by Maccini 
and Yang (2009) shows that adult women who 
had higher than average rainfall during their 
year of birth have higher socio-economic 
outcomes than others. 
In addition to the direct negative impacts 
of shocks, economic development may also 
be seriously hindered by the mere threat 
or anticipation of future shocks, causing 
people to shy away from riskier activities and 
profitable investments like for example cash 
crop production and cattle rearing. Rural 
households often revert back to subsistence 
agriculture after having been hit by shocks 
and shift portfolios to less risky but also less 
profitable activities (see e.g. Collier, 1999; 
Deiniger, 2003; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 
1993; Morduch, 1990 and Dercon, 1996). 
To date there is a vast amount of empirical 
literature estimating the impact of various 
types of shocks at the village, household, or 
even individual level (see e.g. Bundervoet, 
Verwimp and Akresh, 2009; Cutler, 1986; 
Corbet, 1998; Del Ninno et al., 2003; Dercon 
and Krishnan 2000a; Dercon and Krishnan, 
2000b; Günther and Harttgen, 2009; Jacoby 
and Skoufias, 1997; Heltberg and Lund, 2009; 
Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001; Kinsey et al., 
1998; Kochar, 1999; Udry, 1995; and Yamano et 
al., 2005). This type of research has picked up 
rapidly since the early nineties when reliable 
household data became increasingly available 
for many developing countries. An excellent 
overview is presented in Günther and Harttgen 
(2009).   
Despite increased scholarship, the impact 
of shocks on households’ long-term well-
being and economic behavior is still not well 
understood. Partially this is due to the absence 
of long (panel) data that permits estimation 
of long-term equilibrium outcomes, rather 
than short-tem responses. When faced with 
for example food shortages, households will 
need to respond immediately to stay alive, 
but this may clearly differ from their long-term 
planning horizons. Another part is due to a 
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“time-lag”, i.e., the impacts of certain shocks 
may only surface after several years have 
passed since the shock took place, including 
reduced school attainments, and physical or 
mental illnesses. This clearly depends on the 
type of shock that is being investigated.  Most 
of the empirical work so far has concentrated 
on household responses to weather-related 
shocks, illnesses, or other influential factors 
that shape poverty patterns over time (see e.g. 
Carter, 1997; Del Ninno et al., 2003; Harrower 
and Hoddinott, 2005; Kochar, 1999). Only 
recently scholars have turned to analyzing the 
impacts of shocks of civil war. 
Civil wars have obvious immediate negative 
economic impacts in terms of the destruction 
of human and physical capital through killings, 
destruction of houses or infrastructure, and 
looting of assets. Additionally, the effects 
of violence in the aftermath of the conflict are 
estimated to be substantial through reduced 
human capital formation, increased health 
problems, population displacement and 
impediment of economic sector development. 
Hoeffler and Reynal-Querrol (2003) estimate 
that a country’s involvement in civil war for 
five years reduces its annual growth rate 
by not less than 2 percent. (See Abadie and 
Gardeazabal  2003; Bodea and Elbadawi, 2008; 
Ghobarah et al., 2003; and Kondylis, 2008 for 
other (empirical) evidence on the destructive 
impacts of civil warfare). 
So far, impacts of civil wars seem to be 
comparable to other types of shocks discussed 
earlier, although its magnitudes can obviously 
be quite different.  There are however several 
other features of civil wars that make them 
distinctly different from for example high 
weather variability or severe (lethal) illnesses. 
We discuss them below and argue that because of 
these features, shocks of civil wars should not 
be treated as yet another shock, but deserve 
specific attention when designing policy and 
(post-war) reconstruction programs.  
First of all, unlike hurricanes, floods or (most) 
severe illnesses, wars typically last long, 
especially since recent decades. While civil 
wars during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century were relatively short in duration, about 
one and a half year, since 1944 the average 
duration has increased up to more than four 
years (Hironaka 2008) with some lasting for 
over twenty years (Fearon, 2004). Civil wars 
may thus last for a considerable part of life, as 
it did, in for example Burundi, Sudan, Liberia 
and Angola. Even with reasonable credit 
and insurance markets in place, households 
are unlikely to absorb shocks for such a long 
period of time. In that respect adjustment 
is likely to be more permanent compared to 
shocks of floods or droughts.  
Second, several scholars have shown that 
countries that have been in civil war have a 20-
50 percent chance to relapse back into conflict, 
within the first five years after the conflict has 
ended (see e.g. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 
2004). The fear for a repeated shock of violence 
is thus often justified but when and at what 
scale is often unpredictable. These fears also 
likely influence the paths of development (or 
types of coping mechanisms) households and 
governments choose. Bodea and Elbadawi 
(2008, p.2) elaborate “In addition to its direct destructive 
effect, political violence undermines the micro-security of the 
individual as well as the macro-security of communities, nations 
and countries. Therefore it can change behavior, preferences and 
public policy”. 
And third, civil war is increasingly affecting 
civilians, with armed groups pursuing horrific 
acts of violence, including gang rapes, 
amputations, and excessive torture to install 
fear and commitment of the population. 
Survivors are left with vivid images of their own 
account of the violence, and loved ones being 
killed or (permanently) maimed, in addition to 
economic losses. Witnessing acts of violence, 
even though you do not experience them 
yourself, can have severe implications (Yehuda, 
2002); there are numerous accounts of ex-
combatants and civilians being diagnosed with 
post-traumatic stress disorder after having 
witnessed acts of violence or seeing horrifying 
events in the media (see e.g. Blanchard et al., 
1982; Macksoud and Aber, 1996; Neugebauer 
et al., 2009;) without the act or pain being 
inflicted on oneself. Witnessing these events 
may install fear, or even anger. While fear is also 
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likely to result from weather related shocks, or 
even illnesses, these shocks arguably invite 
no or few sentiments of anger, while violence 
clearly can. People for example may seek 
revenge for what has been done to themselves 
or their family members. Additionally, people 
may start behaving recklessly because of what 
has been done to them, or when they expect 
that (next time) soon they might be killed or 
tortured. Lorentzen et al., (2008) for example 
find that people with lower life expectancy 
take more risk and invest less than others. 
Taking all of the above into consideration it 
thus comes as no surprise that civil wars are 
dubbed “development in reverse”. 
Recent evidence however suggests the 
picture is not necessarily all that bleak. There 
is a small literature emerging documenting 
positive responses to trauma, referred to as 
post-traumatic growth theory (e.g. Tedeschi 
and Calhoun, 1996): persons affected by 
violence become better citizens, become 
reference persons in their community and 
succeed in transforming the negative event 
into something positive, for themselves 
as well as for others. Empirical supporting 
evidence in economics is provided by e.g. 
Bellows and Miguel (2009); Blattman (2008); 
and Voors and Bulte (2008). They for example 
show that political participation, community 
engagement, and contributions to local public 
goods are significantly higher among victims 
of war than non-victims in Sierra Leone and 
Uganda respectively. Powell et al., (2003) report 
that victims of the war in Sarajevo are more 
affected but also claimed to have experienced 
more personal growth than others. 
Microeconomic evidence exploring 
this route is, to date however limited to 
personal accounts of (self ) growth, political 
participation and community engagement. 
If war can indeed induce positive responses 
along those lines, it may also impact on 
individual economic behavior, either directly, 
or through the aforementioned mechanisms 
of increased collective action. Given the 
empirical evidence for both positive as well as 
negative behavioral responses to war, we take 
the view that its direction is a priori unknown. 
The direction, the magnitude of the response, 
and how this differs from say, weather related 
shocks or illness is instructive for national 
and international post-conflict intervention 
programs. Studying portfolio decisions 
provides insights into future development 
paths. If, for example farmers indeed revert 
back to subsistence agriculture and grow 
crops that require low inputs (such as cassava) 
but that are also prone to diseases and yield 
low returns, households may not be able to 
escape poverty and the country may face a 
high risk of falling back into a cycle of violence. 
If, on the other hand violence induces more 
profitable investments and (or resulting from) 
increased cooperation and trust, economic and 
institutional development may be accelerated 
and Burundi’s prospects of sustainable peace 
are much higher.  
We are not the first to establish a causal relation 
between violence exposure and portfolio choice 
(in its broadest sense). Earlier studies include 
Deiniger (2003) who studies net investments 
and enterprise start-up across violent and non-
violent communities in Uganda; Grun (2008) 
investigating the composition of households’ 
assets across victims and non-victims of 
violence in Columbia; and Bozzoli and Brück 
(2009) exploring differences in crop portfolios 
using cross-sectional post-war data from 
Mozambique. We contribute to this stream of 
literature and improve on existing studies in at 
least four ways by (i) using unique household 
and community panel data from rural Burundi 
from two nationally representative surveys, 
including fine-grained measures of violence 
exposure; (ii) corroborate findings from survey 
questions with results from experimental 
games that were played with a subset of the 
households interviewed in 1998 and 2007; (iii) 
compare decision-making during, and after 
the war, using the panel component of our 
data; and (iv) provide tentative insights into 
possible mechanisms that could explain the 
positive correlation between war victimization 
and increased risky cash crop farming.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 discusses income portfolios in Burundi. 
Section 3 describes fourteen years of civil 
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warfare in Burundi. Section 4 and 5 present 
the data, the estimation strategies, results as 
well as our handling of issues of endogeneity. 
In section 6 we provide robustness checks and 
section 7 concludes.  
2. Risky income activities in Burundi 
Several scholars have hypothesized and 
empirically illustrated that income shocks, 
or its mere risk, adversely affect investments 
in productive assets (see e.g. Rosenzweig 
and Binswanger, 1993; Dercon, 1998). In this 
study, investment, or risky activities constitute 
income from cash crops. (see Austin, 2008 for 
a justification of this classification). We hereby 
distinguish between export crops, including 
coffee, tea, and tobacco and cash crops that 
are produced for the domestic market only, 
i.e. beer bananas. 
Coffee is the primary export cash crop activity 
and the country’s most important export 
product, accounting for more than 80 percent 
of Burundi’s annual export earnings. Coffee is 
a typical risky activity in Burundi for several 
reasons. First, in contrast to popular food crops, 
like beans that are harvested after one growing 
season, coffee trees only produce berries after 
three years for harvesting and selling.  Second, 
until recently, the Burundian government had 
a strict policy with respect to growing coffee. 
Once planted, farmers were forbidden to rip 
out coffee trees, even if, given for example 
low prices, it would have been much more 
profitable to grow other crops. In that respect, 
farmers also face a price risk. And third, armed 
groups often destroyed coffee trees or looted 
the harvest (see also Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 
2000).72  
Banana beer is locally brewed and sold and is 
the most important cash crop in Burundi. For 
neighboring Rwanda, which has a comparable 
agricultural economy, Clay et al. (1998) found 
that farmers prefer to grow bananas over 
beans because the former have a higher 
monetary value per acre of land. The revenue 
72  Clearly, food crops like beans, potatoes and maize can 
also be stolen but this (almost) never happens.     
of the beer sales is then used to buy beans on 
the market. Given the high variability of food 
crop prices this also poses a risk for the farmers 
to (partially) depend on the market, instead 
of producing crops that form the major part 
of their staple diet themselves. Banana trees 
are also risky for being prone to theft and 
destruction. Banana trees are often found very 
close to the homestead. As they are a farm 
most valued trees, the household members 
want to keep an eye on potential thieves. There 
are few things as easy as cutting of a branch of 
bananas to provide for instant supply. Neither 
tea nor tobacco is of major importance, but 
if grown its only for the purpose of selling it 
abroad, therefore they are included as well.  
Other income sources like off-farm wage 
activities may also comprise some risky element 
particularly if the type of employment requires 
specific skills learned in school, but they might 
just as well be part of a diversification strategy. 
Off-farm activities are for example to be found 
among households that face greater variation 
in farm profits. (see e.g. Rosenzweig and 
Stark, 1989; Kochar, 1995). These households 
consciously choose to have a family member 
involved in steady off-farm employment 
anticipating future income shocks. Including 
livestock as risky income is also problematic 
as livestock can also be held as collateral to 
obtain credit, or, act as a buffer during hard 
times (see e.g. Deaton, 1991).   
We therefore only focus on the aforementioned 
set of income sources that unambiguously reflect 
high-risk activities, in Burundi referring to 
yields from cash or export crops (Clay et al., 
1998). For notational clarity we refer to ‘export 
crops’ as being coffee, tea and tobacco while 
‘cash crops’ includes all export crops as well as 
income from banana beer sales. 
3. Civil warfare: the Burundian case
Burundi has, since its independence in 1962, 
been involved in multiple cycles of gruesome 
violence involving the two main ethnic groups, 
the Hutus and Tutsis struggle for power. The 
latest episode ravaging war started in 1993 
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with the assassination of the Hutu president 
Melchior Ndadaye and his associates by Tutsi 
army officers as a result of tensions between 
the Tutsi-dominated military and the then 
Hutu-controlled government. The subsequent 
eruption of Hutu-led violence, slaughtering 
thousands of civilians was retaliated by massive 
indiscriminate violence by the government 
forces. The war in Burundi was largely a 
war against civilians. Both soldiers of the 
Burundian armed forces as well as combatants 
of the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) 
and Forces for the Defence of Democracy 
(FDD) rebel movements were often involved 
in indiscriminate and disproportionate use of 
violence against civilians resulting in injury or 
death. Observations by Human Rights Watch 
(2003, p. 20) illustrate the disregard of human 
lives by both armed groups. 
“In the early morning of April 23, FNL combatants attacked 
the national police brigade at Kabezi. Other FNL combatants 
ambushed soldiers en route to reinforce the brigade, occasioning 
an exchange of fire in which several civilians were killed. Soldiers 
then deliberately killed civilians in and near the ambush site”.   
And, 
“Most soldiers fired without regard for the mass of civilians 
caught on the road between them or feeling over the hills nearby. 
At some point during the exchange of fire between government 
soldiers and the FNL combatants, or shortly thereafter, soldiers 
reportedly turned their guns on civilians and shot the people in 
the back that ran” (HRW, 2003, p.22). 
In some cases people were killed by knifes 
or bayonets, but rebels also bombed areas 
in for example Ruyigi, Gitega, and Cankuzo 
using shell grenades, sometimes even from 
helicopter gunships (HRW, 2003). In addition 
to (mass) killings torture, rape, kidnapping 
and destruction, soldiers and rebels also 
looted goods from civilian houses and their 
lands.  If they had not fled, local villagers were 
often forced to collaborate with one of the 
armed groups. Villagers had to cut wood, fetch 
water and transport food. There was however 
no evident reciprocal relation; if the village 
got attacked by the opposing group, civilians 
were often killed in reprisal. Moreover, non-
compliance with orders meant punishment 
and many were deliberately killed or injured 
as a result.  
In 2005 a peace-agreement was brokered 
between the national authorities and all but 
one of the rebel movements (FNL) resulting in 
peace and relative political stability, although 
occasionally attacks were staged in the 
nations’ capital, Bujumbura and its immediate 
surroundings; Bujumbura Rurale. Although the 
war ended in 2005, the intensity of violence 
had already decreased considerably by 2002. 
Both refugees and internally displaced persons 
have since then started to return to their home 
communities.  Numbers from displacement 
camps in the province of Gitega, Kayanza, 
Kirundo, Muramvya and Ngozi declined from 
284,000 in 2002 to 140,000 by April 2004 
(Kamuni et al., 2005).  
Despite its numerous accounts of horrific 
acts of violence, and (economic) destruction, 
optimism is high among Burundians. After 
years of distress and underdevelopment 
people want to start a “new life” (Kamuni et al., 
2005). We return to this point in the analysis 
below.  
 
4. Data
4.1 The Burundi Household Priority Survey73 
We make use of two rounds of nationally 
representative rural household and village 
level data; the 1998 and 2007 Burundi Priority 
Surveys, henceforth referred to as BPS. The 
first round of surveys took place in 1998, five 
years after the the start of the war. This round 
was conducted by the Burundi Institute of 
Statistics (ISTEEBU) in cooperation with the 
World Bank. The initial sample consisted of 
3900 rural and 2700 urban households in all 
provinces, including the capital Bujumbura. 
The 2007 round was also implemented by 
ISTEEBU, on behalf of our research program 
and objectives. The programme budget was 
insufficient to reinterview all households 
from 2007. Therefore, a random subsample 
was drawn from the 1998 rural sample. We 
randomly selected a subsample of 100 out 
73  The original surveys are available upon request. 
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of the 390 villages (administrative ‘sous-
collines’ in Burundi) sampled in 1998. In 
each village or cluster we then interviewed 
all households that were part of the 1998 
sample (10 per cluster).74 Both household 
surveys contained detailed questions about 
demographic and socio-economic indicators, 
including education, employment, health, 
production, consumption, assets and income. 
The 2007 survey had additional sections on 
victimization, land (ownership), trust, social 
capital and subjective welfare, including recall 
questions to assess the situation in 1998.   
The community questionnaires entailed 
questions about infrastructure, violence, 
clashes between the warring factions and rebel 
recruitment. For the community questionnaire 
we relied on a group of ‘key experts’, often the 
village level leader, accompanied by elders. 
Questionnaires were designed in French, and 
interviews conducted in the local language, 
Kirundi. We trained 65 interviewers during a 
one-week training during which we improved 
the questionnaire. The questionnaire was 
pilot tested in an out of sample village and 
final corrections to the survey were made. 50 
interviewers were selected in a competitive 
exam that included a case study on household 
composition, consumption and production as 
well as a range of questions on research ethics. 
A team leader supervised each team of five 
interviewers. Two out of five team members 
were women.  
Attrition with respect to the 1998 survey was 
less than 13 percent, which is reasonable 
given the long time span of ten years, and the 
fact that there was a war going between the 
survey periods, for seven more years. Collines 
are rather small and isolated, hence people 
often know about each other’s whereabouts. 
Of the initial 1000 household we eventually 
were left with 872 usable observations. For 
74  Due to on-going violence in the provinces of Makam-
ba, Bubanza and Bujumbura rural no ‘second wave’ inter-
views were undertaken in these areas. In Makamba no 
interviews were held in 1998 either while in Bubanza and 
Bujumbura rural only a very small sample of households 
was interviewed then as a result of the war.     
the 126 households that could not be found 
we know for 113 the reason of absence. We 
refer to Verwimp and Bundervoet (2008) for an 
analysis and discussion of attrition using these 
same data. Both surveys entailed the same 
questions about income sources. Households 
were asked to indicate the revenue they had 
obtained from off-farm income. We calculated 
the value of farm income using detailed 
questions on production and consumption in 
the questionnaire. 
Table 1a presents the fraction of households 
that derive income from a particular source, 
for the average of two years (Column 1) and in 
a given year (Columns 2-3). A large majority of 
households derive income from subsistence 
farming in Burundi. By 2007, only 8.3 percent 
did not consume any home produce. 60% of 
all households derive income from the sale 
of food products in 1998. The category ‘food 
sales’ constitute all major food crops that are 
typically part of the staple diet in Burundi 
including e.g. maize, beans, potatoes and 
cassava.  This increases to nearly 70 percent of 
all households by 2007. Export crops comprise 
of revenues derived from coffee, tea, tobacco 
and cotton. Note that by 2007 no household 
in Burundi grows cotton anymore. The data 
reveal a downward trend; in 1998 more than 
50 percent of all households had income 
from export crops, while in 2007 this figure 
fell to about one third. Enterprises suffered. 
Less than 3 percent managed to get income 
from their own business in 2007, while in 
1998 almost 17 percent of all households did. 
Selling banana beer was, and continues to be, 
an important source of income; about half of 
all households rely on it for their income. We 
also observe a decline here by 2007, but not 
as strong as in the case of coffee. Income from 
rents, livestock products (i.e., milk, honey, 
eggs, and manure) and off-farm employment 
(including agricultural wage labor and non-
agricultural salaries from public and private 
sector jobs) are employed by only a small 
selection, on average not more than 5 percent 
of the households. The fact that fractions 
remained low over time suggests that there 
has not been much diversification of income at 
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least into these activities taken place. Transfers 
(remittances) remain a source of income for 
one quarter of the households, although this 
declines over the years. In sum, (column 4) 
we see that income from food sales, livestock 
products, non-farm activities and wage 
labor on average has been taken up by more 
households, while a smaller percentage now 
derives income from export crops, enterprises, 
beer sales, and remittances.  
In Table 1b average income shares are 
presented. The share of income from cash 
crops (coffee + banana beer) in overall income 
has declined from 13% in 1998 to 8% in 2007.
4.2 Experimental data 2009
In 2009, the team of academic researchers that 
were involved in the 2007 survey went back to 
implement economic games among a sub-
sample of respondents included in the 1998 
and 2007 BPS. The aim of the 2009 project 
was to gauge social, risk and time preferences 
among respondents that were affected and 
not (directly) affected respectively by the 
war. A series of experiments was conducted 
using a stratified random (sub)sample of 35 
communities. Stratification was based on 
the experience of community level attacks. 
The community survey of 2007 contained 
detailed questions on the incidence, number 
and intensity (number of people killed and 
wounded) of violent clashes between the 
governments’ army and rebel groups. 24 
communities experienced violence of such 
kind, 11 did not. The civil war naturally 
affected the entire country to some extent; 
if one examines the macro-level indicators 
for Burundi over time, one will surely find 
(predictable) changes in indicators measuring 
e.g. economic growth, per capita levels of GDP, 
and health indicators (see Nkurunziza and 
Ngaruko, 2000), although even there seems to 
be room for some optimism.75  
The intensity of violence was geographically 
widespread and varied significantly across 
communities leaving some communities 
practically ‘untouched’ and while others were 
the stage for (often repeated) scenes of violent 
acts perpetrated by both rebel groups as well 
as governmental forces. It is this variation 
that we focus on in our study. For a detailed 
description of the design and outcomes of the 
experiments we refer to Voors et al. (2009).  
After the experiments were executed 
respondents participated in a short exit survey 
that included additional questions about pre-
war conditions and respondents’ ethnic origin, 
something that we until then had been unable 
75  The Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006, p.16) states “Despite be-
ing one of the world’s poorest nations and in the midst of civil war, Burundi’s level 
of development improved slightly in the last five years. HDI changed by 0.014 
between 1995 (0.311) and 2000 (0.325). In 2002, Burundi’s HDI value rose to 
0.339.”  
Table 1a. Share of households deriving income from a par-
ticular source 
Sources: Authors’ own calculations based on the Burundi 
Priority Surveys 1998 and 2007 for individual households 
and communities
Income derived 
from: 
   
 
 
 
All years 
(%) 
1998 
(%) 
2007 
(%) 
Direction 
of ∆ 
Home 
consumption 
92.2 93.7 91.7 - 
Food sales  64.4 60.1 68.7 + 
Export crops 41.8 52.1 31.5 - 
Enterprises 9.8 16.7 2.7 - 
Beer 47.5 50.8 44.1 - 
Non-farm activities 5.2 4.4 5.8 + 
Transfers 22.3 29.2 25.8 - 
Livestock products 4.8 2.7 6.8 + 
Wage Labor 6.2 6.0 6.4 + 
Other 13.9 0.2 17.5 + 
 
Table 1b. Average household income shares 
Sources: Authors’ own calculations based on the Burundi 
Priority Surveys 1998 and 2007 for individual households 
and communities
Share derived from:    
 
 
 
All years 
(%) 
1998 
(%) 
2007 
(%) 
Direction 
of ∆ 
Home 
consumption 
67.19 65.5 68.8 + 
Food sales  9.3 6.8 11.8 + 
Export crops 5.8 6.6 5.0 - 
Enterprises 2.1 3.9 0.3 - 
Beer 4.7 6.5 2.9 - 
Non-farm activities 0.4 0.5 0.3 - 
Transfers 3.2 5.0 1.3 - 
Livestock products 0.1 0.1 0.1 = 
Wage Labor 3.6 4.3 2.9 - 
Other 1.8 0.0 3.6 + 
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to ask during the earlier (large scale) survey 
waves in 1998 and 2007. This information 
we use in section 5 below to demonstrate, 
next to anecdotal evidence, that exposure to 
(community level) violence was random for 
the individual household. Additionally, we 
use it to replicate our cross-sectional findings 
for a smaller sample. The data from 2009 is 
henceforth referred to as the experimental 
data (ED). 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for 
questions asked both in the 1998 and 2007 
BPS (column 1 and 2), additional questions 
from the 2007 BPS (column 3 and 4) and for 
questions that were only asked as part of the 
exit survey in 2009 (column 5 and 6).  For a 
detailed description of the variables the reader 
is referred to Appendix A. 
5. Empirical strategy 
5.1 Cross-section models  
We start our analysis by examining farmer’s 
production decisions exploiting the cross-
sectional variation in violence. We believe that 
community level violence is the appropriate 
measure to use in this setting for at least two 
reasons. First, as cited by several examples from 
the psychological literature in the introduction, 
merely witnessing violent events is sufficient 
to result in severe traumas that may induce 
behavioral changes. Communities in Burundi 
are small and isolated, hence violent battles 
never went unnoticed. Second, (self ) reporting 
may be correlated with characteristics that 
may also influence an individuals’ decision 
to grow export or cash crops, including 
wealth and education. This potential bias is 
arguably attenuated when using village level 
aggregated reports of violence (i.e. systematic 
under-or over reporting at he village level is 
unlikely to be correlated to individual level 
preferences for export of cash crop farming). 
We commence by regressing the fraction 
of export crop farmers in a village in 2007 
on the fraction of community members 
affected by war-related violence during 1993-
2003 (column 1, Table 3A). The correlation is 
positive and significant: we find more current 
export farmers in communities that were 
more heavily affected by violence. Next, the 
dependent is now a dummy reflecting the 
individual household taking on a value of 1 if 
the household currently grows export crops 
and 0 otherwise. The unconditional correlation 
is similar to the community level regression. 
Including household and community level 
controls still leaves the coefficient on violence 
positive and significant although a bit smaller, 
suggesting that the violence measure picked 
up additional factors that influence the 
decision on whether or not to grow export 
crops. Indeed, we find that families with 
male heads, higher educated heads, living in 
villages that have had post-war NGO projects, 
areas that are suitable for growing coffee, and 
are densely populated are more likely to grow 
export crops than others. A one- standard 
deviation increase in the mean level of 
violence increases the probability of growing 
export crops after the war by 8 %.  In column 
(4) we include individual level data as well. 
Individual level attacks are positively related 
to the probability of growing export crops 
but the coefficient is not significantly different 
from 0. 
Columns (5) and (6) present results including 
other types of shocks that may have occurred 
at the village level and may influence the 
probability of growing cash crops, including 
floods, droughts, and plant diseases, or to 
the individual household, including (long-
term) illness or imprisonment of one or 
more household members. The coefficient 
on violence however remains practically the 
same while none of the other shocks has any 
discernable effect on household probabilities 
of export crop farming. Lastly, to mitigate 
endogeneity concerns, we use instrumental 
variables in column (7). The endogeneity test 
in section 5.3, column (2) reveals a negative 
significant correlation between our measure of 
violence intensity and distance to the capital. 
This is unsurprising given that the bulk of 
rebel activities were concentrated in provinces 
close to the capital. Export farming however is 
unlikely to be concentrated close to Burundi’s 
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capital, Bujumbura. For one thing, the export 
crop variable here constitutes mainly of coffee 
(more than 90 percent). Coffee can only be 
grown within a certain altitude range (higher 
than 1500 and below 2500 meters). These 
areas are not concentrated among Bujumbura 
but spread across the entire country. Also, 
coffee is sold to local cooperatives, marketing 
boards and washing stations that are based 
in the countryside rather than in capital. There 
is thus no need for a farmer to be close to 
the capital to sell his produce. We therefore 
use distance to the capital as an instrument 
for violence. In order to test whether our 
instrument is valid, we however need the 
equation to be overidentified. We therefore 
use distance to the nearest health center as 
Year  1998 and 2007  2007  2009  
 Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Panel A: Household (HH) characteristics 
Age of HH head 46.55 15.87   48.65 14.52 
Years at school HH head 1.54 2.45   1.41 2.25 
HH size in adult equivalents 4.29 1.90   4.49 1.97 
Head is male  0.74 0.44   0.69 0.46 
HH grows cash crops 0.42 0.49   0.33 0.47 
HH owns cattle 0.16 0.37   0.08 0.27 
# Months illness within HH   10.83 7.56   
Soil quality index      2.69 0.51 
HH grew cash crops before the war     0.57 0.50 
HH owned cattle before the war     0.14 0.35 
Fraction income from cash crops 0.06 0.13     
Respondent is Hutu     0.61 0.49 
Respondent is Tutsi     0.26 0.44 
HH invests in soil improvement      0.18 0.39 
HH member was traditional authority before the 
war 
    0.28 0.45 
HH monetary income (log)     7.41 2.57 
Perceived current wealth    4.8 1.0   
HH has tenure security   0.75 0.43   
Panel B: Village characteristics 
HH members that are literate 0.30 0.12     
Ethnic homogeneity     87.68 14.69 
Distance nearest health center 2.65 0.84     
Distance nearest market 1.62 0.60     
Distance drinking water facility 3.22 0.90     
Distance main road 3.34 1.66     
Suitable for coffee  0.83 0.37     
Altitude (m)     1663.14 173.5 
Distance to capital (km)     95.59 34.82 
Population density 1990 (log)     5.46 0.49 
Population density 2008) (log)     5.71 0.45 
Fraction HH with current disputes   0.06 0.07   
Land Gini   0.26 0.21   
Fraction votes Ndadaye   0.65 0.18   
Panel C: War schocks 
Percentage HH in village attacked   22.13 10.90   
Fraction HH member attacked   0.32 0.47   
Fraction HH member violently killed     0.18 0.38 
# HH members in prison   0.13 0.45   
Fraction returned refugees      0.07 0.15 
PRIO ACLED dummy for attack     0.20 0.40 
PRIO ACLED # attacks     2.19 4.49 
Panel D: Other village shocks       
Villages with post-war NGO projects   0.36 0.48   
# Floods (1998-2007)    1.69 0.33   
# Droughts (1998-2007)   1.60 0.48   
# Incidents of plant diseases (1998-2007)   1.92 0.45   
HH Observations 1744  872  250  
Village observations 100  100  35  
 
Table 2. Summary statistics
Sources: Authors’ own calculations based on the Burundi 
Priority Surveys 1998 and 2007 for individual households 
and communities and the Experimental Economics Proj-
ect 2009. Model results all report the effect of ethnic het-
erogeneity.
A Phoenix in Flames?     75
a second instrument.76 Although correlated 
with violence, it may arguably not satisfy the 
exclusion restriction as distance to health 
centers may proxy for accessibility or wealth 
for example. The first-stage regressions 
however show that the instruments are 
correctly excluded albeit the partial F-statistics 
76  Results are similar when we only use distance as an 
instrument (coefficient is 0.019, p-value=0.03). 
are somewhat small (reported in Appendix 
B). Column (7) shows that our instrumented 
violence variable is significant at 5%.77 
Table 3B presents results for cash crops 
including beer bananas. Results are 
qualitatively similar for violence but smaller; a 
one-standard deviation change increases the 
probability of growing cash crops by a mere 
5%. Household size is significant and positive. 
Education and NGO presence are also positive 
77  We use 2SLS here to be able to test for the validity of 
overidentifying restrictions. The rescaled OLS parameter 
(0.028) compares reasonably well to the ivprobit estimate 
of 0.044 (results of ivprobit are not shown).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ML ML ML ML ML ML IV-2SLS 
        
HH attacked (%) 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.014** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Individual attack    0.014    
    (0.039)    
Age   0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age2   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head is male   0.132*** 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.117** 
   (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) 
Years at school   0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
NGO   0.124* 0.125* 0.126* 0.125* 0.115* 
   (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.064) 
HH size   0.014 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.010 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Suitable for coffee   0.127** 0.126** 0.129** 0.126** 0.132* 
   (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.076) 
Density 2008   0.278*** 0.279*** 0.278*** 0.277*** 0.231*** 
   (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.055) 
Land Gini   0.100 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.115 
   (0.165) (0.166) (0.164) (0.165) (0.133) 
Current disputes   0.622 0.623 0.604 0.621 0.641* 
   (0.408) (0.411) (0.404) (0.409) (0.381) 
Flood     0.006   
     (0.022)   
Drought     -0.002   
     (0.020)   
Plant diseases     0.017   
     (0.017)   
Sickness      0.000  
      (0.000)  
Prison      0.027  
      (0.034)  
Distance to 
Bujumbura (log) 
       
        
Regional FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100 872 798 798 798 798 798 
Log-likelihood  -544.07 -436.54 -436.48 -435.98 -436.25  
2!   22.41 90.01 90.26 93.68 92.98  
Pseudo-R2  0.02 0.126 0.126 0.127 0.126  
Adj. R2 0.07      0.127 
 
Table 3A Cross section models for victimization and 
export cash crop farming (BPS 1998/2007)
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Maximum Likelihood Logit 
estimates. Marginal effects reported, valued at the mean. 
Suppressed community variables include distance vari-
ables to: nearest market, drinking water provision and 
provincial road.
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but lose significance compared to the export 
model. As said, growing bananas for beer is 
an important income generating activity in 
Burundi, but requires less knowledge and 
fewer investments than coffee. Also, NGOs 
may not be particularly keen on stimulating 
the production of locally brewed alcohol. 
Land inequality has a negative effect, but 
cash crop farmers live in areas where there 
are on average more disputes among family 
members or fellow villagers. Possibly, disputes 
arise at the margin, thus in areas with roughly 
equally sized landholdings that nonetheless 
have something worth fighting for (coffee 
trees, some money or assets). Lastly, there 
is a marginal significant positive effect of 
imprisonment. Other studies have shown that 
it matters which family member is (temporarily) 
unable to supply labor. It may also be the case 
that family members were only in prison for 
a short while (perhaps a few days as is often 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS ML ML ML ML ML IV-2SLS 
        
HH attacked (%) 0.241** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.011** 
 (0.113) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Individual 
attack 
   -0.005    
    (0.043)    
Age   0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.005 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age2   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head is male   0.135*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 
   (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.040) 
Years at school   0.011 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.010 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
NGO   0.032 0.032 0.039 0.034 0.044 
   (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.052) 
HH size   0.020* 0.020* 0.022* 0.020* 0.016 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
Suitable for 
coffee 
  0.130 0.130 0.134* 0.122 0.144** 
   (0.081) (0.080) (0.079) (0.083) (0.073) 
Density 2008   0.110* 0.110* 0.113* 0.112* 0.099* 
   (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.055) 
Land Gini   -0.262** -0.263** -0.265** -0.267** -0.191* 
   (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.131) (0.108) 
Current 
disputes 
  0.518* 0.517* 0.503* 0.520* 0.528* 
   (0.281) (0.281) (0.272) (0.283) (0.276) 
Flood     0.048**   
     (0.023)   
Drought     0.002   
     (0.028)   
Plant diseases     0.027   
     (0.018)   
Sickness      -0.001  
      (0.001)  
Prison      0.079*  
      (0.042)  
Distance to 
Bujumbura (log) 
       
        
Regional FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100 872 798 798 798 798 798 
Log-likelihood  -581.08 -491.87 -491.84 -487.70 -489.88 0.106 
2!   8.43 78.55 81.18 90.46 85.28  
Pseudo-R2  0.01 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09  
Adj. R2 0.04       
Table 3B Cross section (logit) models for victimization and 
cash crop farming (BPS 1998/2007)
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Marginal effects reported, 
valued at the mean. Suppressed community variables 
include distance variables  to: nearest market, drinking 
water provision and provincial road.
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the case in Burundi). Households would then 
presumably not shift production modes and 
hence the positive correlation would then not 
have any causal interpretation but result from 
a peculiarity in the data on imprisonment. 
Here we also use an instrumental variable 
specification and find similar results to those 
in table 3A.   
In Table 4 we present conditional income shares 
from export crop production. We also report 
a positive effect of community level violence 
on income shares from export sales.78 Export 
78  Due to the censored nature of the data on shares we 
also estimate tobit models. Results are qualitatively the 
same and available upon request. 
farmers that live in areas suitable for coffee 
have larger shares.  We also find that current 
population pressure is positively related to 
income shares from cash crops, this may stem 
from an increased need to grow crops that 
provide high monetary return to land (see 
Platteau, 2000) or may lend support to the 
idea that technology spills over more easily in 
more populated areas, and (or) the presence of 
economies of scale effects. Households living in 
areas with more current disputes tend to have 
lower shares than others. This would contradict 
the notion that disputes break out in villages 
or, for that matter, within families that have 
something worth fighting for (if we believe that 
the causality indeed runs the other way). 
One interpretation consistent with both results 
is that disputes break out in, or across, families 
that are only just breaking out of poverty. 
Remember that we only observe a non-zero 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
HH attacked (%) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Individual attack  -0.017   
  (0.015)   
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head is male 0.019* 0.020* 0.018* 0.018* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
NGO -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Years at school -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HH size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Suitable for coffee 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Land Gini 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Density 2008  0.059*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Current disputes -0.117* -0.121* -0.120* -0.118* 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) 
Flood   -0.000  
   (0.005)  
Drought   -0.001  
   (0.006)  
Plant diseases   0.003  
   (0.005)  
Sickness    0.000 
    (0.000) 
Prison    0.004 
    (0.014) 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 798 798 798 798 
 
Table 4 Cross section models for victimization and income 
shares from export crops (BPS 1998/2007)
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Suppressed community 
variables include distance variables to: nearest market, 
drinking water provision and provincial road.
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value for shares if the household grows export 
or cash crops. Those at the high end of the 
distribution with large income shares from 
export crops will not argue with their children 
or with fellow villagers, because they or their 
offspring are likely to have ample other (off-
farm) opportunities. Kamuni et al. (2005) 
furthermore note that wealthy landowners 
maintain, but underutilize their land, and keep 
it purely for purposes of speculation or access 
to bank loans, leading to increased tensions in 
these areas. 
Results from shares that include income from 
banana beer are very similar in magnitude 
although standard errors are bigger and 
hence significance levels lower (p<0.10 in all 
models).  Results are not shown but available 
upon request.   
5.2 Panel models 
Next we use the panel component of our data 
to determine the effect of violence on cash 
crop farming. Remember that the first wave of 
survey data collection took place in 1998, which 
is about halfway through the war.  Households 
may hence have adjusted farming decisions 
well before 1998. Even when only considering 
violence that took place after 1998, we cannot 
pretend that the 1998 data can serve as a 
credible baseline if communities attacked in 
1998 and later were also likely to have been 
attacked earlier on. Regressing a community 
level variable that measures the incidence 
(number) of violent attacks up till 1997 on the 
incidence (number) of violent attacks that took 
place since 1998 and a set of controls, indeed 
shows that violence persists in communities 
that were attacked earlier (results not shown). 
This however has, as we show later as part 
of the exogeneity test, nothing to do with 
particular community characteristics. 
However, we believe that the panel component 
is useful for a different purpose, namely to 
disentangle the “overall” effect of simply living 
in a country during times of war, from that of 
being a direct victim of civil warfare. The overall 
effect of the war will be reflected in the time 
dummy for the year in which the second wave 
took place (i.e. 2007). A positive value reflects 
positive effects over time. Analogously, a 
negative value confirms expectations about the 
overall destructive effects of the war. Naturally 
both forces could work simultaneously; the 
former dominates the latter if the coefficient 
is positive and vice versa if we find a negative 
result. Note that the time dummy picks up 
all developments, not only the ending of the 
war, between 1998 and 2007 that are non-
specific to communities.79 We fit conditional 
logit estimates to investigate changes within 
households with respect to cash crop farming 
activities.  We report conditional logit estimates 
in Table 5. This is simply Conditional Maximum 
Likelihood, following Chamberlain (1980). 
Here, only observations for which transitions 
in the dependent variables are observed are 
used. This takes care of the selection problem 
estimating the probability of being an export 
or cash crop farmer conditional on 1 2 1y y+ = . 
The sample is consequently reduced to about 
600 observations. 
Results are presented in Table 5 below. We 
report a positive significant effect of violence 
on the probability of being an export or cash 
crop farmer in 2007, meaning that on average, 
more households in the high violence areas 
changed from having no export or cash crops 
in 1998, to participating in these activities 
by 2007 compared to the areas where there 
was less violence. A one-unit increase in 
the violence variable increases the odds of 
growing (export) cash crops by 3 to 4 percent 
(across all specifications).80 The year dummy 
is strongly negative, suggesting an overall 
decrease over time of cash crop farming, 
although this is partially offset by the increase 
in cash crop activities in the previously violent 
areas. Post-war aid flows and reconstruction 
projects that rushed in after the war, as 
reflected by the NGO indicator variable, do 
not seem to drive this result: their influence is 
79  For example aggregate income shocks that affect the 
entire country would be reflected in the time dummy.   
80  Outcomes are similar using the full sample in a ran-
dom effects specification (not reported but available 
upon request). 
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statistically negligible and even has a negative 
sign in the default specification (2). Results 
are very similar for cash crops including beer 
bananas (not shown). 
5.3 Testing for endogeneity 
We take the view that violence in Burundi 
was random with respect to socio-economic 
conditions. There exists a substantial body of 
literature that describes the brutality and the 
indiscriminate nature of the violence employed 
both by the rebels as well as the governments’ 
army (see e.g. HRW, 1998; Krueger and Kruger, 
2007). Admittedly, given that both sources 
stem from outsiders (foreigners) that were 
either based in the capital, or necessarily relied 
on second-hand information from survivors, 
some selection may have gone unnoticed. 
We therefore also rely on an empirical 
strategy to purge the concern that export or 
cash crop farmers or otherwise households 
with characteristics that would lead them to 
increased adoption of (export) cash crops, 
self-selected into violence that would hence 
explain the positive correlation between 
violence exposure and (export) cash crop 
activities or its income shares. We use both the 
BPS and the ED sample to examine selection 
into violence.  
In Column (1) of Table 6 we regress a dummy 
variable of community level violence on a 
set of fixed village level characteristics and 
prewar population density. We find none of 
the variables to be significant. Column (2) 
presents the results for our preferred measure 
of community level violence that is used 
throughout the paper.  
Tackling the issue of a non-random distribution 
of attitudes towards export farming is 
challenging. It could be that households 
who remained in their dwelling throughout 
the civil war have different attitudes towards 
investment compared to those who left the 
village.  A priori it is unclear whether the 
more risk-seeking or more risk-averse people 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ML ML ML ML ML 
      
HH attacked (%) 0.04** 0.04** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Individual attack   0.567*   
   (0.326)   
Age  -0.038 -0.046 -0.050 -0.022 
  (0.055) (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) 
Age2  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head is male  0.021 -0.033 0.108 0.043 
  (0.429) (0.441) (0.450) (0.434) 
Years at school  0.013 0.027 0.011 0.012 
  (0.094) (0.095) (0.106) (0.094) 
HH size   0.205** 0.214** 0.213** 0.200** 
  (0.091) (0.092) (0.090) (0.090) 
NGO  -0.012 0.052 0.155 0.051 
  (0.397) (0.404) (0.416) (0.386) 
Flood    0.305  
    (0.547)  
Droughts    0.590  
    (0.448)  
Plant diseases    0.106  
    (0.496)  
Dummy for t=2 -2.207*** -2.401*** -2.515*** -4.177*** -2.441*** 
 (0.404) (0.515) (0.532) (1.257) (0.535) 
Sickness     0.010 
     (0.006) 
Prison     -0.733 
     (0.480) 
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 614 602 602 602 602 
 
Table 5 Panel models for vicimization and export cash 
crop farming (BPS 1998/2007)
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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stay behind. We use our community data to 
probe into this issue. We include the fraction 
of 1993 refugees that have returned to their 
communities. The idea here is that villages 
with high fractions of returned refugees 
(that left the village prior to the start of the 
violence) may have different risk attitudes 
than villages that only had a small fraction of 
returned refugees. Note that in Burundi, even 
though the actual number of refugees is still in 
the tens of thousands, the majority returned, 
and almost all to their home community. 
The variable is far from being significant. This 
provides confidence in the idea that pre-war 
risk attitudes were the same in both the violent 
as well as the non-violent areas. 
Column (3) in Table 6 further shows that 
(visible) wealth before the war (evidenced 
by cash crops, and cattle ownership) had 
no effect on the percentage of households 
experiencing violent attacks. Also, potential 
differences in political beliefs, or the presence 
of local authorities cannot explain the variation 
in violent attacks. The log of distance to the 
capital remains significant though even in the 
small sample and we report a negative effect 
of pre-war population density. Armed groups 
may have been less inclined to attack villages 
where there was a dense village population 
that may resist and fight back. Note that 
population density in the regression models 
is positively correlated with income share from 
Sample BPS BPS  ED ED ED 
Dependent  
Violent 
attacks 
(0/1) 
HH attacked (%)  HH attacked (%) 
HH member 
attacked 
HH member 
violently killed 
       
Years at school -0.007 0.010  0.046 0.010 -0.003 
 (0.051) (0.013)  (0.029) (0.020) (0.021) 
Age -0.012 0.000  -0.003 0.003 0.007* 
 (0.009) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Head is male 0.216 0.100  0.009 0.141* 0.121 
 (0.313) (0.082)  (0.181) (0.080) (0.088) 
Respondent is Tutsi     0.208 -0.022 
     (0.177) (0.207) 
Respondent is Hutu     0.294** 0.052 
     (0.121) (0.247) 
HH grew cash crops before the war    0.038 -0.027 -0.081 
    (0.114) (0.094) (0.123) 
HH owned cattle before the war    -0.123 -0.121 -0.038 
    (0.208) (0.084) (0.096) 
HH member was a traditional 
authority before the war 
   0.086 0.088 0.067 
    (0.158) (0.089) (0.106) 
Ethnic heterogeneity    -0.001   
    (0.002)   
Suitable for coffee 0.291 -0.068  -0.004   
 (0.215) (0.049)  (0.088)   
Fraction of 1993 returned refugees    0.079   
    (0.162)   
Distance to Bujumbura (log) -0.013 -0.118***  -0.131   
 (0.160) (0.053)  (0.090)   
Density 1990 (log) 0.164 -0.009  -0.124   
 (0.111) (0.038)  (0.082)   
Altitude (log) -0.517 0.177  -0.004   
 (0.534) (0.173)  (0.088)   
Fraction votes for Ndadaye 0.004 0.001  0.001   
 (0.003) (0.001)  (0.002)   
Constant  -0.709  -0.481   
  (1.212)  (2.886)   
Regional/Village FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95 95  35 199 141 
 
Table 6 Testing for endogeneity
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models (1) (4) and (5) are 
Maximum Likelihood Logit estimates. Marginal effects re-
ported, valued at the mean.  Model (2) and (3) is estimated 
using OLS.
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cash and export crop production, attenuating 
a possible concern of selection bias driving 
the positive relation between violence and 
(export) cash crop production. Column (4) 
and (5) present the result for individual level 
violence. We regress individual reports of 
violence (4) on household variables that could 
plausibly explain selection into violence, 
including wealth, traditional leadership before 
the war, and ethnic origin, and a set of village 
level dummies. We find that Hutu respondents 
had a higher chance of being victimized than 
respondents belonging to the other ethnic 
group. There is however no a priori reason to 
Table 7 Cross section models for victimization and export 
cash crops including pre-war controls (ED)
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Suppressed community 
variables include distance variables to: nearest market, 
drinking water provision and provincial road.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS ML ML ML ML ML ML ML 
         
HH attacked (%) 0.009* 0.008*** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.009* 0.010** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Individual attack     0.066    
     (0.062)    
Soil quality index    0.053 0.048 0.094 0.078 0.059 
    (0.169) (0.160) (0.206) (0.159) (0.116) 
HH grew cash crops 
before the war 
   0.213*** 0.212*** 0.220*** 0.229*** 0.206*** 
    (0.067) (0.066) (0.081) (0.067) (0.070) 
HH owned cattle before 
the war 
   0.071 0.072 0.052 0.087 0.063  
    (0.150) (0.146) (0.146) (0.144) (0.135) 
NGO   0.039 0.053 0.049 0.079 0.083 0.069 
   (0.099) (0.093) (0.091) (0.109) (0.109) (0.094) 
Age   -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008  
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Age2   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head is male   0.090* 0.106** 0.108** 0.108* 0.136*** 0.104**  
   (0.051) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.046) (0.052) 
Years at school   0.017 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.022 
0.031* 
 
   (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.01) 
HH size   0.022* 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.011  
   (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Current disputes   -0.889 -0.534 -0.608 0.366 -0.350 -0.342  
   (1.154) (1.128) (1.140) (1.525) (1.017) (1.207) 
Density 2008   0.312** 0.249 0.260 0.262 0.258 0.260  
   (0.156) (0.188) (0.188) (0.196) (0.175) (0.173) 
Suitable for coffee   0.053 0.020 0.003 0.035 0.043 0.051  
   (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.060) (0.067) (0.076) 
Land Gini   0.051 -0.125 -0.140 -0.099 -0.152 -0.110 
   (0.271) (0.226) (0.222) (0.218) (0.228) (0.235) 
Ethnic heterogeneity    0.005 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003  
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Flood      -0.144   
      (0.242)   
Drought      -0.117   
      (0.153)   
Plant diseases      0.104   
      (0.187)   
Prison       -0.113  
       (0.073)  
Sickness       -0.001  
       (0.001)  
Land tenure security         0.164** 
        (0.064) 
Constant 0.135        
 (0.107)        
Ethnicity FE No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 35 250 236 236 236 236 236 231 
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assume that Hutus are more likely to grow 
cash crops or invest more than others, hence 
this is unlikely to be the driver of our results.81 
In column (5) we try to deal with the 
potential problem of having a sample of 
survivors only. From our 2009 survey we 
know whether households had one or more 
of their household members killed because 
of the war. Although this obviously does not 
eliminate the concern of selection bias, this is 
given the data the best we can do. As shown, 
households that had family members killed 
as a result did not systematically differ from 
those that all survived. The dependent variable 
however contains many zeros; only 17 percent 
of our sample reported the violent death of a 
household member. The results should thus 
be interpreted with caution.
6. Robustness
As part of our robustness check we first 
replicate the cross-section models using 
additional controls from the 2009 sample. 
Although the sample consequently reduces 
to 250 observations, we now can control for 
pre-war variables including export (cash) 
crop farming. If indeed selection would be 
driving the result, including relevant pre-
war variables like export crop farming prior 
to the war would then presumably pick up 
all the variation and the leave the violence 
variable insignificant. Column (1)-(2) are the 
usual unconditional correlations; column (3) 
uses the same specification as before, only 
with the smaller 2009 sample. Including pre-
war controls in column (4) does not change 
the results much, suggesting that selection 
into violence through wealth (i.e. export crop 
farming) is not driving our results. Results are 
similar when including individual exposure or 
other types of shocks (column 5-7). The pre-war 
control for export crop farming (“hh grew cash crops 
before the war”) is a strong predictor for farming 
export cash crops now. Male household heads 
81  Contrary to popular belief the two groups however 
are hardly distinguishable on physiological features, lan-
guage, cultural characteristics and geographic settlement 
(Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2000). 
are also more likely to grow high value export 
cash crops, confirming standard results that 
men rather than women control these crops. 
Lastly, the 2009 survey also included a question 
about land tenure security. Security over land 
is commonly believed to stimulate investment 
on it (e.g. Besley, 1995). We included a dummy 
for tenure security in column (8). The variable 
has the expected sign and is significant at 5%. 
The coefficient of our key explanatory variable 
(violence) is however not affected.
Table 8 presents the results for export 
crop shares. Coefficients are similar across 
specifications; there is a positive effect of 
violence on shares from export crops. More 
populous areas are positively associated 
with export crop shares, in all models. Ethnic 
heterogeneity has a positive impact on shares. 
One explanation might be that the converse, 
ethnic homogeneity proxies isolation 
meaning that in ethnic homogeneous 
societies traditional customs and behavior 
are sustained. Traditions are more likely 
to break up with increased heterogeneity. 
Note that we also found a positive effect of 
ethnic heterogeneity on the probability to 
grow export crops, although there it was not 
significant at conventional levels. 
Secondly, we use different dependent 
variables, to examine if the positive results 
of community level violence extend to other 
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types of investments.82 We define two types. 
The first constitutes investments in schooling, 
including the set-up of new schools, the latter 
having a clear public good character.83 And 
second, we use a subset of soil improvement 
techniques that have more of a public good 
character than others (i.e., anti-erosion 
techniques and agro-forestry arguably 
have a more public good character than 
improved seeds and fertilizer). Subsequently 
we investigate the impact of violence on 
household total wealth, using both “objective” 
and “subjective” wealth indicators.   
Results are displayed in Table 9 below. Column 
(1) presents results for investments in schools. 
We find that exposure to violence increases 
investments in schooling. A one-standard 
deviation increase in violence leads to 36.3% 
increase in schooling expenditures (which 
then amounts up to about half a US dollar per 
household per month).  Larger households, 
more densely populated and coffee-growing 
communities are all positively associated 
with investments in schooling. Soil problems 
and current disputes are all negatively 
associated with this type of investment. 
82  We also investigated potential effects of violence on 
enterprise ownership. In some of the conditional logit 
models we find a marginally significant positive effect 
of violence on positive changes in enterprise ownership. 
Results are however not robust across specifications and 
therefore not reported in the paper. One interpretation for 
the absence of any effect is that ownership of small en-
terprises is flux in countries like Burundi. Businesses are 
typically started with a small amount of own or borrowed 
capital and often comprise of small shops where villagers 
can buy varieties of soap, mobile phone cards and canned 
food. Civil warfare may affect economic development 
through reduced spending (i.e. people need their money 
for other goods) and destruction of capital goods or in-
frastructure. This implies that communities may not need 
to have been affected directly by violence but enterprises 
within the community are affected through the impact 
of war on the economy as a whole. On the other hand, 
events not necessarily related to the war may cause peo-
ple to default on loans or rental payments, and shops eas-
ily close down because of this, providing yet an alternative 
interpretation why we do not find a robust effect.  
83  Variation in school expenditures may also result from 
a difference in provision by the government or NGOs and 
hence not necessarily reflect increased public good provi-
sion by the community members themselves. The coeffi-
cients are however unaffected when including a dummy 
variable for school projects. 
Table 8 Cross section models for victimization and income 
shares from export crops including pre-war controls (ED 
sample)
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Suppressed (fixed) commu-
nity variables include distance variables to: nearest mar-
ket, drinking water provision and provincial road.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
HH attacked (%) 0.294* 0.296* 0.313* 0.292* 
 (0.165) (0.168) (0.181) (0.163) 
Individual attack  -0.014   
  (0.023)   
Soil quality index -0.045 -0.044 -0.053 -0.045 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.045) (0.040) 
HH grew cash crops 
before the war  
0.035* 0.036* 0.035* 0.033* 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) 
HH owned cattle 
before the war 
0.024 0.023 0.029 0.027 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) 
NGO -0.044 -0.044 -0.042 -0.051 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head is male 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.019 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) 
Years at school -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
HH size 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Current disputes -0.325 -0.318 -0.262 -0.297 
 (0.306) (0.300) (0.271) (0.292) 
Density 2008 0.065** 0.063** 0.072** 0.065** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) 
Suitable for coffee 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.026 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
Land Gini 0.033 0.038 0.036 0.031 
 (0.049) (0.054) (0.052) (0.048) 
Ethnic 
heterogeneity  
0.002** 
0.002**
* 
0.003** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Flood   -0.014  
   (0.011)  
Drought   -0.003  
   (0.009)  
Plant diseases   0.016  
   (0.015)  
Prison    0.035 
    (0.033) 
Sickness    -0.000 
    (0.000) 
Constant 0.150    
 (0.219)    
     
Observations 223 223 222 223 
R-squared 0.220    
 
84     A Phoenix in Flames?
Column (2) presents results for the ‘public’ soil 
improvement techniques. We find violence to 
be a strong positive predictor of investing in 
high input techniques that have some public 
good character. Pre-war export crop farmers 
are more likely to invest and households living 
in areas that have few current disputes. If we 
believe that current disputes somehow proxy 
cohesion, it comes to no surprise that this is 
a negative predictor of investments that have 
a larger public good character. Column (3) 
presents results for monthly household income. 
Although the coefficient is positive, it is not 
significant at conventional levels (p<0.18). We 
therefore conclude that there is no discernable 
effect of violence on household income 
across violent and non-violent communities. 
Column (4) presents results on households’ 
subjective perception of their welfare. Here we 
find that households exposed to higher levels 
of violence systematically attach a higher 
score to their level of welfare than others. 
(Note that the scale is reversed, with 1 being 
at the highest and 6 at the lowest possible 
level, hence the negative correlation indeed 
Table 9 Cross-section models for victimization and differ-
ent dependent variables
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable in col-
umn (1) is monthly expenditures on school construction 
and school fees in 1998 prices. Dependent variable in col-
umn (2) is a dummy variable that is 1 if the household cur-
rently invests in soil improvement techniques with a high 
public good character, including anti-erosion gulls and 
agro-forestry. The model in column (2) is estimated using 
Maximum Likelihood (ML). Marginal effects are reported. 
Suppressed (fixed) community variables include distance 
variables to: nearest market, drinking water provision and 
provincial road. Dependent in model (3) is the log of total 
monetary monthly household income. Model (4) is an or-
dered logit model estimated with Maximum Likelihood. 
Dependent is subjective evaluation of welfare on a scale 
from 1-6 with 1, being very rich and 6 being extremely 
poor. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 School expenditures (log) Soil improvement 
Household 
income (log) 
Perceived wealth 
     
HH attacked (%) 0.033** 0.004* 0.034 -0.004** 
 (0.016) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) 
Soil quality index -0.589 0.013 0.135 0.052 
 (0.526) (0.063) (0.507) (0.072) 
HH grew cash crops before the war -0.164 0.089** 1.008*** -0.080** 
 (0.432) (0.045) (0.324) (0.038) 
HH owned cattle before the war 0.171 -0.029 1.204** -0.025 
 (0.491) (0.032) (0.481) (0.061) 
NGO 0.819** 0.040 0.175 0.050 
 (0.345) (0.116) (0.436) (0.048) 
Age 0.103 0.005 0.007 0.004 
 (0.068) (0.009) (0.081) (0.011) 
Age2 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Head is male -0.246 0.037 1.332*** -0.019 
 (0.384) (0.039) (0.458) (0.054) 
Years at school 0.139** -0.001 0.228** -0.024 
 (0.067) (0.009) (0.093) (0.016) 
HH size 0.579*** -0.012 0.077 -0.036** 
 (0.084) (0.013) (0.098) (0.015) 
Current disputes -3.623 -0.916** -0.627 0.749* 
 (3.472) (0.466) (4.551) (0.429) 
Density 2008 -0.073 0.089 0.386 -0.136*** 
 (0.450) (0.057) (0.496) (0.043) 
Suitable for coffee -0.560* 0.118*** 0.047 -0.005 
 (0.324) (0.022) (0.428) (0.030) 
Land Gini -1.059 0.069 -1.145 0.034 
 (0.782) (0.096) (1.375) (0.099) 
Ethnic heterogeneity  0.030** 0.002 0.015 -0.004** 
 (0.013) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) 
Constant 3.376  4.348  
 (2.532)  (3.280)  
Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 236 235 236 235 
R-squared 0.341  0.238  
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shows that more violence leads to higher 
perceived current welfare). Due to the low 
number of possible values for the dependent 
variable we use an ordered logit model here. 
The coefficient in column (4) presents the 
marginal effect of violence on the probability 
that a household will consider itself “extremely 
poor” (belonging to category 6). A one-unit 
increase in violence decreases the probability 
of perceiving yourself as extremely poor by 0.4 
percent (at mean levels). 
The number of (prewar) wealthy farmers (if 
we proxy wealth by cattle ownership) seem 
to be roughly equally distributed across 
violent and non-violent areas, as shown by 
the endogeneity test. Hence results cannot be 
simply interpreted as a “selective” initial wealth 
effect. Rather, the fact that the more exposed 
systematically attach a higher value to their level 
of wellbeing than other mitigates the possible 
concern that omitted variables, and not 
violence exposure are driving the result.   
Lastly we use different measures of violence. 
As noted all our measures of violence are self-
reported. This may be problematic if responses 
systematically vary with other characteristics 
that influence the outcome variable. Even 
though the problem may be less in our case 
as we regress household outcomes on village-
level responses, we cannot completely rule 
out this alternative interpretation. Villages 
with a large proportion of wealthy, literate 
cash farming households may on average 
be more likely to report incidents of violence 
than others. We do two things to show that 
this potential response bias is not driving 
the results. First, we use data from the 2007 
community questionnaire rather than the 
aggregated household level responses. 
Arguably, community leaders differ less from 
each other than individual households across 
communities. All community leaders in our 
sample were literate and although some are 
better off than others differences are small. 
We thus do not expect them to systematically 
under-or over-report. Second, we use ‘objective’ 
data from the International Peace and 
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). The ACLED 
(Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset) 
is a publicly available dataset that codes the 
location of reported incidents of conflict across 
the world. For more details on ACLED refer to 
Raleigh, Linke and Hegre (2009). Since 2003, 
Table 10 Cross section models for different measures of 
violence and cash crop farming
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first two columns pres-
ent Maximum Likelihood Logit estimates, marginal effects 
are reported. Dependent in column (1) is a dummy that is 
1 if the percentage of community member that got killed 
as a result of violent clashes is above the average percent-
age killed. Dependent in column (2) is a dummy that is 1 
if a violent attack between 1993 and 2003 has been re-
corded for that particular community within the ACLED 
database. Dependent in column (3) uses the number of 
attacks recorded by PRIO during the entire period of war 
since 1993. Suppressed community variables include dis-
tance variables to: nearest market, drinking water provi-
sion and provincial road.
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ML ML ML 
    
Dummy for % of 
community deaths is > 
average  
0.426***   
 (0.105)   
Dummy for ACLED record 
of attack 
 0.456***  
  (0.172)  
# Attacks recorded by 
ACLED 
  0.029*** 
   (0.008) 
Soil quality index 0.268** 0.294** 0.182 
 (0.132) (0.126) (0.131) 
HH grew cash crops before 
the war 
0.189*** 0.182** 0.209*** 
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.065) 
HH owned livestock before 
the war 
0.068 0.077 0.025 
 (0.122) (0.141) (0.120) 
NGO 0.182* 0.101 0.139 
 (0.097) (0.078) (0.086) 
Age -0.002 -0.006 0.000 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head is male 0.104** 0.110** 0.096* 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.052) 
Years at school 0.027 0.024 0.031** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) 
HH size 0.009 0.015 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Current disputes -0.179 1.216 0.036 
 (1.145) (1.054) (1.059) 
Density 2008 0.153 -0.005 0.100 
 (0.135) (0.145) (0.114) 
Suitable for coffee 0.186*** 0.037 0.080 
 (0.039) (0.060) (0.060) 
Land Gini -0.313* -0.307* -0.256 
 (0.176) (0.164) (0.164) 
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.002 0.004 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 236 236 236 
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local conflict data is available for Burundi. 
Using the GIS codes we were able to match the 
PRIO data to ours. Table 10 below presents the 
results. Column (1) uses the community level 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the village high 
more than the average fraction of its members 
killed, in column (2) we use a dummy that is 
1 if a PRIO attack took place in any given year 
and column (3) reports results for using a PRIO 
variable reflecting war intensity: the number 
of attacks up until 2003.
Clearly, using different measures of violence 
does not change the results qualitatively. 
Community level violence affects the 
probability of farming export crops after the 
war positively and significantly.  
7. Conclusion
We use three waves of unique household and 
community data from Burundi to examine 
the effect of civil war violence on households’ 
investment decisions. The cross-sectional 
models show that households exposed to 
violence in their community during the 
Burundi war are increasingly likely to have 
portfolios shifted towards more sustainable 
and more profitable activities than others. We 
also find that income shares from export crop 
farming are larger for those living in previously 
violent areas. By contrast, farmers’ behavior 
is unresponsive to other type of covariate 
shocks, including droughts, floods and plant 
diseases, and even to idiosyncratic shocks that 
may influence labor supply such as sickness 
and imprisonment. 
The panel data allow us to examine the 
changes in household behavior over time. Also, 
we attempt to separate a country-wide effect 
of warfare from violence inflicted on one’s 
community. The household –and year fixed 
effects specifications shows that households 
exposed to violence in their community are 
more likely grow export crops by 2007 than 
others. The negative time-dummy suggests that 
the war (and (or) possibly other developments 
still have harmful consequences in 2007. In 
addition to the panel we use a smaller (sub)
sample collected in 2009, with information on 
pre-war socio-economic variables as well as 
respondents’ ethnic origins. The first part of the 
robustness check includes these variables and 
replicates the cross-sectional models. We find 
that results are remarkably robust. The second 
part of our robustness checks for a possible 
selection in reporting incidents of violence. 
We use objective violence accounts from the 
Peace and Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) to 
address this concern. We find qualitatively 
similar results. Finally, we investigate whether 
our results extend to more general type of 
investments, not necessarily related to farm 
production. We find that they do. People 
exposed to violence are more likely to spend 
money on school (construction), invest more 
in soil improvement techniques with public 
good characteristics, and report higher levels 
of self-perceived welfare than others.  
We attempt to rule out the possibility that 
selection bias drives the results: those 
villages with more cash farming activities 
were not particularly targeted for their 
appropriable wealth. We explicitly control for 
the possible endogeneity of violence in our 
2SLS specifications in two of our cross-section 
models. They show similar results. These 
positive responses unlikely result from rushed 
in aid projects after the war (naturally most 
often found in the worst affected areas) as 
our NGO variable controls for that. Our results 
confirm experimental evidence from the same 
data as recently shown by Voors et al. (2009). 
This provides confidence in the idea that 
experiments of this kind are also externally 
valid; i.e., the outcomes of the economic 
games are consistent with actual behavior.
In the paper we do not explicitly deal with 
mechanisms that may underlie these positive 
relations between investment and violence. 
Instead, we offer some explanations that are 
consistent with the patterns in the data.  The 
fact that those farmers who are exposed to 
violence also spend more on public goods 
provision might point to increased community 
cohesion as a result from the war. The joint 
experience of trauma’s may bring people 
closer together, which translates into increased 
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community participation and, possibly, 
profitable cash crops production through e.g. 
joint insurance or a increased sense of safety. 
This interpretation resonates with findings in 
the aforementioned experimental paper as 
well as other empirical evidence from post-war 
societies including Uganda and Sierra Leone: 
respondents exposed to violence reveal more 
altruism towards their fellow villagers than 
those that were not, or less heavily, exposed. 
There may even be some optimism as 
reflected in the positive correlation between 
self-perceived welfare levels and violence, 
particularly since “objective” current wealth 
indicators do not confirm that they are 
better off by monetary standards. Although 
speculative, this may lend tentative support to 
the existence of post-traumatic growth effects 
after civil warfare. 
The paper presents evidence that contrary 
to the conventional idea that wars are 
“development in reverse” war can have positive 
outcomes as well.  Our outcomes contrast 
other micro-level evidence regarding crop 
production and investments after civil warfare 
in e.g. Uganda and Mozambique, suggesting 
at the very minimum, that war-impacts are 
context-dependent. Indeed, the wars in 
Uganda and Mozambique were fought for 
different reasons and had a distinctly different 
character than the war in Burundi. That said, we 
do believe that, as foremost psychological and 
recent economic evidence shows, traumatic 
experiences, while clearly unwarranted, may 
have positive consequences as well. This may 
have profound implications for countries’ 
postwar development paths. 
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Appendix A Data description of key vari-
ables
Community level violence: percentage of 
households that had been personally attacked 
by one of the armed groups. Attacks included 
the destruction of one’s house, or fields and 
the theft of crops, livestock, assets or money.
Individual attacks: dummy=1 if at least one 
household member experienced of torture, 
ambushes, kidnapping or had to work without 
payment   
Export farmer: dummy=1 if the household 
grows coffee, tea or cotton
Cash crop farmer: dummy=1 if the household 
grows coffee, tea, cotton or beer bananas
Export/cash crop shares: monthly revenue 
from export (cash crops) as a fraction of total 
monthly income in constant (1998) Burundian 
Francs (BIF)
Land Gini coefficient: Variable based on 
household land holdings. Community level 
Gini coefficient is created by ∫−=
1
0
)(21 dXXLG
(BPS) 
Appendix B First-stage regressions 
Table A2 First stage regressions to columns (7) in Table 3A 
and 3B
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at 
village level. Conditioning variables are suppressed (avail-
able upon request). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 HH attacked (%) HH attacked (%) 
Distance to capital -10.51** -10.51** 
 (5.36) (5.36) 
Distance to health 
center 
3.36** 3.36** 
 (1.59) (1.59) 
Partial F 4.70** 4.70** 
Hansen-J 0.48 0.24 
First stage to 
regression: 
Table 3A Table 3B 
 
6
Does Conflict affect Preferences? 
Results from Field Experiments 
in Burundi84
Abstract
We use experimental data from 35 randomly selected communities in Burundi to examine the 
impact of exposure to conflict on social-, risk- and time preferences.  These types of preferences 
are important as they determine people’s propensity to invest and their ability to overcome social 
dilemmas, so that changes therein foster or hinder economic growth.  We find that conflict affects 
preferences.  Individuals that have been exposed to greater levels of violence display more altruistic 
behavior towards their neighbors, are more risk seeking, and have higher discount rates.  Adverse, 
but temporary, shocks can thus alter savings and investments decisions, and potentially have long-
run consequences.
84 This paper was co-authored with Maarten Voors and Erwin Bulte, Development Economics Group, Wageningen Universi-
ty, the Netherlands, Philip Verwimp, University of Antwerp and Université Libre de Belgique, Belgium, Robert Lensink, Depart-
ment of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, University of Groningen, the Netherlands, andDaan van Soest, Department of 
Spatial Economics, VU University Amsterdam, and Department of Economics, Tilburg University, the Netherlands. Submitted 
to the American Economic Review.
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1. Introduction
Civil wars are associated with the destruction 
of capital, the breakdown of social norms and a 
reduced ability of people to “cope” with adverse 
conditions (e.g. Collier 2003; Fearon and Latin 
2003).  While the speed of recovery following 
conflict is subject of debate, the conventional 
view is that wars are “development in reverse.” 
This message emerges from both cross-
country studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2008; Cerra 
and Saxena, 2008) as well as from much of 
the micro level research (e.g. Deininger, 2003; 
Verwimp, 2005; Barron et al., 2009; Do and Iyer 
2009).  This comes as no surprise—deaths and 
injuries, destroyed infrastructure and assets, 
displaced populations, and deterioration of 
institutions all seem to work together to push 
households into poverty.  However, recent 
evidence suggests this is only part of the 
picture.
A number of African countries have 
experienced remarkable post-war recovery 
after civil war.  Examples include Mozambique, 
Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda.  Undoubtedly, 
this is partly due to generous aid flows that 
typically follow the cessation of violence. 
But other mechanisms may be at play too. 
Heterodox social scientists have long argued 
that violence can carry the seed of societal 
reform, spurring the expansion of capitalism 
and promoting economic growth.  For 
example, Cramer (2006) points to historical 
events to support his claim that violence can 
“produce institutional changes, amendments 
to the rule of the game.  In retrospect, many 
changes that come to be seen as progressive 
have their origins in social conflicts that have 
taken a violent turn.  Herein lies a paradox 
of violence and war: violence destroys but is 
also often associated with social creativity.” 
Interestingly, a small literature is now emerging 
that appears consistent with this perspective. 
Blattman (2009) shows that political 
participation in Uganda is greater, and that 
community networks are more extensive, in 
areas that have experienced violence.  Bellows 
and Miguel (2006; 2009) find similar results in 
Sierra Leone.  
One possible interpretation consistent with 
this evidence is that exposure to conflict 
induces a shift in preferences.  This explanation 
challenges economic theory as economists 
regard preferences as exogenous and fixed in 
their straw man model of Homo economicus 
(at least in the short-term––see below).  The 
notion of endogenous, or context-dependent, 
preferences gnaws at the foundations of 
standard welfare theory.  Yet, some evidence 
suggests that preferences can change in 
the short term.  For example, Robson (2002) 
discusses adaptive utility in the context of 
relative consumption – the appreciation of a 
consumption bundle depends on consumption 
levels relative to those of peers.  In this study 
we aim to explore the issue of endogenous 
preferences, allowing for the possibility that 
exposure to conflict has shaped preferences.
Interestingly, there is little opposition against 
the concept of “malleable preferences” in 
other social sciences.  Indeed, in psychology 
it is widely accepted that (temporary) shocks 
can permanently affect somebody’s outlook 
on life, as well as his subjective valuation of 
goods and services (Hobfoll 1989; Tedeschi et 
al. 1998).  Shocks may not only have an impact 
on political motivations and social preferences, 
but also on other preferences, including those 
pertaining to evaluating risk and discounting 
the future.  Since such preferences are 
fundamental determinants of consumption, 
saving and investment behavior –– the drivers 
of economic growth –– it appears as if the 
notion of endogenous preferences can have 
far-reaching consequences for how we think 
about development.  For example, a shock 
that makes people prefer the present rather 
than the future will discourage saving, and 
thereby lower long-term income.  Shocks that 
attenuate preferences for social interaction 
and collaboration may erode social capital 
and make communities less resilient against 
future shocks (undermining joint insurance) 
or hamper the provision of growth-enhancing 
public goods.  If so, dynamic trajectories 
of development need to be rethought. 
Particularly, the scope for vicious and virtuous 
development cycles will be radically altered—
if adverse shocks invite anti-social preferences 
or discourage savings, then temporary shocks 
can condemn communities to trajectories into 
poverty trap type of outcomes.
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The main objective of this paper is to examine 
the causal effect of exposure to violence on 
behavior in economic experiments in which 
payoffs vary between choices across three 
dimensions: timing, riskiness, and social 
consequences.  Do victims of conflict behave 
more pro-socially, do they have a higher 
propensity to invest in the future, and are 
they more prone to taking risks?  We try to 
answer this important question by pulling 
together survey and new experimental data 
from Burundi.  First, we collected detailed 
information on the (local) history of violence 
in a set of Burundian communities, and on a 
range of household and community variables. 
We then conducted a series of artefactual 
field experiments, playing games believed to 
gauge risk -, time -, and social preferences in 
an incentive–compatible fashion.  While such 
preferences have been measured in a variety 
of contexts (see Carpenter and Cardenas 2008 
for a review), this study is the first to apply 
experimental methods in a post-conflict 
environment to gauge the effect of violence 
on human decision-making. We are aware of 
potential concerns about the endogeneity 
of exposure to violence, omitted variables 
and non-random attrition, and probe the 
robustness of our findings using various 
additional analyses, including an instrumental 
variable approach.  
Our results strongly suggest that exposure 
to violence affects behavior – possibly via 
altering preferences.  We find that individuals 
who have either experienced violence 
themselves, or who live in communities that 
have been violently attacked, display more 
altruistic behavior, are more risk seeking, and 
act less patiently.  Our results are robust across 
several specifications, and are obtained for 
both experimental and observational data.  We 
believe they shed important new light on post-
war recovery processes by speaking against 
overly pessimistic views on the destructive 
long-term consequences of civil war.  
This paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 
we sketch two perspectives on the malleability 
of human preferences.  In section 3 we discuss 
our data and experiments, and outline our 
identification strategy (including the way in 
which we address endogeneity issues).  In 
section 4 we present our main experimental 
results and aim to interpret them in the context 
of conventional economic assumptions with 
respect to behavior.  Section 5 concludes.
2. Preferences and Behavior
The canonical model of utility maximization in 
economics assumes that preferences are given. 
But preferences are not written in stone – a rich 
economic literature has developed that tries 
to capture the evolutionary processes behind 
the long-term selection of time preferences 
(e.g., Rogers 1994, Robson and Samuelson 
2007, Netzer 2009), risk preferences (Netzer 
2009) and social preferences (Bowles 2009).85 
Evolutionary models of preference selection 
provide an equilibrium match between 
behavior and the environment within which 
people reside (for overview work, see Robson 
2001, 2002).  Given the long-term nature of 
evolutionary processes, though, the notion 
of endogenous preferences thus defined 
does not really challenge the mainstream 
economics paradigm.  Specifically, preferences 
may still be treated as hard-wired and fixed for 
individuals.  
There is also research that documents 
systematic differences across communities 
that may be explained by changes taking place 
at much shorter time scales, such as changes 
in physical environments or technologies.  For 
example, cross-section experimental work 
by Henrich et al. (2001, 2004) documents 
behavioral variation across societies, arguing 
that this variation can be reasonably well 
explained by the geographical and social 
context – including economic variables 
such as the degree to which individuals are 
integrated into markets.  However, correlation 
between variables like market integration on 
the one hand and social or risk preferences 
on the other hand need not capture a causal 
effect.  Self selection into (market) activities 
suggests that the reverse may be true as well 
– certain “types” of individuals are more likely 
85  For other work on the evolution of preferences via 
selection, see Hanson and Stuart (1990) and Eaton and Es-
waran (2003).  For a critical approach towards the conven-
tional economic model of stable preferences, see Ariely et 
al. (2003).
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to engage in market exchange than others. 
Such endogeneity concerns imply that it is not 
straightforward to challenge the canonical 
model of fixed preferences.
Psychologists sometimes have difficulty 
grasping the economist’s perspective on 
behavior.  Indeed, their standard framework 
does not contain the equivalent of exogenous 
preferences.  Rather, individuals are believed 
to have a flexible repertoire of states and 
traits, enabling them to formulate context-
specific coping strategies.  The distinction 
between personality traits (characteristics)86 
and states (context-dependent behavior, see 
McCrae and Costa, 1997) appears to reflect the 
economist’s distinction between preferences 
and behavior, but this is only superficially so. 
While traits are relatively stable over time and 
across situations, they can profoundly change 
in response to traumatic events (as do coping 
strategies and states).  The consensus view 
among psychologists is that a shock, such as 
civil war, may result in either temporal (“non-
chronic”) or permanent changes (“chronic” or 
“personality” changes or disorders) in behavior 
(McCrae, 2006).  This is true even if the 
experience was not first hand (Yehuda, 2002). 
Whether a trauma develops into a personality 
change, or not, depends on various factors (de 
Jong 2002).87  Yet, if people overcome adversity 
they may be propelled to a higher level of 
functioning than prior to the event (Linley and 
Joseph, 2004). Such posttraumatic “growth” 
has been observed under victims of a wide 
range of tragedies such as rape, cancer, heart 
attacks, disasters, combat and the Holocaust 
(e.g. Tedeschi et al., 1998; Carmil and Breznitz, 
1991; Punamaki et al., 1997).  
Exposure to traumatic events, including 
86  Five personality traits are commonly identified: open-
ness to experience, agreeableness, conscientiousness, ex-
traversion and neuroticism.
87  Such factors include (i) the magnitude and intensity 
of the event, (ii) demographic characteristics of the indi-
vidual (age, gender, socio-economic status, education, 
preparedness, religion and ethnicity), (iii) the subjective 
appraisal of the event (whether a person perceives the 
event as positive or negative and whether a person feels 
capable of mastering the impact of the event), (iv) the 
resources available to the person and the social support 
networks around a person, and (v) the coping behavior of 
an individual, both problem oriented and emotional ef-
fort to deal with the event’s impact.
attacks on the community, can augment the 
value individuals place on people around 
them.  Collins et al. (1990) show that the 
“recognition of one’s vulnerability” may 
enhance the value of social networks.  Also, 
psychologists have pointed out that the 
disruption of support networks is a key 
damaging aspect of traumatic events (de 
Jong, 2002).  If violence disrupts communities, 
through permanent displacement or ethnic 
tensions, the breakdown of social support 
networks may occur.
What about risk preferences?  The psychological 
literature also offers some clues on how risk 
preferences might be affected by shocks.  The 
core idea is that human emotions and behavior 
are affected by traumatic shocks (Cutchin et 
al., 2008) even when the experience is not first 
hand (Weinstein, 1989). These emotions in turn 
affect people’s risk evaluations in situations 
subsequent and unrelated to the traumatic 
event (Lerner and Keltner, 2001) yielding 
ambiguous predictions with respect to 
experimental play.  Specifically, when trauma 
has induced feelings of anger, respondents are 
more likely to make optimistic risk evaluations 
and are more prone to choosing risky options 
(Lerner and Keltner, 2001).  In contrast, when 
the trauma has induced feelings of fear, 
respondents are more likely to avoid risky 
options.  It is an open question which effect 
dominates.
Time preferences may also be affected by 
exposure to conflict.  Traumatic events may 
raise the subjective appreciation of the risk of 
being exposed to trauma again in the future 
(Lerner and Keltner, 2001), and experiencing a 
shock often induces self-protective behavior in 
survivors (Weinstein, 1989).  Hence, exposure 
to conflict may induce hazard preparedness 
in people, skewing asset portfolios towards 
assets that can easily be hidden or moved. 
If so, exposure to violence should make our 
respondents seek immediate returns over 
future ones, raising discount rates as measured 
in experimental play. 
However, the difficulty in identifying the 
causal effect of conflict on preferences is 
evident.  As mentioned, one key concern 
is potential endogeneity of exposure to 
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conflict with respect to preferences due to 
(self ) selection effects.  Moreover, it is difficult 
to distinguish true preference shifts from 
information effects––which would be perfectly 
compatible with the mainstream model of 
fixed preferences.  If people care more about 
their fellow survivors than before the conflict, 
preferences have shifted.  However, if people 
learn during conflict that certain modes of 
behavior are more functional than others, this 
may induce them to adopt new heuristics—
possibly more cooperative ones.  Conflict may 
teach community members that altruistic 
behavior pays (or does not pay) because 
fellow villagers (fail to) reciprocate in times of 
need.  Alternatively, conflict may help people 
discover what their true preferences are, as 
it forces them to reflect on the essence of 
living.  That is, preferences may be a stable but 
fuzzy and multidimensional construct, so that 
identifying them takes effort (Bateman et al., 
2008).  We return to this in section 4.2.
3. Experimental Design
3.1 Data 
We conducted our series of experiments 
in a random and stratified sample of 300 
households in 35 communities. These 
communities and households were drawn 
from a set of 100 communities that we visited 
in 2007 to collect data on local conflict, 
social capital and a range of household and 
community variables.88  The data gathering 
effort was part of a larger project, initiated 
by the World Bank, who collected the first 
wave of data halfway through  the war (in 
1998).  For a total of 1400 households in 100 
communities we have panel data regarding 
many important household characteristics as 
well as information on the development and 
consequences of armed conflict.  We randomly 
selected 35 communities and revisited all 
respondents of the earlier surveys, inviting 
them to participate in a series of experiments. 
88  Burundi Priority Survey 2007. The data collection was 
a collaborative effort between the Institut de Statistiques 
et d’Etudes Economiques du Burundi (ISTEEBU), Antwerp 
University, Brussels University and Wageningen Univer-
sity, and was implemented under the flag of MICROCON 
– an EU funded project focusing on household
analysis of violent conflict in various regions of the world.
Of the 35 communities, 24 experienced 
violence in the period 1993-200389, and 11 were 
not exposed to violence. Table 1 summarizes 
our main data.
Our starting point is the assumption that 
there are no systematic differences between 
our subjects before the onset of conflict.  That 
is, we assume our 300 participants are drawn 
from the same distribution of preferences in 
the Burundi population.  Next, we test whether 
exposure to violence is random – the odds 
of an individual being subjected to violence 
are independent of variables like wealth, 
education, etc.  Following anecdotal evidence 
(HRW, 1998; Krueger and Krueger, 2007; 
Voors and Bulte, 2008) our null hypothesis is 
that violence is not systematically related to 
individual characteristics.  Our data do not 
allow us to reject this null—see below.  Hence, 
we can think about exposure to violence during 
the 1993-2003 conflict as a quasi-experiment, 
enabling identification of the effects of the 
“conflict treatment” –– systematic differences 
in experimental play between communities 
can be attributed to exposure to conflict. 
We measure civil war shocks at both the 
household and community level. Since 
independence Burundi has been the stage 
of nearly three decades of civil war between 
the country’s two main ethnic groups; Hutu 
and Tutsi. At the outbreak of the most recent 
episode of violence in 1993, following the 
assassination of the country’s first Hutu 
president, Melchior Ndadaye, Hutu groups 
targeted Tutsi in retaliation throughout the 
country, killing 30,000-50,000 Tutsi within 
weeks. In turn, the Tutsi-dominated army 
responded with indiscriminate and large-scale 
attacks on Hutu. In the years that followed, 
confrontations between rebel groups and the 
army ravaged communities throughout the 
country.   Nevertheless, most of the violence 
concentrated around the nation’s capital, 
Bujumbura, as both rebels and the army 
fought over its control. Also, violence was less 
89  The end of the conflict was officially sealed with a 
peace agreement signed in 2005. Yet, the intensity of 
conflict in the last 2 years was negligible as compared to 
the intensity in the first 11 years.  When constructing our 
variables on conflict and victimization, we focus on the in-
cidents in the 1993-2003 period.
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present in remote places such as communities 
at greater altitudes (Figure 1). Burundi has only 
recently started to recover from this violence, 
which left over 300,000 Burundians dead 
and displaced 1.2 million people (Ngaruko 
and Nkurinziza, 2000). We recorded the 
number of confrontations between army and 
rebels as well as bouts of one-sided violence 
hitting communities without regard for the 
characteristics of their victims over the 1993-
2003 period. In our sample, about two thirds 
of the communities experienced such attacks 
resulting in the death of up to 15% of the 
communities’ inhabitants. 
3.2 Experimental Games
For our series of experiments we use adapted 
versions of well-established experimental game 
protocols. We implement a social orientation 
experiment, a risk experiment and a time 
preference experiment, to be implemented 
in this order.  In the risk experiments subjects 
face the possibility to make losses – as we elicit 
decisions in both the win and loss domain.  To 
avoid subjects making losses in the session 
(i.e., over all three games), we pay them a 
show-up fee of 2000 FBU.90 
To measure social preferences we adapted the 
social value orientation experiment devised by 
Liebrand (1984).  In this experiment, subjects 
(denoted by i,j) are anonymously matched 
to another participant from their community 
(their ‘partners’), and make six choices 
between two own-other payoff combinations; 
A and B. The pairs of allocations lie on a circle 
in the positive quadrant, where the amount of 
money the decision maker allocates to himself 
(Si) is measured along the horizontal axis and 
the amount of money allocated to the other 
participant is measured along the vertical axis 
90  USD 1 = 1,210 FBU (20 May 2009), which is roughly 
equal to a full day’s wage rate for unskilled labor.
(Oi).
91  The radius of the circle is 250 FBU, so that 
S2+O2 = (250)2.  As a result, the total amount of 
money to be allocated (Si+Oi) is not constant 
across combinations.92  Subject i’s earnings are 
equal to the amount of money allocated to 
himself (the sum of Si’s over the six choices), 
plus the amount of money allocated to him by 
his partner j in the experiment (the sum of Oj 
over the six choices).  If we take the ratio of the 
total amount of money a subject allocated to 
the partner (the sum of all Oi’s) and the total 
amount allocated to himself (the sum of Si’s), 
we obtain a measure of this subject’s social 
orientation.  This ranges from totally selfish (if 
the subject always chose the allocation with 
the highest payment for himself ) to totally 
altruistic (if he always chose the option with 
the highest payment for his partner).  We 
rescale the results such that social orientation 
is measured on a scale from 0 to 100, with 
0 denoting purely selfish preferences, 100 
identifying the subject to be maximizing 
his partner’s payoff, and 50 identifying the 
social optimum (i.e., choosing allocations to 
maximize joint payoffs). On average we find 
a value of 27, indicating that most subjects 
tend to be fairly individualistic (Table 1). 
The subjects were not informed about their 
earnings in this experiment (the sum of Si+Oj 
over all 6 choices) until after the other two 
experiments had been completed. 
The second experiment of the session was the 
risk preferences experiment.  Here we used 
91  Originating in the social psychology literature this 
experiment is now frequently applied in the economics 
literature as well (see Offerman et al. 1996; Vyrastekova 
and van Soest, 2007). In these versions subjects are of-
fered 24 pair wise allocations, covering all four quadrants 
of the circle.  Pretesting revealed that the cognitive bur-
den of making all 24 choices was too large for our (largely 
illiterate) subject pool.  We decided to just offer subjects 
pair-wise choices in the “first quadrant” of the social ori-
entation circle––corresponding to positive amounts for 
both the giver and receiver. We thus reduced the cogni-
tive burden imposed on our illiterate subjects at the cost 
of reduced precision with which pro-social preferences 
can be measured. 
92  See Appendix for example of record sheet and full 
choice pair table.
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a game (based on Harbaugh et al. 2002) 93 
where subjects could choose between playing 
a simple gamble and receiving a specific 
amount of money with certainty. Participants 
were presented with 6 choice cards, each of 
which presented them the choice between A: 
receiving (or losing) an amount of money with 
certainty (y, that varied between the 6 choice 
cards), and B: participating in a game where 
they may either gain (lose) 2000 FBU with 
probability 0.3, or gain (lose) nothing with 
probability 0.7.  Hence, the expected absolute 
93  We used an adapted version of a simple design for 
children by Harbaugh et al. (2002) which is well suited for 
illiterate people as it uses a simple trade-off and clear vi-
sual instruction.  Our use of the experiment differs slightly 
from Harbaugh et al. as we specifically use information 
from questions where the certainty equivalent is different 
from the expected value of the gamble. 
value of the gamble was always the same 
(600 FBU, which was an expected gain for 
three cards and an expected loss for the other 
three cards), whereas we varied the amount of 
money to be received with certainty (y).  For 
both gains and losses the certain bid (y) was 
lower, equal to, and higher than the expected 
value of the gamble.  As the certain payoff 
(y) in A increases, the gamble in B becomes 
less attractive.  The point at which a subject 
switches from the risky to the safe alternative 
allows us to determine her degree of risk 
aversion.94  
The probabilities of the gamble (0.3 of 
winning/losing 2000 FBU, and 0.7 of receiving 
nothing) were represented visually using 
94  See Appendix for record sheet and full choice pair 
table.
Variable 
obs 
household 
level 
obs 
community 
level 
mean std. dev. min max 
Panel A: Preferences       
Social preferences [0-100] 298 35 27.34     28.10  0 100 
Risk preferences Gains 271 35 4.11 2.08 1 6 
Risk preferences Losses 259 35 4.83 1.91 1 6 
Discount rate (%) 285 35 39.67 41.26 0 100 
       
Panel B: Conflict variables       
Relative number of dead in attacks (%)  35 2.35 4.48 0 15.63 
Individual victimization index 299 35 0 1 -0.50 3.86 
       
Panel C: Household variables       
Respondent is literate 296 35 0.52 0.50 0 1.00 
Respondent age 298 35 44.91 15.76 14.00 90.00 
Respondent is male 298 35 0.61 0.49 0 1.00 
Total land holdings per capita (ha2) 292 35 5.43 5.08 0.10 34.25 
Respondent is livestock farmer (1993) 300 35 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Perceived trust level (1998) 300 35 4.69 2.16 1 10 
Social capital index (2007) 299 35 0 1 -0.47 4.49 
Respondent is cash crop farmer (1998) 300 35 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Respondent is cash crop farmer (2007) 300 35 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Investments farm buildings (FBU, 1998) 295 35 398.20 375.16 0 5000 
Investments farm buildings (FBU, 2007)  300 35 221.86 1001.42           0 12155.87 
       
Panel D: Community variables       
Land Gini coefficient  35 0.30 0.20 0 0.54 
Distance to market   35 2.85 0.72 1 6 
Conflict over land (% yes)  35 0.25 0.15 0 0.60 
Ethnic homogeneity  35 0.88 0.15 0.30 1.00 
Population density 1990 (log)  35 5.47 0.48 4.20 6.11 
Population density 2008  (log)  35 5.79 0.44 4.50 6.49 
Per capita total expenditure 1998 (log)  35 8.57 0.70 5.17 10.70 
Per capita total expenditure 2007 (log)  35 9.24 0.47 8.09 10.40 
Severe draught (% yes)  35 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Access rain (% yes)  35 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Manioc disease (% yes)  35 0.90 0.29 0 1 
Upcoming ceremony (% yes)  35 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Distance to Bujumbura (km)  35 93.17 34.53 39.5 167 
Altitude (m)  35 1662.06 158.39 1260 2200 
 
Table 1 Descriptives
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three black and seven white balls.  To illustrate 
the chances of winning/losing money, the ten 
balls were put into a bag in the presence of all 
participants in the session, and subsequently 
stirred. Next, we drew one ball from the bag 
about ten times – with replacement – to show 
the participants that the likelihood of drawing 
a black ball (implying winning/losing money) 
was less than half the likelihood of drawing a 
white ball (resulting in zero payoffs). The choice 
cards displayed the options both numerically 
and graphically with each change in money 
stock represented by an equivalent number of 
notes. Payoffs for this second experiment were 
not determined until after the third experiment 
had been completed.  Then, payoffs were 
determined by first selecting which of the six 
cards was to be implemented.  Six numbered 
balls were put into a bag to randomly select 
one card to be played for payment. Those 
subjects who had chosen the safe option A 
were informed about the amount of money 
y, as stated on that card, they were to receive 
(or had to pay).  For those who had chosen the 
gamble, option B, the seven white balls and 
the three black balls were put into the bag to 
determine whether they would receive (have 
to pay) 2000 FBU (when any of the three black 
balls were drawn), or whether they received 
nothing (if one of the seven white balls was 
drawn). Note that we made sure that at the 
end of the experiment all subjects had non-
negative earnings because of the 2000 FBU 
show-up fee. 
The third and final experiment aimed to gauge 
time preferences.  We presented subjects 
with a set of nine simple pair wise choices 
between two options: receiving an amount 
of money at some date in the near future, 
and receiving a larger sum at a later time.  The 
amounts of money were to be delivered by a 
trustworthy local NGO, Ligue ITEKA.  However 
future money is always less certain than 
instantaneous money.95   Consequently, we 
provided subjects with a choice between two 
future options – receiving money tomorrow, 
or in 15 days – rather than one “instant” versus 
95  Ligue ITEKA is a Burundian non-governmental or-
ganization with a solid reputation of being trustworthy 
amongst Burundians. It has a long history of operation as 
well as nationwide coverage in Burundi. 
one future income option (see Harrison et al. 
2002).  The two options to choose between 
were A: receive 1000 BFU in one day, and B: 
receive 1000(1 + d) FBU in two weeks plus 
one day, with d equal to 0.00, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 
0.10, 0.40, 0.70, and 1.00.96  Subsequently, at 
the highest interest rate subjects earned an 
additional 1000 FBU by waiting two weeks. 
In the experiment subjects were asked to 
identify their switching point from preferring 
A to preferring B.  Increasing the interest rate 
d over the nine decisions allows us to observe 
the point at which a subject switches from 
preferring 1000 FBU tomorrow to preferring 
1000(1 + d) FBU in two weeks plus one day. 
The switching point serves as a measure of 
the subject’s discount rate; the earlier people 
switch from A to B the more patient they are. 
After subjects completed all questions (and 
after having determined the payoffs for 
the social orientation game and the risk 
preference game), we randomly determined 
which pair-wise choice was to be paid in the 
time preference experiment.  To do so, we 
put 9 numbered balls into a bag, and picked 
one randomly.  The option chosen for that 
question (i.e. A or B) then determined how 
much money was delivered, and when.  Then 
the participants were informed about their 
revenues in the social orientation game, the 
payments for the risk preference game were 
determined using the procedure explained 
above, and they received the associated 
earnings, plus their show-up fee. The pay-
off of the time preference game was placed 
in a sealed envelope and handed over to a 
representative of the regional office of the 
local non-governmental organization, while 
all participants received a receipt stating the 
amount of money they were entitled to.  At 
the relevant date (either the next day, or 15 
days later), the representative went back 
to the community to deliver envelopes to 
the respective participants, in return for the 
their receipts.  To ascertain that the money 
envelopes were indeed delivered by our local 
organization, we checked whether all receipts 
were collected – which was indeed the case. 
96  See Appendix example of record sheets and full 
choice pair table.
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The participants were informed about this 
procedure in advance.   
3.3 Implementation
The experiments were conducted during March-
April 2009. Following an extensive training of 
our local experimenters97, we ran several pilot 
tests to ensure that our typical participant was 
able to understand our experiments without 
much effort. As many of our participants had 
received little or no education, we followed a 
relatively simple design and our experimenters 
used clear and visual instructions to make it 
easier for illiterate subjects to understand the 
consequences of any decisions they made 
in the games. We tested comprehension by 
asking test questions before the start of each 
experiment.98 A day before the experiments, 
research coordinators contacted local 
government officials in each research site, and 
asked them to invite the household heads of 
the 2007 survey participants. The experiments 
started at approximately 9 A.M. the next day, 
and lasted about three hours. Each session 
started with a general introduction in which 
the participants were informed, among other 
things, that upon completion of the session 
they would receive a show-up fee of 2000 FBU 
plus or minus the amount of money they would 
gain or lose as a result of their decisions during 
the session.  The games were implemented by 
three teams, each with one instructor and two 
research assistants. Subjects who had difficulty 
completing record sheets by themselves were 
helped by research assistants who carefully 
avoided giving specific instructions about how 
to answer. The average experimental earnings 
for three games were about 6000 FBU (roughly 
5 days wages for unskilled labor), including 
the 2000 FBU show-up fee. 
3.4 Exogeneity and selection bias
The assumption underlying our empirical 
97  The experiments were conducted in the local lan-
guage Kirundi.
98  To enhance understanding we also limited the group 
size to 10 participants and if needed experiments were 
conduced in two groups. Also, instructors we went though 
the experiments question by question.
approach is that violence across and within 
communities was exogenous with respect 
to individual preferences.  However, any 
co-variation of preferences and exposure 
to violence may be due to (i) non-random 
violence or (ii) non-random attrition in the 
sample. 
Regarding the first, there is ample evidence 
highlighting the brutal and indiscriminate 
nature of the Burundi conflict (HRW 1998, 
Krueger and Krueger 2008; for a more detailed 
examination of the nature of violence in 
Burundi, refer to Voors and Bulte 2008). 
Some communities were severely attacked, 
for example when the army raided whole 
communities in search of weapons, rebels 
and loyalists (HRW 1998, Krueger and Krueger 
2007).  Similarly, rebels indiscriminately 
attacked individuals and communities in 
search of supplies. We collected data on 
exposure to violence both at the household 
and community level (Table 1).  For example, 
the community survey elicited information 
on the intensity of violence resulting from 
confrontations between the army and rebel 
groups as well as one-sided violence by either 
group.  We recorded the date and severity of 
the attacks, including the number of civilians 
killed or injured over the period 1993-2003.    
To statistically examine whether ‘selection 
into violence’ might bias our results we assess 
whether violence experienced by communities 
is associated with pre-war community 
characteristics; see Table 2.  Violence is 
measured as the number of attacks during 
1993-2003 (column 1), and as the number 
of people dying in attacks in that period, 
expressed as a share in the total population 
(column 2).  In these two columns we find no 
significant correlation between our measure 
of violence and a broad range of pre-war 
community characteristics including, among 
others, average wealth99, the fraction of votes 
for the assassinated president, and ethnic 
homogeneity.  Only two (exogenous) variables 
are correlated with the share of villagers killed 
– distance to Bujumbura, the nation’s capital, 
and altitude, a measure of geography (see 
99  Unfortunately our data lack pre-war income levels, in-
stead we proxy wealth by average livestock ownership.
98     Does Conflict Affect Preferences?
also Figure 1).  We employ these variables as 
instruments for conflict intensity to attenuate 
any remaining endogeneity concerns and 
measurement error.  Below we will demonstrate 
that the instruments are not correlated with the 
error term of the second stage regressions.
Second, we analyze whether households are 
selected into violence, or not.  In the third 
and fourth column of Table 2 we repeat the 
above analysis, but now at the household 
level.  We have two proxies for household 
exposure to violence: (i) whether a physical 
attack happened to a household member and 
(ii) whether household members have been 
exposed to non-physical attacks (including 
theft, forced labor, etc.).  In columns (3) and 
(4) we demonstrate that neither variable 
is correlated with a range of household 
characteristics (income, gender, education, 
Table 2 Exogeneity 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable in column (3) is a 
dummy, 1 if respondent was interviewed in both 1998 and 
2007, zero else; in column (4) is a dummy, 1 if respondent 
was interviewed in both 2007 and 2009, zero else; in col-
umn (5) is a dummy, 1 if respondent was in village during 
1998, zero else
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Attack during 1993-2003 
Rel. number of 
dead in attacks  
1993-2003 
Physical  attack on 
family member  
Non-physical 
attack on family 
member 
Interviewed in 
1998 and 2009 
 Probit OLS Probit Probit Probit 
Community variables      
Average literacy household head -0.593 -5.943    
 (1.148) (3.479)    
Average age household head -0.002 0.0823    
 (0.043) (0.144)    
Percent male -0.368 1.268    
 (1.723) (6.927)    
Livestock farmer (1993) 2.350 5.636    
 (1.908) (5.608)    
Density in 1990 (log) 0.185 0.761    
 (0.573) (1.866)    
Ethnic homogeneity (1993) 0.015 0.026    
 (0.020) (0.060)    
Fraction of votes for Ndadaye (1993) -0.011 0.025    
 (0.020) (0.061)    
Distance to Bujumbura (km, log)  -5.749*    
  (3.160)    
Altitude (m, log)  -17.360*    
  (8.889)    
      
Relative number of dead in      0.0255 
attacks 1993-2003     (0.0189) 
      
Household variables      
Literacy   -0.041 -0.0283 0.312 
   (0.192) (0.156) (0.270) 
Age   0.006 -0.0008 -0.00239 
   (0.007) (0.0060) (0.00660) 
Gender    0.125 -0.176 -0.794*** 
   (0.263) (0.222) (0.239) 
Livestock farmer (1993)   0.225 0.0748 0.0660 
   (0.216) (0.181) (0.252) 
Ethnicity   0.0684 0.0453  
   (0.167) (0.142)  
Total expenditures (1998)   0.253 0.160 -0.193 
   (0.223) (0.186) (0.164) 
Perceived trust level (1998)   -0.0052 -0.0109  
   (0.0431) (0.0378)  
Share of cash crops in total    -0.366 0.170 -0.0973 
production (1998)   (0.417) (0.307) (0.412) 
Expenditures farm improvement    0.0843 0.0356 0.0296 
(1998)   (0.0902) (0.0803) (0.0605) 
      
Constant 0.302 145.7* 0.457 1.686 2.295 
 (4.755) (75.45) (0.390) (1.452) (1.448) 
      
FE no no yes yes yes 
N 35 35 239 239 279 
adj. R2  0.13    
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etc.).  The same applies to survey-based 
data that are related to the preferences we 
are interested in: (i) perceived trust levels (a 
measure of social capital as a proxy for social 
preferences), (ii) crop choice (proxy for risk 
preferences), and (iii) expenditures on farm 
improvements (proxy for time preferences-
-see section 4.3).100  Taken together, the 
regression results in columns (1)-(4) of Table 2 
support the anecdotal evidence that violence 
in the Burundi war committed by both soldiers 
and rebels was random. 
Next, to address sample attrition we analyze 
whether a non-random subset of the 
population was murdered or moved out in 
response to the threat of violence (and did 
not return) between 1998 and 2009.101  Some 
14% of the households surveyed in 1998 were 
‘missing’ in 2009, which represents a modest 
attrition rate given the circumstances.  In 
column (5) of Table 2 we analyze whether 
these drop-out households differ statistically 
from the re-interviewed household in 2009. 
We follow the approach taken by Fitzgerald et 
al. (1998) and estimate a probit model of 1998-
2009 attrition on a range of 1998 household 
characteristics.  All but one variable enter non-
significantly.  The one exception is gender of 
the household head.  According to our data, 
households headed by a male were less 
likely to be present in the 2009 survey than 
households headed by a female (the share of 
male-headed households dropped from 80% 
100  These household data are not available for the pre-
war period.  Instead we rely on early war data from our 
first survey wave, conducted in 1998.  
101  Unfortunately, we do not have data to explore this 
same issue for the entire duration of the war; from 1993 
until 2003.  Households that migrate in anticipation of 
violence may have different risk and social preferences 
than those households which stayed behind.  We use data 
from an alternative study to probe into this.  The Enquête 
Socio-Démographique, Santé et Reproduction (ESD-SR) 
was collected by a UN institution, and we use it to ana-
lyze whether migration during the early war period (1993-
1998) is explained by community or household character-
istics.  In this sample, 20% of households were not present 
in their village in 1998, and according to this sample both 
gender, literacy and age mattered for migration decisions. 
However, for these villagers we do not know whether 
their village of origin indeed experienced conflict, and it 
is therefore not evident that migration of households af-
fects the composition of conflict-ridden villages relative to 
those who escaped conflict.
in 1998 to 60% in 2009).  We return to this issue 
in section 4.
4. Conflict, Behavior and Preferences
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest 
considerable heterogeneity in experimental 
behavior.  In this section we investigate 
whether experimental behavior varies with 
exposure to conflict, and regress decisions 
made in the social, risk and time preference 
experiments on our measures of violence.  We 
include several household and community 
characteristics as controls, and also include 
regional fixed effects.102 We focus primarily 
on the relationship between community 
exposure to violence and individual 
preferences.  The reason is that even if only 
a sub-set of individuals directly experienced 
acts of violence, the consequences may be felt 
throughout the community (Yehuba, 2002). 
Our main measure of violence comprises 
the total number of dead during 1993-2003 
relative to population size in the community. 
However, in some models we also include an 
index of individual level exposure to violence. 
Throughout we cluster standard errors at 
102  See appendix for variable definitions.
Fig. 1. Number of casualties in surveyed communities as a 
result of attacks by army or rebels by province over 1993-
2003 period (BCS data)
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the community level to account for intra-
community correlation. 
4.1 Conflict and Behavior
We explore the relationship between conflict 
and behavior in the experimental games in 
Tables 3, 4 and 5.103  In Table 3 we report the 
results for our measure for pro-social behavior. 
Across all OLS specifications we record a 
statistically significant and positive correlation 
between conflict intensity and altruistic 
behavior at the community level (column 1) 
as well as at the household level (columns 
2-5). This is in line with earlier empirical survey 
work by Bellows and Miguel (2006, 2009) and 
Blattman (2009) who report an increase in 
social cohesion and political participation in 
response to violence.  As discussed above, 
our findings also resonate with psychological 
studies into the effect of traumatic experiences 
on people’s attitudes.  
Our results are robust to the inclusion of 
ethnicity fixed effects, as well as a series of 
other household and community controls 
and regional fixed effects (Table 3, columns 
3 and 4 respectively).104  For example, social 
preferences are higher when respondents are 
literate, male, and own more land.  We find 
weak evidence that social preferences are 
declining in age.  Turning to the community 
level controls, social preferences are positively 
associated with ethnic homogeneity, and 
negatively associated with distance to the 
market and ongoing conflicts within the 
community over land.  The effect of market 
integration is consistent with Henrich et al. 
(2004), and the land conflict and ethnicity 
outcomes makes intuitive sense.  We find 
that population density, average community 
income and land distribution are not correlated 
103  All regressions in Table (3)-(5) use OLS. As our de-
pendent variables take only a limited number of values, 
we also estimate the models in columns (1)-(5) using an 
ordered probit specification. The results are qualitatively 
similar and available on request. 
104  In addition the coefficient on violence increases 
if controls are included. Following Bellows and Miguell 
(2009) this suggest that it is unlikely that omitted variable 
bias explains away the conflict effect (see also Altonji et 
al., 2005). 
with social preferences.
Next, we employ a household level conflict 
variable, rather than a community-based 
measure.  For this purpose we have constructed 
a household victimization index105 (Table 3, 
column 5).  We again find a positive correlation 
with social preferences, indicating that both 
individual and community level violence are 
associated with altruistic behavior.  This is 
consistent with the existing psychological 
evidence.   
OLS regression results for risk preferences are 
presented in Table 4.  Throughout we document 
a positive correlation between community 
level conflict intensity and risk seeking.  This 
result is robust to including common controls 
and fixed effects  (columns 2–5).  In column (7) 
the dependent variable measures preferences 
over losses.  One key insight from Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1979) seminal paper is that 
people value changes in gains and losses 
differently.  In line with their work we find that 
people respond differently to changes in gains 
and losses: while conflict induces risk seeking 
over gains it does not affect attitudes towards 
losses. Though work by economists on shocks 
and risk preferences has so far been limited 
(Dercon, 2008) this result suggests it may be 
a viable area for future research.  The pattern 
of responses provided in Table 4 is consistent 
with the psychologist’s model in case exposure 
to violence has invited sentiments of anger. 
It is striking to observe that risk preferences 
are not (robustly) associated with any of the 
household or community-level controls. 
Finally, in Table 5 we summarize the impact 
of conflict on inter-temporal choices.  The 
models suggest that exposure to conflict 
causes an increase in discount rates.  While 
the evidence seems more mixed, violence 
appears to make people less patient.  Again, 
this is not inconsistent with the psychologist’s 
model of interpreting traumatic events.   It is 
interesting to note that time preferences are 
not associated with any of the household-
105  Our victimization index is an additive scale of expo-
sure to a range of violence measures (rape, theft, forced 
labor, torture, ambushes). Since the absolute scale of this 
variable is arbitrary it is normalized to have a mean of zero 
and standard variation of one.
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level variables (including individual exposure 
to violence, when controlling for community 
attacks).  In contrast, several of the community 
variables enter significantly, communities 
with higher levels of ethnic homogeneity 
display lower discount rates. Yet, contrary to 
intuition, we find that discount rates are lower 
in communities with an unequal distribution 
of income and those with ongoing conflicts 
over land.
To attenuate potential endogeneity and 
omitted variables concerns in Tables 3-5 we 
re-run our analysis using a 2SLS specification, 
where we use distance to Bujumbura and 
altitude as instruments for our conflict 
measures.  Results are reported in columns 
(6) in all three Tables.  Predicted violence is 
significant at the 1% level, and the value of 
the coefficient is larger than before.106  Our 
identifying assumption is that these geography 
variables only affect the allocation of violence 
and have no direct impact on preferences.  If, 
however, distance to the capital is analogous 
to distance to markets then preferences are 
likely dependent on distances to Bujumbura 
(see Henrich et al., 2001).  Yet, direct effects of 
106  The 2SLS point estimate is somewhat larger than the 
OLS estimate. This is a common finding in cross-country 
studies, usually attributed to measurement error (biasing 
the OLS estimates towards zero). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Relative number of  0.143* 0.136* 0.241*** 0.255*** 0.259*** 0.422*** 0.464*** 
dead in attacks (%) (0.0792) (0.0687) (0.0676) (0.0738) (0.072) (0.115)  
Individual victimization      0.499***   
Index     (0.254)   
        
Household variables        
Respondent is literate   1.338** 1.330** 1.430** 1.436*** 0.174*** 
   (0.533) (0.527) (0.523) (0.521)  
Respondent age   -0.0301* -0.0291* -0.031* -0.0315* -0.119* 
   (0.0157) (0.016) (0.016) (0.0161)  
Respondent is male   0.882* 0.914* 0.866* 1.047** 0.123** 
   (0.503) (0.500) (0.481) (0.450)  
Total land holdings per    0.110*** 0.095** 0.099** 0.108** 0.130** 
Capita   (0.0389) (0.0381) (0.038) (0.0497)  
        
Community variables        
Land Gini coefficient   -1.379 -1.170 -0.542 -2.097 -0.101 
   (1.415) (1.291) (1.264) (1.366)  
Distance to market   -0.858** -0.853** -0.768* -1.06*** -0.181*** 
   (0.387) (0.398) (0.405) (0.370)  
Conflict over land   -3.556** -3.127** -3.152** -4.45*** -0.167*** 
   (1.667) (1.444) (1.385) (1.668)  
Ethnic homogeneity   0.037** 0.040** 0.034** 0.029* 0.106* 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.0160) (0.016)  
Population density   0.893 0.996 1.087 1.399** 0.150* 
   (0.687) (0.866) (0.850) (0.706)  
Per capita total    0.101 0.103 -0.0347 -0.143 -0.018 
expenditure   (0.484) (0.595) (0.600) (0.560)  
        
Constant 41.19*** 41.23*** 34.59*** 34.11*** 35.24*** 35.89***  
 (0.356) (0.338) (6.804) (6.828) (6.826) (5.860)  
        
Regional FE no no no yes yes yes yes 
N 35 298 288 288 288 288 289 
adj. R2 0.063 0.019 0.138 0.136 0.197 0.115  
        
First stage instruments        
Distance to Bujumbura (log)      -4.996***  
      (0.695)  
Altitude (log)      -22.41***  
      (3.401)  
        
Hansen J, p-value      0.35  
Partial F      44.01  
Table 3. Conflict and social preferences 
Dependent variable: Degree of altruism scale 0-100. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses clustered at commu-
nity level. Column (1): dependent variable is community 
average. Column (6): excluded instruments of first stage 
reported only. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Column 
(7) contains beta coefficients.
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proximity to the capital are likely minimal as 
most farmers operate at subsistence level and 
sell goods at local markets, which often act as 
an intermediary for goods making their way 
to the capital as well.  These markets are close 
by in all communities in our sample (never 
over a 2 hour walk away), reducing concerns 
about a correlation between geography and 
preferences.  Also, export crops production 
such as coffee is usually sold to local 
intermediates or washing stations. Statistically, 
this is conformed by the test statistics 
indicating that our excluded instruments are 
correlated with the endogenous variable (see 
the high partial F values), and also that these 
instruments are correctly excluded from our 
second stage regression (the p-value of the 
Hansen J statistic is well above 0.10).   
Finally, to assess the magnitude of these effects, 
we report the coefficients of all significant 
variables in each of the Tables 3-5 after having 
standardized the explanatory variables such 
that they have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one.  These so-called beta 
coefficients are reported in column (7) in Tables 
3 and 5, and in column (8) of Table 4.  Clearly the 
impact of conflict dominates all other impacts. 
For example, the beta coefficient of violence in 
the social preference regression is 0.46, about 
three times as large as the beta coefficients of 
the other variables in the same column.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 gains gains gains gains gains gains losses gains 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Relative number of  0.11*** 0.10*** 0.0614* 0.0659* 0.0656* 0.114* 0.0261 0.247* 
dead in attacks (%) (0.042) (0.033) (0.0328) (0.0378) (0.0377) (0.0699) (0.0366)  
Individual      -0.0914    
victimization Index     (0.0999)    
         
Household variable         
Respondent literate   -0.404 -0.398 -0.407 -0.351 -0.191 -0.086 
   (0.253) (0.256) (0.258) (0.269) (0.308)  
Respondent age   0.0105 0.0107 0.0114 0.00945 -0.0085 0.073 
   (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0105)  
Respondent is male   -0.288 -0.257 -0.256 -0.208 -0.0456 -0.050 
   (0.268) (0.267) (0.268) (0.267) (0.231)  
Total land holdings    -0.0309 -0.0384 -0.0395 -0.0347 -0.0298 -0.086 
Per Capita   (0.0273) (0.0285) (0.0280) (0.0250) (0.0288)  
         
Community variable         
Land Gini    -1.153 -1.020 -1.111 -1.310* 0.125 -0.125* 
Coefficient   (0.769) (0.886) (0.901) (0.758) (0.806)  
Distance to market   0.237 0.254 0.237 0.189 0.207 0.066 
   (0.190) (0.178) (0.176) (0.209) (0.225)  
Conflict over land   0.132 0.359 0.358 -0.0068 1.153 0.000 
   (1.243) (1.288) (1.299) (1.059) (1.210)  
Ethnic homogeneity   0.0122 0.0133 0.0143 0.0101 0.0001 0.075 
   (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0114) (0.0143)  
Population density   0.505* 0.480 0.473 0.579 0.685 0.125 
   (0.291) (0.367) (0.363) (0.426) (0.453)  
Per capita total    -0.370* -0.340 -0.319 -0.413 0.0433 -0.096 
Expenditure   (0.197) (0.218) (0.215) (0.284) (0.355)  
         
Constant 3.81*** 3.88*** 2.974 2.933 2.728 3.581 0.351  
 (0.189) (0.201) (2.596) (2.591) (2.603) (3.169) (3.776)  
         
Regional FE no no no yes yes yes yes yes 
N 35 271 261 261 261 261 251 262 
adj. R2 0.16 0.042 0.118 0.115 0.113 0.109 0.09  
         
First stage instruments         
Distance to Bujumbura (log)      -4.996***   
      (0.695)   
Altitude (log)      -22.41***   
      (3.401)   
         
Hansen J, p-value      0.82   
Partial F      39.31   
 
Table 4.  Conflict and risk preferences
Dependent variable ranges 1 (risk averse)  - 6 (risk loving). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at com-
munity level. Excluded instruments of first stage reported 
only. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Column (1): depen-
dent variable is community average. Column (8) contains 
beta coefficients.
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4.2. True preference shifts versus changes in 
beliefs?
Our results shed light on the consequences of 
conflict for growth.  Conflict induces people 
to make more pro-social choices and take 
more risky decisions in our experiments, but 
are also found to be more impatient.  What 
matters for development is behavior, and not 
the underlying preferences.  Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to consider whether the behavioral 
change that we document is due to a (true) 
preference shift.  Most of the literature ignores 
this issue, and simply interprets experimental 
play as reflecting underlying preferences 
(e.g., Henrich et al., 2001; 2004; Carpenter and 
Cardenas, 2008; Tanaka et al., 2009; and Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009). The results in Tables 3-5 are 
consistent with the notion that exposure to 
violence has altered preferences.  However, the 
observed change in behavior may also be due 
to the fact that victims and non-victims having 
been exposed to different opportunities for 
learning about their own latent preferences, or 
about heuristics regarding behavior in specific 
situations.  This is akin to questions about 
the effect of propaganda and advertisement 
– do they create new preferences, or do 
they appeal to latent preferences, or invite 
updating of preferences via the provision of 
new information?  While we cannot analyze 
this issue in detail, we explore it further by 
delving a little deeper into differences in 
means and variances between the victims and 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Relative number of  0.572 0.760 1.468** 1.359** 1.366** 3.42*** 0.383*** 
dead in attacks (%) (0.591) (0.474) (0.618) (0.566) (0.571) (1.249)  
Individual      3.185   
victimization Index     (2.143)   
        
Household variables        
Respondent literate   -4.301 -3.982 -3.791 -2.709 -0.033 
   (5.349) (5.332) (5.345) (5.387)  
Respondent age   -0.143 -0.146 -0.174 -0.185 -0.070 
   (0.168) (0.166) (0.171) (0.172)  
Respondent is male   -2.649 -3.185 -3.320 -1.589 -0.019 
   (4.758) (4.595) (4.569) (5.291)  
Total land holdings     0.206 0.417 0.474 0.572 0.071 
Per capita   (0.454) (0.446) (0.447) (0.502)  
        
Community variables        
Land Gini coefficient   -56.5*** -62.0*** -59.2*** -73.9*** -0.358*** 
   (15.32) (15.55) (15.84) (14.41)  
Distance to market   2.500 2.686 2.976 0.0537 0.001 
   (3.539) (3.991) (4.008) (4.166)  
Conflict over land   -29.24 -37.04** -37.43** -54.5*** -0.204*** 
   (19.43) (17.66) (17.27) (18.73)  
Ethnic homogeneity   -0.554** -0.626*** -0.659*** -0.77*** -0.280*** 
   (0.226) (0.187) (0.181) (0.189)  
Population density   7.699 8.285 8.978 13.50* 0.145* 
   (6.509) (8.106) (8.150) (7.284)  
Per capita total    10.37 9.685 9.036 6.198 0.071 
expenditure   (7.011) (5.882) (5.897) (5.283)  
        
Constant 39.32*** 37.83*** -26.48 -25.45 -20.80 1.119  
 (4.280) (3.967) (77.03) (72.39) (73.12) (59.86)  
        
Regional FE no no no yes Yes yes yes 
N 35 285 276 276 276 276 276 
adj. R2 0.01 0.004 0.104 0.115 0.117 0.082  
        
First stage instruments        
Distance to Bujumbura (log)      -4.996*** -4.996*** 
      (0.695) (0.695) 
Altitude (log)      -22.41*** -22.41*** 
      (3.401) (3.401) 
        
Hansen J, p-value      0.44 0.44 
Partial F      48.65 48.65 
 
Table 5. Conflict and time preferences 
Dependent variable: discount rate. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses clustered at community level. Excluded in-
struments of first stage reported only. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Column (1): dependent variable is com-
munity average. Column (7) contains beta coefficients.
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non-victims. 
In the top panel of Table 6 we compare sample 
means for communities that have and have 
not been exposed to violence.  Consistent 
with Tables 3-5 we find systematic differences. 
We believe the systematic nature of the 
differences speaks against the interpretation 
that respondents have learned about their 
true preferences.  There is no reason to assume 
that a-priori (i.e. without exposure to conflict) 
respondents’ uninformed guesses about their 
true preferences would be systematically 
biased towards one direction or another. 
Hence, albeit tentatively, the systematic 
nature of the response supports the idea of 
a preference shift rather than the alternative 
explanation of preference discovering. 
Next, we tentatively explore whether the 
pattern of responses is consistent with the 
other alternative hypothesis – the idea that 
exposure to conflict induced learning about 
optimal behavior (adjusting heuristics), so 
that people “converge” towards a certain 
behavioral pattern.  In the second panel of 
Table 6 we run t-tests on the differences in 
variance between the two groups.  We find 
no significant difference in the variance of 
our preference parameters for social and time 
preference, which is at odds with the idea of 
learning about ‘best behavior’.  However, for 
risk preference we cannot reject the hypothesis 
of unequal variances.  
4.3 Robustness
In this section we report the outcomes of a 
series of robustness analyses.  First, we explore 
whether the differences in experimental 
play translate into systematic differences 
in behavior in real life. We estimate several 
alternative models and summarize our 
findings in Tables 7 and 8.  In Table 7 we 
replace our experimental variables with 
survey-based social-, risk- and time preference 
proxies.  In column (1) the dependent 
variable is a social capital index in the spirit 
of Narayan and Pritchett, (1999).  This index 
comprises a weighted (and normalized) scale 
of respondents’ participation in community 
organizations and the degree of membership. 
Consistent with our experimental variables 
we find a positive correlation with exposure 
to violence.  In column (2) we proxy for risk 
attitudes by using a common measure of crop 
choice.  If conflict alters risk preferences we 
would expect an effect on investment and 
asset portfolio choice––skewing resources to 
more risky and profitable activities.  We use 
our 1998-2007 panel to estimate the effect 
of conflict on the share of cash crops to total 
production, and find that households in 
regions exposed to greater levels of violence 
cultivate relatively more cash crops.  (Recall 
that earlier we demonstrated that cash crops 
did not invite conflict – see Table 2 columns 
3-5).  Again this result is consistent with the 
experimental evidence. Lastly, in column (3) 
we use a measure of long-term investments 
– the share of expenditures on farm building 
improvements – as our dependent variable. 
The assumption is that a greater share of 
durable investments reflects greater patience. 
Again we find our experimental results 
reflected in the survey data: households 
affected by greater levels of conflict invest less 
in farm buildings.  
To further assess the robustness of our findings 
we return to the possible bias introduced by 
selection in to our sample.  Table 2, column (5) 
showed that men may be underrepresented 
in our sample (some 40% of households were 
female headed in 2009).  Hence, correlation 
between gender and preferences may bias our 
estimates in Tables 3-5.  In columns (4)-(6) of 
Table 7 we re-estimate our 2SLS models on a 
restricted sample of same gender respondents 
who were present in both 1998 and 2009, 
 social risk time 
    
Community mean    
Below mean violence 25.38 (1.51) 
3.82 
(0.12) 
37.27 
(2.35) 
Above mean violence 35.59 (3.69) 
4.97 
(0.21) 
48.30 
(4.65) 
Difference -10.21 -1.15 -11.45 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.04 
    
Variance around community mean    
Below mean violence  1.75 1.04 5.80 
Above mean violence 1.86 0.60 5.94 
Difference -0.11   0.44 -0.15 
p-value 0.64 0.00 0.79 
 
Table 6. Student t-test on means and variances of prefer-
ences 
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and find that for social and risk preferences 
the results go through as before, with only 
minimal differences in the coefficients.
In Table 8 we assess whether other types of 
shocks such as natural disasters (drought 
and excess rainfall) and plant diseases affect 
preferences as well.  Again we estimate 
the models explaining experimental play. 
Interestingly, we find no consistent set 
of significant effects of such shocks on 
preferences.  Natural disasters and diseases do 
not produce the same traumatic responses as 
exposure to conflict—attenuating the risk that 
we are picking up omitted variable effects. 
The one exception is a correlation between a 
major plant diseases and social preferences.  
5. Conclusions
The literature on the consequences of civil wars 
has often emphasized its detrimental effects 
on households’ ability to cope.  According to 
this view, such civil wars may invite poverty 
traps.  However, this pessimistic view on 
development has come under new scrutiny 
from a few recent careful micro level studies 
suggesting that exposure to conflict is not 
necessarily detrimental for development and 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 social capital 
fraction of cash 
crops in total 
production 
expenditures 
on farm 
improvements 
social  
subsample 
1998 same 
gender 
households 
risk  
subsample 
1998 same 
gender 
households 
time 
subsample 
1998 same 
gender 
households  
 OLS Tobit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Relative number of  0.0377** 0.00783* -21.28** 0.450*** 0.152* 1.550 
dead in attacks (%) (0.0155) (0.00474) (10.39) (0.150) (0.0923) (1.537) 
       
Household variables       
Respondent is literate 0.376** 0.0500 119.1 1.852*** -0.170 -7.734 
 (0.145) (0.0377) (90.63) (0.645) (0.323) (6.050) 
       
Respondent age -0.00162 0.00174 0.323 -0.0538*** 0.00786 -0.218 
 (0.00403) (0.00143) (3.271) (0.0205) (0.00909) (0.199) 
       
Respondent is male -0.139 0.0609 -30.83 -0.136 -0.306 5.924 
 (0.140) (0.0415) (72.38) (0.752) (0.369) (7.469) 
       
Total land holdings per  0.0270* 0.0126*** -5.933 0.126** -0.0283 0.410 
capita (0.0142) (0.00460) (9.504) (0.0572) (0.0279) (0.515) 
       
Community variables       
Land Gini coefficient -0.0157 0.0940* 128.3 -1.833 -1.318 -85.23*** 
 (0.330) (0.0541) (200.1) (1.745) (0.940) (16.41) 
       
Distance to market -0.0913 -0.492*** 74.36 -1.140** 0.0797 5.192 
 (0.0996) (0.138) (51.83) (0.461) (0.259) (4.421) 
       
Conflict over land -0.988** 0.00289 519.8 -4.538** -0.421 -67.67*** 
 (0.479) (0.0411) (353.9) (2.179) (1.345) (21.87) 
       
Ethnic homogeneity -0.00182 -0.620*** -5.222* 0.0335* 0.00535 -0.820*** 
 (0.00656) (0.206) (2.850) (0.0192) (0.0132) (0.200) 
       
Population density 0.0870 0.00219 -89.96 1.143 0.628 15.17** 
 (0.188) (0.00211) (139.4) (0.833) (0.472) (7.704) 
       
Per capita total  -0.266* 0.295*** 132.1* -0.0562 -0.426 5.133 
expenditure (0.144) (0.101) (69.95) (0.679) (0.332) (5.710) 
       
Constant 2.252 0.255*** -564.5 38.12*** 4.163 -2.566 
 (1.864) (0.0287) (1059.4) (7.207) (3.767) (65.49) 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 283 288 289 218 196 210 
adj. R2 0.029  0.005 0.074 0.056 0.170 
Hansen J, p-value    0.38 0.91 0.31 
Partial F    34.19 24.68 31.86 
 
Table 7. Conflict and behavior 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. First stage instruments distance and alti-
tude, results not shown. Column (2) is unconditional tobit 
regression with fixed effects, potentially inducing some 
bias in our estimate; regression using random effects is 
qualitatively similar.
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may contribute to social capital (see Bellows 
and Miguell 2006; 2009; Blattman, 2009). 
Yet, social preferences are but one of a set 
of preferences likely affected by conflict and 
of interest to development economists and 
practitioners. We extend upon earlier work by 
(i) including risk and time preferences in our 
analysis, and (ii) gauging such preferences 
with a series of incentive-compatible field 
experiments (rather than via a survey 
approach). 
In this paper we set out to investigate the impact 
of conflict on social, risks and time preferences 
and use data from a series of economic 
experiments using 300 respondents in 35 
randomly selected communities in Burundi. 
We find that conflict is robustly correlated 
with preferences. Econometric analysis reveals 
that individuals in communities which were 
exposed to greater levels of violence display 
more altruistic behavior to their neighbors, are 
more risk seeking and have higher discount 
rates. 
The evidence documented in the various 
tables is consistent with the idea that 
preferences of people are endogenous and 
respond to experiences or the context.  While 
we cannot rule out that behavioral differences 
in experimental play are due to learning effects 
invited by exposure to conflict – learning 
about own preferences or those of others, and 
about consequences of behaviors over a range 
of contexts – we believe that the behavioral 
patterns (including higher order terms such 
as the variance) do not generally support 
such an interpretation.  Of course our natural 
experiment approach implies imperfect 
control, and cleanly separating preference 
shifts from learning effects is not possible.  The 
benefit of our approach is that we are able to 
analyze the response to an event of first-order 
salience.  Analysts routinely trade-off control 
versus the relevance of the context when 
conducting experiments (e.g. List, 2007).
A key finding of this paper is that temporary 
shocks have long-term consequences: civil war 
violence that occurred between 1993 and 2003 
has a clear impact on individual behavior in 
2009. These consequences may even prove to 
be permanent if they invite preference shifts. 
Our evidence for Burundi suggests that the 
net effect on development is unclear.  While 
exposure to violence causes pro-social behavior 
and encourages risk taking, arguably positive 
features for development at least within certain 
bounds, it also seems to trigger impatience.  As 
impatience discourages savings it could drag 
down investment levels also in the presence 
of imperfect capital markets (as obviously 
prevailing in Burundi).  If so, the net effect on the 
ability of communities to rebound after conflict 
is ambiguous.  Nevertheless, the results may 
partially explain the pattern of recovery observed 
in many post-conflict settings, and thereby 
provide new evidence against pessimistic views 
on the destructive legacies of civil war.
Table 8 Other type shocks and preferences.
Table summarizes coefficients of separate regressions in-
cluding controls and fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses, clustered at community level. * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
 (1) (2) (3) 
 social risk Time 
    
Severe draught -1.290 -0.689 -0.334 
 (1.453) (0.597) (0.676) 
    
Access rain  0.0936 -0.223 0.0516 
 (1.057) (0.439) (0.435) 
    
Manioc crop disease -2.142** -0.400 -0.861 
 (1.011) (0.552) (0.992) 
    
Upcoming ceremony   -0.768 
   (0.795) 
    
N 288 261 276 
 
Table A1. Choice Pairs Task 1.
Table A2. Choice Pairs Task 2.
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Appendix A
Appendix B
Violence variables
Number of dead in community attacks 
relative tot population size   Reports number 
of dead on colline as a consequence of 
confrontations between rebels and army as 
well as one sided violence between 1993-2003 
divided by population size, as stated by local 
administrators (BCS).  
Household level victimization index is 
an additive index of the exposure of any 
household member to either rape, theft, forced 
labor, torture, ambushed. Since the absolute 
scale of this variable is arbitrary it is normalized 
to have a mean of zero and standard variation 
of one (BPHS).
Household and community variables 
Age: Age of head of household, measured in 
years (BPHS and ESD-SR) .
Respondent is male:  Gender of head of 
household. In household level regressions 
variables is dummy variable taking unity if head 
of household is male, zero else.  In community 
level regressions, variable household dummy’s 
are averaged over number of households per 
community (BPHS and ESD-SR).
Respondent is literate: Literacy of head of 
household.  In household level regressions 
variables is dummy variable taking unity if head 
of household is literate, zero else. In community 
level regressions, variable household dummy’s 
are averaged over number of households per 
community (BPHS and ESD-SR).
Land size per capita (m2):  Total land size 
of household i  in square meters, divided 
by number of adult equivalents present in 
household i  (BPHS). 
Distance to market:  Distance to main 
agricultural market where food and non-food 
items are traded, measured in time intervals of 
15 minutes, where 5,...,1=t  (BCS).
Prewar income (1993): In household level 
regressions variables is i -th household 
indication of perceived level of wealth in 1993 
on a scale, ranging 1 (very rich)-6 (poor). In 
community level regression, variable for j -th 
community is created by averaging over all 
community households (BPHS).
Perceived trust level 1998 and 2007. Perceived 
level of trust in community members, rated 
Table A3. Choice Pairs Task 3.
Note: Participants were not shown (d).
Fig. Example Record Sheet Task 1.
Fig. Example Record Sheet Task 3.
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on a 10 point scale 1 (very low)-10 (very high) 
(BPHS).
Livestock farmer 1993: In household level 
regressions variables is dummy taking unity if 
household owned livestock in 1993, zero else. 
In community level regression, variable for j
-th community is created by averaging over all 
community households (BEES and ESD-SR).
Cash crops relative to total production. Share 
of cash crops (coffee, tea, tobacco and cotton) 
produced relative to total production (BPHS).
Land Gini coefficient:  Variable based on 
household land holdings. Community level 
Gini coefficient is created by 
€ 
G =1− 2 L (X )dX
0
1
∫
j
 
(BPHS).
Population density (1990 and 2008):  Number 
of people in community per square kilometer 
(MPDRN).
Vote in favor of president Ndadaye: Percentage 
of votes in favor of Ndadaye at the commune 
level during the presidential elections in 
1993.
Distance to Bujumbura. Distance  of  j-th 
community to capital in kilometers. 
Altitude. Average altitude of j-th community 
(MPDRN).
Land conflicts: Dummy taking unity if there 
are land conflicts in community (BPHS).
Ethnic homogeneity: Percentage of Hutu 
population in community (BEES). 
Community income: Variable is the aggregated 
income of per capita expenditure for all goods 
purchased over a 15 day period valued at 
local market prices and divided by the adult 
equivalents of household i  (BPHS).
Severe draught: Dummy taking unity if 
household was exposed to severe draught in 
past three years (2007-2009) (BEES).
Access rain: Dummy taking unity if household 
was exposed to access rain in past three years 
(2007-2009) (BEES). 
Manioc crop disease: Dummy taking unity 
if household was exposed to cassava crop 
disease in past three years (2007-2009) (BEES).
Upcoming ceremony: Dummy taking unity if 
household was expecting a ceremony in the 
near future (BEES).
Experimental variables
Social preferences: Degree of altruism 
resulting from 6 choices between participant 
(S) and randomly chosen community member 
(O), for each question holds S2+O2 = (250)2, the 
resulting degree of altruism is α =  tan (O/S), 
with 37.5 < α < 52.5. Item rescaled to 0 < α < 
100. In community level regression, variable 
for j -th community is created by averaging 
over all community households.
Risk preferences: Switch point [0 (risk averse), 
… , 6 (risk loving)] between risky gain (or loss) 
with a probability p = 0.3, and certain (y) gain (or 
loss). In community level regression, variable for
j -th community is created by averaging over 
all community households. 
Time preferences: Discount rate is switch point 
between receiving 1000 FBU in one day  and 
receiving (1+ d)1000 FBU in two weeks and 
one day, d = [0, … , 100]. In communit    y 
level regression, variable for j -th community 
is created by averaging over all community 
households.
Data sources
BPHS. Burundi Priority Household Survey 
2007
BCS. Burundi Community Survey 2007
BEES. Burundi Experiments Exit Survey 2009
MPDRN. Monographies Communales Burundi. 
Ministre de la Planification du Developpement 
et de la Reconstruction Nationale, Bujumbura, 
2006
ESD-SR. Enquête Socio-Démographique, Santé 
et Reproduction 2002
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General discussion and conclusions
Development economists have since long 
been concerned with the question of Africa’s 
poor economic performance. While some 
progress has been made in understanding this 
question, there are still large parts of the puzzle 
missing. I examined the role of three themes 
that are demonstrably related to development 
in Africa: foreign aid, institutions, and civil war. 
Convincing empirical evidence is scant, in 
part due to the inherent complex interactions 
between these themes. Those interactions 
are of particular interest as they are more 
likely to explain underdevelopment than any 
of the three themes by itself. The literature 
review showed that a handful of scholars 
now explicitly attempt to investigate these 
interactions. Cross-country regression analyses 
are particularly criticized for lack of attention to 
possible interactions (in addition to other well-
know criticism regarding endogeneity). 
While such concerns are certainly valid to 
some extent, the outcomes of this dissertation 
suggest that cross-country analyses should not 
be dismissed too easily. The cross-national results 
in Chapter 2 are for example consistent with 
evidence from sub-national studies: the effect 
of aid fades out after donors’ leave. Moreover, 
I found outcomes in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
to be in line with each other, and with results 
from Chapter 4: rent-seeking may not be the 
predominant explanation for bad institutional 
quality, nor civil war on-set. This convergence 
in outcomes between macro-and micro-level 
studies is hopefully a next step in arriving 
at more definite answers on the question of 
underdevelopment. 
The results and implications of each paper are 
summarized below. 
In Chapter 2 we tested whether foreign aid 
bears a systematic relation with the quality 
of governance in the short run. We test 
the popular idea that aid adversely affects 
institutions through rent-seeking behavior of 
government elites. The analyses showed the 
opposite result: higher aid flows translate into 
higher levels of governance. We used a set of 
credible exogenous instruments to mitigate 
possible endogeneity concerns. Our preferred 
2SLS-specification shows that an increase in 
aid levels by 2.2 percent leads to a one-point 
increase in the quality of governance. 
We also tried to shed light on which economic 
institutions could drive the results. We find 
that aid is particularly effective in decreasing 
corruption and providing for a better rule of 
law. The effect on the rule of law is interpreted 
as an increased ability to enforce contracts. 
Finally we performed some robustness checks 
as to compare our studies to recent other 
work on this topic. We tested the sensitivity 
of the results and find that the positive effect 
of aid extends to at least two years after 
disbursement. Both 2SLS as well as dynamic 
GMM estimates support this result, thereby 
contrasting recent findings by for example 
Coviello and Islam (2006). 
A plausible explanation for this divergent 
result is that we use a much longer time-frame, 
with data up until 2005. Splitting our sample 
in two time periods confirms that the positive 
effect of aid on governance particularly applies 
to the period 2000-2005. A negative (though) 
insignificant effect is found when using blocks 
of five-year averages, suggesting that aid 
may only work in the short term. This is not 
inconsistent with observations in the field that 
many projects fail to sustain once donors leave 
(Morduch, 1999; Meuwissen, 2002).107 
The paper contributes to the increasing 
literature on aid and its impact on governance. 
We however extend current scholarship by: 1) 
our explicit focus on a time-frame that is up-to-
date, 2) using a variety of static and dynamic 
specifications; 3) employing credible external 
as well as internal (GMM) instruments, and 4) 
corroborate findings with those from other 
studies by replicating their models. Although 
our analyses could not provide a definite 
answer on the role of aid on institutions, 
107  Another interpretation that is consistent with these 
outcomes is the subjective nature of our dependent vari-
able. If aid flows in, people hope or expect that this will 
contribute to development and may assign a high ICRG 
score based on expectations. After some years, this effect 
has disappeared and ICRG scores drop again. As stated 
before, we should be aware of the fact that cross-country 
indicators of institutional quality are all subjective (not 
only ICRG index but also the popular Polity IV data (www.
cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/) and Freedom House index 
(www.freedomhouse.org) are based on expert judgment) 
and may not necessarily represent the actual situation in a 
particular country at a particular time. This again stresses 
the need to supplement cross-country analyses with stud-
ies at the sub-national level. 
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the outcomes provide some guidance for 
extensions. An important question that 
remains is why the positive effect fades out 
after only two or perhaps three years. Is this 
really because donors’ monitoring actions slow 
down after a while, as the literature suggests? 
Also the finding that the positive effect of aid is 
most prominent since the year 2000 should be 
explored further, and future studies should use 
available recent data. The implication is that 
aid-policy is more likely to work if it is based on 
the research that analyses the current situation 
rather than that of the past. 
In Chapter 3 we extended the rent-seeking 
hypothesis to civil war. We hypothesized 
that aid may increase the risk on civil war by 
providing incentives for rent-seeking rebels 
or government elites. Conversely it may 
decrease the risk on violence if aid is sufficiently 
fungible and used to increase a governments’ 
army. We aimed to test both hypotheses. 
As in Chapter 2, we explicitly addressed the 
potential of reversed causality and stressed the 
importance of controlling for fixed effects (and 
their problems when used in a dynamic set-
up). We extended earlier work by Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002) in at least three ways: first by 
controlling for fixed effects; second by using a 
novel exogenous instrument for aid, and third 
by allowing for different parameter estimates 
of war on-set and duration. 
Our results showed no significant effect of 
aid on civil war on-set, confirming Collier and 
Hoeffler’s result. By contrast, we reported a 
significant negative coefficient for aid in the 
duration models, suggesting that aid tends 
to shorten wars. These results have important 
implications. The zero effect in the on-set 
models speaks against the idea that aid affects 
the probability of violence through rent-
seeking. The significant negative effect of aid 
on war duration on the other hand is consistent 
with the interpretation that aid is used to 
increase arm supplies to strengthen its military 
force. We are however careful to draw firm 
conclusions on the underlying mechanisms as 
these are preferably investigated using within-
country data.  
In Chapter 4, we built on our results from 
Chapter 3 by reexamining the hypothesis of 
rent-seeking and reduced opportunity costs at 
the sub-national level. We used cross-sectional 
and panel data from a random sample of 100 
villages in Burundi. The cross-sectional results 
showed that grievances based on historical 
incidents of violence in the 70s and 80s did not 
systematically vary with recruitment activities 
in the 90s and new millennium. By contrast, 
above mean level incidents of insufficient 
rainfall during the civil war was a positive 
predictor of recruitment. The panel analyses 
showed that exogenous shocks in commodity 
prices (coffee) are weakly associated with 
recruitment. By contrast, negative rainfall 
shocks show a strong, robust relation with 
recruitment activities. This is consistent with 
findings from the cross-country literature. 
Blattman and Miguel (2009) conclude, “Unlike 
rainfall these shocks (commodity price movements) show a 
less consistent relation to conflict whether they are experienced 
mainly by farmers, the government, or the aggregate”.108 We 
also examined whether exogenous shocks 
in export prices increased the intensity of 
violence in coffee growing regions. We did not 
find support for such an effect. Naturally, the 
limited availability of data on recruitment in 
our survey complicates strong inferences from 
our results. We fully agree with Blattman and 
Miguel (2009) that individual motivations 
cannot be analyzed at the village level. In 
recognition of this, information about rebels’ 
incentives to join is now increasingly collected 
(see e.g. Pugel et al., 2006). On the other hand, 
these interviews are based on individual recall 
and ex-combatants may not have an incentive 
(or the ability) to provide honest answers.109 
Results of more aggregate level surveys, for 
example at the village or district level should 
thus be corroborated with those of individual 
interviews to check for consistency. A broad 
confirmation of results would strengthen 
support for both types of analyses while large 
divergences would merit more research.
Chapter 5 focused on the economic legacies 
of civil warfare. We used household level 
data from Burundi to investigate the impact 
108  Besley and Persson (2008) for example find that 
higher export commodity prices raise the incidence of 
conflict through increased resource rents, while Brückner 
and Ciccone (2007) conclude that low-income growth 
only affects civil war on-set or incidence in countries with 
autocratic governments. 
109  These concerns always exist with surveys that are 
based on recall and address sensitive topics. They are 
however plausibly larger in studies that target ex-combat-
ants for interviews.  
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of village level violence on households’ 
investment activities. Cross-sectional 
estimates showed a strong positive effect of 
civil war violence on the probability to grow 
cash crops in 2007. Also, income shares from 
cash crops were larger among households 
exposed to violence than those that were not. 
The panel regressions broadly confirmed the 
cross-sectional outcomes. We tested for the 
robustness of our findings using instrumental 
variables and a smaller sample that contained 
information about individuals’ ethnic origin 
and pre-war investment activities. The positive 
effect of violence remained significant. This 
provides confidence in the idea that the 
estimated relation is causal. 
Other studies found similar positive effects of 
civil war violence on e.g. political participation, 
and voluntary community cooperation in Sierra 
Leone and Uganda. We also reported that 
households in war-affected areas contributed 
more to public goods in the village. Moreover, 
these households systematically attached 
higher scores to subjective welfare measures 
than households in the non-violent areas. This is 
particularly striking considering that objective 
welfare measures (current income) was not 
significantly higher in this group. Although 
speculative, these results hint at possible 
shifts in preferences as a result of civil warfare. 
An important caveat is that our data were 
collected only two years after the war ended. 
We therefore can only hypothesize whether 
they will extend to the long run. If we believe 
that civil war may indeed shift preferences, this 
may hold some promise for a successful post-
conflict recovery trajectory given the arguably 
‘positive’ outcomes for cooperation and famers’ 
willingness to invest in more profitable crops. 
The final paper in Chapter 6 ran more or less 
parallel to the one in the previous chapter. 
We examined to what extent civil war shocks 
are conducive to preference changes using 
an experimental set-up. We focused on three 
classes of preferences that are considered of 
key importance to development: preferences 
for altruism, risk, and time. Using a set of 
experimental games we found that war-
exposed households were more altruistic, 
more risk-seeking over gains and had a higher 
rate of time preference. The outcomes suggest 
that civil warfare, while clearly unwarranted, 
does not necessarily lead to the destruction 
of institutions and social norms that promote 
local collection. The experimental results 
support the results from the survey data 
used in Chapter 5 and are consistent with the 
aforementioned outcomes from studies in 
Uganda and Sierra Leone. 
Two important conclusions, both concerning 
‘external validity’ can be drawn from these two 
facts alone. First, the results do not support the 
often-heard critique about the lack of external 
validity of experimental games (Easterly, 2009; 
Rodrik, 2008). The analyses on survey-based 
questions reveal the same effects as those 
from our experimental games. Second, the fact 
that recent studies in Sierra Leone and Uganda 
report similar findings provides tentative 
support for the idea that results may extend 
to other settings outside Burundi. The latter 
interpretation naturally warrants caution. The 
studies in Sierra Leone and Uganda had a 
slightly different focus and used information 
from surveys instead of experimental data. Yet, 
the consistent positive outcome on community 
involvement in all three studies may suggest 
there is some reason for optimism. 
Directions for future research
The vast majority of cross-country empirics 
now and in the past could only hint at the 
potential channels that explain Africa’s 
underdevelopment. As a result, micro-
economists have advocated the use of 
randomized control trials to assist policymakers 
in providing ‘evidence-based aid’ (Rodrik, 
2008). Yet, standard randomized trials focus 
exclusively on whether a particular thing works 
or not. While this provides important insights 
into causal relations, it does not necessarily 
reveal the underlying mechanisms and hence 
inform policy-makers whether results extend 
to other environments. In this dissertation 
I view both approaches as complementary 
rather than substitutes and have shown that 
results do not necessarily need to be far apart. 
Both macro- as well as micro-level studies 
should have the ambition to move beyond 
significant (cor)relations and explore the 
underlying mechanisms. Micro-empirical 
studies for example may broaden their 
analyses by an explicit focus on possible 
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conditioning variables resulting from cross-
country regressions such as ethnic diversity or 
the quality of institutions (see e.g. Miguel, 2009; 
Habyarimana et al., 2007). In the dissertation I 
for example fail to find robust support for the 
popular mechanism of pure rent seeking, both 
in the cross-country studies as well as at the 
micro-level. Future studies should take up this 
issue and examine alternative mechanisms. 
Also, they should better explore the option 
that aid and civil war, commonly associated 
with negative effects on institutions may in 
fact have a positive relationship. The papers 
in Chapter 2, 5, and 6 all provide tentative 
evidence for such a positive impact. 
Researchers should also aim to test multiple 
hypotheses within a single experiment or 
survey. A clever mix-and-match combination 
of program elements and subgroups (e.g. on 
the basis of gender, ethnicity or religion) can 
help to isolate the individual contribution of 
each of these factors to a successful or not so 
successful intervention. However in the case 
that random assignment is impossible to 
control by the researcher like for example civil 
war exposure, matching techniques may prove 
to be feasible. 
In Chapter 1, I reviewed the few micro-level 
studies that exploit credible random variation 
in violence exposure and in Chapter 6 I showed 
how we made use of the random nature of 
violence in Burundi. This could inspire others. 
Many impact evaluations are nowadays 
executed in post-war environments, as to 
contribute to successful post-conflict recovery. 
Few however fully exploit the possibilities 
to learn something about the effects of civil 
warfare on human behavior. A close reading on 
the history of civil war in a particular country 
often reveals that fighting, even when hand 
weapons like machetes or small guns are used, 
in fact often has a more random character than 
conventional (media) reports will tell. Using 
credible natural or quasi-natural variation 
often also provides for a much broader scope 
of a project than pure randomized control 
trials. The experiments’ sample in Burundi 
for example covered villages throughout the 
entire country instead of one particular region. 
Although we were not concerned with a 
particular aid intervention, the idea is the same. 
Development processes can seriously change 
as a result of civil war, as shown in Chapter 
5 and Chapter 6 and not necessarily in the 
directions that one would expect. It is therefore 
of paramount importance to explicitly examine 
the legacies of war over time, to detect these 
changes and study their consequences.
As Easterly (2009) and Rodrik (2008) argue: in 
order to create sound development policies 
we need to understand the causal mechanisms 
that underlie significant correlations showing 
up in regression models. In this dissertation 
I have attempted to contribute to an 
increased understanding of causal effects of 
development. The underlying mechanisms 
(channels) however cannot be inferred from this 
work. Although I tentatively try to discriminate 
between channels I cannot draw any firm 
conclusions. Future research should explicitly 
address this issue and simultaneously test a set 
of possible mechanisms. Habyarimana et al., 
(2007) do just this in their study on ethnicity 
in Uganda. More of this type of studies is 
needed. 
Lastly, cross-country regressions should be 
rigorously tested, extended and compared to 
outcomes at the micro-level. General patterns 
in cross-country data should be exploited. It 
may help to formulate hypotheses that can 
be tested at the micro-level. Insights from 
behavioral economics but also adjacent 
disciplines like psychology, sociology or 
anthropology can help us interpret results that 
might not fit a standard economic framework. 
Policy recommendations
The dissertation has examined the various 
interactions between foreign aid, institutions, 
civil war and development. With respect to aid, 
donors should closely monitor how aid is spent, 
and if for an unintended purpose, they need to 
find out why. As our and other results suggest, 
if there is any impact of aid on improving 
governance at all, this may only appear in the 
short run. Donors and recipient governments 
may want to experiment with different sets 
of monitoring techniques and the duration of 
monitoring to find out why effects may not 
sustain in the long run. Their need could of 
course dovetail with academic interests as the 
work by Olken (2007) illustrates. Donors and 
recipient governments may want to cooperate 
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with local (NGO) organizations on the ground. 
They are usually well-informed about what is 
going on at the grassroots level and could do 
the monitoring for them.   
Also, donors should be aware of the interactions 
their (donated) sum of foreign exchange has 
with a recipient country’s (local) institutions, 
political stability and poverty levels. The mere 
provision of large inflows of foreign aid is 
unlikely to unambiguously help Africa develop, 
on the basis of historical evidence. Donors may 
instead want to focus more on time-varying 
(negative income shocks for example) and time-
invariant (e.g. geography, political institutions) 
determinants of aid effectiveness. The finding 
that negative income shocks are conducive to 
recruitment activities in Burundi could have a 
more general implication. Negative income 
shocks could lead to reduced investment 
in physical and human capital, which in 
turn influences development. Donors and 
recipient governments can then jointly explore 
possibilities reduce the impact of such shocks 
by setting up e.g. (joint) insurance schemes or 
providing schooling or work programs through 
e.g. NGOs or civil society organizations.  
When developing a post-war reconstruction 
program its designers should have detailed 
knowledge about the various actors in a civil 
war and how they are linked. Information about 
recruitment processes for example is of key 
importance to reintegrate ex-combatants back 
into their home communities. Communities 
may arguably be more sympathetic to 
former rebels that were abducted and fought 
somewhere else in the country than towards 
those that joined voluntarily and looted and 
destroyed in their own village. Also, as argued 
above, the finding that voluntary recruitment 
activities took place in regions with negative 
income shocks may provide for clear-cut 
donors’ or national governmental actions that 
work towards reducing or preventing these 
impacts. 
The final two chapters have shown that in 
spite of the obvious destructive impacts of civil 
warfare, (informal) social structures survived or 
even improved. Policymakers need to be aware 
of this and address needs that really need to 
be addressed. For example, if social structures 
(unexpectedly) remain in place then post-war 
reconstruction programs perhaps should to be 
less concerned with rebuilding those structures 
but make use of existing structures such as 
community organizations when implementing 
community-based projects. 
A general recommendation to donors and 
recipient governments is to be critical and 
routinely compare studies. They should concern 
themselves with questions regarding internal 
and external validity. When in considerable 
doubt about the latter, they should perhaps 
have the hypotheses tested at the sub- 
national level when feasible (e.g. trade policies 
are clearly not). When there is considerable 
uncertainty whether results extend beyond 
the controlled laboratory setting, experiments 
could be replicated. In some cases this can be 
done by the researchers themselves through 
observed variation in conditioning variables 
like institutional quality. In other cases donors 
may want to call in the help of consultants who 
are not necessarily concerned with ground-
breaking academic work but aim to bridge a 
potential gap between scientific outcomes 
and policy.110  
A final recommendation that applies to all 
donors, researchers, recipient governments 
and local organizations on the ground, is 
to communicate with, and learn from each 
other. Fortunately we are already seeing this 
to some extent. Academic researchers now 
routinely cooperate with local NGOs and civil 
society organizations, demonstrated by the 
enormous surge in (quasi)natural experiments 
and randomized control trials. This not only 
leads to a better insight into what works or not 
but also helps to improve cognitive skills of 
the local assistants involved. There are even a 
few studies in which the researchers cooperate 
with (local) recipient governments to analyze 
determinants of corruption or the quality 
of governance more generally. In order to 
really understand the influence of foreign aid, 
institutions and civil war on development we 
should proceed this way. 
110  Of course I do realize that many of the consultant 
work that is being done in fact is done by academic re-
searchers and is ground-breaking (e.g. World Bank and 
UN consultancies). The point I want to make here is that 
it does not necessarily need to be so. There are several 
small(er) institutes or private firms that are primarily inter-
ested in this other type of consulting work. 
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126     Summary
This thesis is concerned with three themes that 
are associated with economic development in 
Sub-Sahara Africa: foreign aid, institutions and 
civil war. Although there is a vast amount of 
literature on any of these topics, their exact 
relationship with development is still largely 
unknown. Macro-economic studies suffer 
from well-known problems of identification, 
specification and parameter heterogeneity. This 
has motivated scholars to investigate relations 
at the micro level.  Researchers now routinely 
rely on randomized control trials or (quasi)-
natural experiments for identification, when 
assessing the impact of local development 
programs like schoolbooks, medicines or 
microfinance. These types of studies however 
have recently also been subjected to criticism 
as opponents argue that, while internally valid, 
it is usually unknown whether results extend 
to other contexts. Moreover, both macro- 
and micro-studies are often less concerned 
with the underlying mechanisms.  Even when 
the direction of causality is established or 
ensured, it may of little interest if there is no 
plausible mechanism to explain the significant 
correlation. 
The dissertation takes up this issue and aims 
to contribute to: (i) a better understanding 
of the causal relations between foreign aid, 
institutions, civil war and development; 
(ii) increased insights into the various 
interactions and underlying mechanisms; and 
(iii) a convergence between macro-and micro 
empirical studies on the topics. The first part 
of the dissertation pays particular attention 
to testing the well-known argument of rent-
seeking that is believed to underlie negative 
(positive) correlations between aid, institutions, 
(civil war on-set) and development. The second 
part is concerned with the legacies of civil war 
on economic development. 
Cross-country level data for 30 Sub-Saharan 
African countries is used to assess the short-
run impact of aid on the quality of governance 
in Chapter 2.  A negative correlation between 
aid and governance quality can clearly be due 
to the fact that those countries that are in 
greatest need also have the worst institutions. 
More recently however, scholars have argued 
that aid of itself can have a negative impact on 
institutions.  The intuition is that aid induces 
government officials to engage in rent-seeking 
behavior, or that aid reduces a government’s 
accountability as foreign aid reduces the 
incentive to tax the population.  We try to 
shed more light on the issue by controlling for 
unobserved (fixed) country characteristics and 
by employing instrumental variables to assess 
causation. We however find that aid is positively 
associated with increased governance quality, 
up to at least two years after disbursement. 
An increase in aid by 2.2 percent improves 
the governance index by 1 point (scaled from 
0-18). The results seem to be mainly driven by 
decreased levels of corruption. Moreover, the 
effect is strongest for the period after the year 
2000.  We interpret these results as suggestive 
evidence that the positive impact of aid may 
not sustain after donors leave, consistent with 
micro-level evidence from the field. 
In Chapter 3 the argument of rent-seeking is 
revisited. Foreign aid has also been associated 
with civil war incidence. High inflows of aid 
augment government revenues and hence 
make it more attractive to capture the state. 
We use a sample of African countries to assess 
the impact of aid civil war on-set and duration 
respectively. The paper acknowledges the 
potential problems of reversed causality 
and omitted variables and employs a novel 
instrument for aid: GDP levels of important 
donors to Africa. We find no effect of aid 
on civil war on-set, consistent with earlier 
studies. Aid however reduces the continuation 
probability of civil wars. An increase in aid flows 
by 10 percent decreases the continuation 
probability by 8 percent points. One possible 
explanation is that this results from aid being 
used by governments to develop a strong 
army, inducing a ‘quick’ victory. 
In Chapter 4 we test whether grievance, 
reduced opportunity costs or rent-seeking 
behavior can explain recruitment activities 
at the sub-national level. Using data from 
100 rural villages in Burundi we investigate 
whether grievances from violent attacks in the 
1970s and 1980s explain voluntary recruitment 
during the civil war in Burundi the 1990s. We 
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do not find such an effect. The cross-section 
estimates further show a significant effect of 
more than average incidents of drought on 
the probability of recruitment. A constructed 
panel of recruitment information (based on 
recall) allowed us to probe into the issue a 
bit deeper. Controlling for village and time 
fixed effects we examine whether changes in 
export commodity prices predicts recruitment. 
Coffee is the main export crop in Burundi 
and producer prices are set by the national 
government, with practically no relation to the 
world-market price. We find no robust relation 
between a drop (increase in producer (world 
market) prices and recruitment activities.  By 
contrast, we find a strong correlation between 
negative income shocks (through reduced 
rainfall) and recruitment activities, consistent 
with the results from the cross-section models. 
Taken together this suggests that reduced 
opportunity costs may be an important 
mechanism to explain why people join rebel 
groups.   
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the 
consequences of civil warfare and the 
implications for economic development. 
Chapter 5 exploits Burundian household- and 
village-level data from two survey rounds in 
1998 and 2007 respectively, to estimate the 
impact of violence on investment probabilities. 
Cross-section models show that households 
that were more exposed to civil war violence 
in their village were more likely to grow 
profitable cash crops now than others. Also, 
income shares were larger among households 
that were more heavily exposed. To mitigate 
endogeneity concerns, instrumental variables 
and panel data were used. Results are 
confirmed in these alternative specifications. 
We tentatively try to shed some more light 
on the outcomes by regressing proxies for 
community cooperation on violence and find 
similar positive effects. Although speculative, 
we suggest that increased social cohesion as 
a result of warfare may promote investment in 
more risky but also more profitable activities. 
The study in Chapter 6 is closely related to the 
previous one but employs a quasi-experimental 
design to elicit individual preferences towards 
altruism, risk and time. We used a subsample 
of 35 communities (out of the 100) stratified 
on the incidence of village-level violence 
during the Burundi civil war. We assess 
whether village-level violence systematically 
varies with individual preferences. We find that 
it does: individuals that lived in more ‘violent’ 
communities displayed more altruism, were 
more risk-seeking over gains and had higher 
rates of time preferences. These results are 
broadly consistent with those from Chapter 
5. The arguably ‘positive’ outcomes in the first 
two games tentatively suggest that civil wars 
are not necessarily destructive, but may have 
positive consequences as well.   
The dissertation concludes with Chapter 7. 
I revisit the objectives of the study and draw 
implications for future research and policy-
making. The main objective of the study was 
to contribute to a better understanding of the 
relations between foreign aid, institutions, civil 
war and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
I explicitly attempted to ‘unravel’ significant 
correlations that commonly show up in 
cross-country regressions. I therefore focus 
on the various interactions and discriminate 
between (rival) theories on the basis of 
empirical econometric tests. Where possible, 
I tentatively explored potential underlying 
mechanisms. Lastly, I examined to what extent 
cross-national and micro-level analyses may 
be converging. I find that results in the first 
part of the dissertation are broadly consistent 
with each other: the two macro-level studies 
as well as the village-level analyses from 
Burundi showed that rent-seeking behavior 
is unlikely to be the dominant explanation for 
bad institutional quality, civil war on-set or 
recruitment activities. This does not suggest 
that it is not present but merely that there 
are arguably other, more important factors. 
In the second part, I showed that survey and 
experimental data can serve as complements 
to better explain the legacies of civil war 
violence on economic development. 
Future research should focus on potential 
mechanisms that can explain significant 
correlations. I conclude that cross-country 
research may guide micro-level researchers. 
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Specifically, cross-national studies may point to 
important conditioning variables that micro-
research can potentially control in a (quasi)-
experimental set-up. Using a clever mix-and-
match combination of program elements and 
subgroups can help to isolate the contribution 
of each element and may enable scholars to 
discriminate between (rival) theories. 
Finally, donors, recipient governments and 
policymakers should closely monitor (aid) 
activities on the ground. They could do so 
by cooperating with local NGOs, civil society 
organizations and researchers. This helps 
to better understand specific needs and 
constraints and is essential to create sound 
policies for development. 
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Deze dissertatie gaat over de relaties tussen 
buitenlandse hulp, instituties, burgeroorlogen 
en economische ontwikkeling in Sub-
Sahara Afrika. Ondanks een omvangrijke 
literatuur zijn  de precieze relaties tussen 
deze thema’s nog niet bekend. Macro-
economische modellen kampen veelal met 
problemen zoals onjuiste aannames, alsook 
de mogelijke heterogeniteit van parameters. 
Dit heeft ertoe geleid dat micro-economisch 
onderzoek naar deze relaties recentelijk een 
grote vlucht heeft genomen. Wetenschappers 
gebruiken tegenwoordig gecontroleerde 
of natuurlijke experimenten om de 
effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s 
te meten. Hierbij kan gedacht worden aan 
programma’s die (gratis) schoolboeken 
of medicijnen verstrekken, of die zich 
richten op microfinanciering. Deze 
onderzoekstechnieken maken de resultaten 
preciezer, maar de uitkomsten zijn moeilijk 
te veralgemeniseren. Daarnaast blijven de 
onderliggende causale verbanden vaak 
onderbelicht. 
De hierboven genoemde vragen c.q. 
problemen staan centraal in dit proefschrift. 
Het hoofddoel van dit proefschrift is een 
bijdrage te leveren aan het debat over het 
belang van buitenlandse hulp, de kwaliteit van 
bestuur, en de invloed van burgeroorlog(en) 
op economische ontwikkeling. Daarnaast zijn 
er twee  subdoelen geformuleerd.  Ten eerste 
richt het onderzoek zich op het zoeken naar 
causale verbanden tussen buitenlandse hulp, 
instituties, burgeroorlogen en economische 
ontwikkeling. Hierbij wordt ook de onderlinge 
samenhang tussen de drie thema’s onderzocht 
en gekeken naar verklarende onderliggende 
mechanismen. Ten tweede vergelijkt 
deze studie macro en micro-empirische 
onderzoeken met elkaar om deze in de 
toekomst beter op elkaar aan te laten sluiten. 
Het eerste deel van de dissertatie richt zich 
op het probleem van rent-seeking. Rent-
seeking is het nastreven van een doelstelling 
die de productiviteit of het publiek belang 
schaadt ten gunste van een persoonlijk 
belang. Huidige theorieën over rent-seeking 
veronderstellen een negatieve correlatie 
tussen buitenlandse hulp en de kwaliteit van 
instituties of de economische ontwikkeling 
van het ontvangende land. In de situatie van 
een burgeroorlog zou tevens een positieve 
correlatie tussen buitenlandse hulp en het 
ontstaan van de burgeroorlog gevonden 
kunnen worden. In deze dissertatie ga ik op 
zoek naar empirisch bewijs voor deze theorie. 
In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 analyseer ik macro-
economische data van een groep Afrikaanse 
landen. In hoofdstuk 4 gebruik ik data op 
dorpsniveau voor één specifiek land: Burundi. 
Gezamenlijk vormen de hoofdstukken 2 tot 
en met 4 het eerste deel. In het tweede deel 
richt ik me op de economische gevolgen 
van burgeroorlogen. In tegenstelling tot de 
eerste drie papers ligt in dit deel de focus op 
individuele huishoudens. 
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik of buitenlandse 
hulp een effect heeft op de kwaliteit van 
instituties van het ontvangende land. Een 
eventuele negatieve correlatie tussen hulp 
en de kwaliteit van bestuur kan worden 
verklaard door twee mechanismen. Enerzijds 
kan deze verklaard worden door het feit dat 
landen met slecht bestuur de meeste hulp 
nodig hebben. Anderzijds kan het zijn dat 
hulp zelf corrumpeert. Door het gebruik van 
instrumentele variabelen kan onder bepaalde 
voorwaarden  de gevonden correlatie 
tussen hulp en de kwaliteit van bestuur 
geïnterpreteerd worden als een causaal 
verband. De resultaten van het onderzoek 
suggereren dat hulp leidt tot een hogere 
kwaliteit van bestuur. Wanneer de variabele 
“bestuur” verder wordt onderverdeeld in 
“corruptie”, “wetgeving” en “kwaliteit van het 
ambtelijke apparaat” blijkt dat het significante 
effect grotendeels te danken is aan een 
vermindering van corruptie. Het effect lijkt 
echter niet duurzaam: na vijf jaar meten we 
geen effect meer.    
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt onderzocht of 
buitenlandse hulp een effect heeft op 
het ontstaan dan wel voortduren van 
burgeroorlogen. Ik test allereerst twee 
hypotheses die betrekking hebben op het 
ontstaan van burgeroorlogen. De eerste is 
dat hulp zorgt voor een toename van het 
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overheidsbudget waardoor het aantrekkelijker 
wordt voor rebellen om zelf aan de macht te 
komen. In dit geval zouden we een positieve 
correlatie tussen hulp en het ontstaan van 
geweld verwachten. De tweede hypothese 
stelt dat de toename van het overheidsbudget 
onder bepaalde aannames leidt tot hogere 
militaire uitgaven van de zittende regering. 
Dit kan potentiële rebellen ervan weerhouden 
om in opstand te komen vanwege een kleinere 
overwinningskans. De correlatie zou in dat 
geval  negatief zijn. Beide effecten kunnen 
ook naast elkaar bestaan. Het is a priori niet 
duidelijk welk effect zal domineren. 
Daarnaast test ik of hulp die tijdens de oorlog 
verstrekt wordt van belang is voor het al dan 
niet voortduren van de oorlog. Hulp kan 
enerzijds bijdragen aan het bereiken van 
compromissen, maar militaire versterking 
(door hulpgeld) van het regeringsleger 
zou anderzijds ook kunnen leiden tot een 
snellere overwinning van de zittende partij. 
Ik gebruik data van 29 Afrikaanse landen om 
deze theorieën te testen. De resultaten laten 
zien dat er geen effect is van hulp op het 
ontstaan van burgeroorlogen. Er blijkt echter 
een negatief verband te bestaan tussen hulp 
en het voortduren van oorlogen: 10 procent 
meer hulp vermindert de kans met ongeveer 
8 procent dat de oorlog het volgende jaar nog 
voortduurt. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt getest of grieven, 
lage opportuniteitskosten of rent-seeking 
correleren met een verhoogde kans op 
rebellenactiviteiten. Met behulp van data van 
100 rurale dorpen in Burundi wordt allereerst 
getest of historisch geweld tijdens de jaren ‘70 en 
jaren ‘80 mensen heeft aangespoord om rebel 
te worden tijdens de burgeroorlog in Burundi 
in de jaren ‘90. Resultaten uit de crosssectie 
analyse laten geen effect van grieven zien. 
Echter, dorpen met een hoger dan gemiddeld 
aantal periodes van droogte hebben een 
hogere kans op rekrutering van rebellen dan 
andere dorpen. In het tweede deel van het 
paper wordt de analyse uitgebreid met behulp 
van geconstrueerde paneldata. Door middel 
van paneldata kunnen tijdsontwikkelingen 
worden geanalyseerd. Specifiek wordt 
gekeken in hoeverre jaarlijkse schommelingen 
in prijzen van exportproducten samenhangen 
met wervingsactiviteiten (rekrutering) van 
rebellengroepen. We vinden geen robuuste 
relatie tussen exportprijzen en de kans op 
activiteiten van rebellen. Echter, negatieve 
inkomensschommelingen veroorzaakt door 
een jaarlijks tekort aan regenval zijn wel 
significant gecorreleerd met een verhoogde 
kans op rekrutering. Dit is consistent met de 
eerdere resultaten uit de crosssectie analyse. 
In hoofdstuk 5 en hoofdstuk 6 onderzoek 
ik de gevolgen van burgeroorlogen voor 
individuele huishoudens en de mogelijke 
implicaties voor economische ontwikkeling. 
In hoofdstuk 5 gebruik ik data op huishoud- 
en dorpsniveau. Deze data zijn verzameld 
gedurende twee interviewrondes. De eerste 
ronde vond plaats in 1998 en de tweede in 
2007. Het doel van dit hoofdstuk is te kijken in 
hoeverre investeringsbeslissingen veranderen 
nadat mensen (huishoudens) oorlogsgeweld 
hebben meegemaakt. Crosssectie analyses 
laten zien dat huishoudens die meer geweld 
hebben meegemaakt vaker winstgevende 
landbouwgewassen bestemd voor de 
markt verbouwen. Een punt van zorg is dat 
huishoudens die winstgevende gewassen 
verbouwen ook al voor de oorlog deze 
gewassen verbouwden en daardoor misschien 
zelfs geweld hebben aangetrokken. Een 
positieve correlatie kan dan duiden op een 
selectie-effect: huishoudens die winstgevende 
gewassen verbouwen zijn vaker slachtoffer 
van geweld. De relatie zou dan andersom zijn. 
Met gebruik van instrumentele variabelen 
kunnen we deze zorg gedeeltelijk wegnemen. 
De resultaten veranderen hierdoor echter 
nauwelijks en versterken de suggestie van een 
causaal verband van geweld op investeringen. 
We schrijven deze resultaten toe aan een 
toename van sociale cohesie in de dorpen die 
getroffen zijn door geweld. 
Het onderzoek in hoofdstuk 6 sluit aan bij dat 
van hoofdstuk 5. Hier gebruiken we een quasi-
experimentele benadering om te kijken in 
hoeverre een geweldsverleden de voorkeuren 
van mensen verandert. We trekken een aselecte 
steekproef van 35 Burundese dorpen uit de 100 
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dorpen die we in 2007 hebben geïnterviewd. 
We gebruiken de data uit 2007 om stratificatie 
aan te brengen in onze steekproef. Dorpen 
die zijn aangevallen tijdens de burgeroorlog 
hebben we onderscheiden van dorpen die 
niet zijn aangevallen. Op deze manier kunnen 
we dorpen met en zonder geweldsverleden 
met elkaar vergelijken. De bevindingen zijn 
consistent met die uit het vorige hoofdstuk. 
Individuen uit dorpen die veel geweld hebben 
gekend tonen zich meer bereid te delen met 
andere dorpelingen, nemen meer risico 
en hebben een hogere discontovoet. Deze 
uitkomsten suggereren dat burgeroorlogen 
weliswaar destructief zijn maar dat het ervaren 
van oorlogsgeweld onderlinge sociale relaties 
ook kan versterken wat als positief zou kunnen 
worden geïnterpreteerd. 
In hoofdstuk 7 volgen tenslotte de conclusies 
en bespreek ik de implicaties voor toekomstig 
ontwikkelingsbeleid en toekomstig 
onderzoek. Het hoofddoel van de studie was 
de invloed van: (i) buitenlandse hulp (ii) de 
kwaliteit van bestuur en (iii) oorlogsgeweld 
op economische ontwikkeling beter 
inzichtelijk te maken. Een subdoel was om 
significante correlaties die bekend zijn uit 
crossnationale studies te ontrafelen en verder 
te onderzoeken welke causale verbanden 
hieraan ten grondslag liggen. Ik heb specifiek 
gekeken naar de interacties tussen de drie 
hoofdthema’s (buitenlandse hulp, kwaliteit 
van bestuur en oorlogsgweld) op basis van 
empirische testen. Het tweede subdoel 
bestond uit het vergelijken van resultaten 
uit crossnationale studies met bevindingen 
uit micro-empirisch onderzoek. In Hoofdstuk 
2, 3 en 4 test ik de hypothese van  een rent-
seeking elite. Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 test ik deze 
hypothese op macro-niveau, en in hoofdstuk 
4 wordt dit gedaan op microniveau. Ik vind 
geen overtuigend bewijs dat rent-seeking 
een belangrijke verklaring is voor een slechte 
kwaliteit van bestuur, voor het ontstaan van 
burgeroorlogen of het werven van rebellen. Dit 
wil niet zeggen dat deze invloed niet mogelijk 
is, maar eerder dat andere, belangrijkere 
factoren een rol spelen. In hoofdstuk 5 en 6 
laat ik zien dat grootschalige enquêtes en 
kleinschalige experimenten complementair 
zijn aan elkaar. Beide kunnen een belangrijke 
bijdrage leveren aan het in kaart brengen 
van de gevolgen van burgeroorlogen en 
de implicaties daarvan voor economische 
ontwikkeling. 
Toekomstig onderzoek zou zich moeten 
richten op het identificeren en testen van 
mogelijke mechanismen die significante 
correlaties kunnen verklaren. Vergelijkend 
landenonderzoek kan helpen studies op 
microniveau aan te scherpen. Met variabelen 
die in crossnationaal onderzoek in veel 
gevallen significant zijn (zoals inkomen, 
geografie en etnische diversiteit) kan in 
gecontroleerde experimenten vaak rekening 
worden gehouden. De invloed van deze 
factoren kan dan afzonderlijk beoordeeld 
worden. 
Tot slot zouden donoren, ontvangende 
landen en beleidsmakers hulpactiviteiten 
nauwkeurig moeten volgen. Een manier om 
dit te bewerkstelligen is door een (langdurige) 
samenwerkingverbanden aan te gaan tussen 
niet-gouvernementele organisaties (NGO’s), 
burgerinitiatieven en onderzoekers. Dit 
kan helpen om de specifieke behoeften en 
beperkingen te onderkennen en is uiteindelijk 
essentieel om goed beleid te ontwikkelen. 
Dank-
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De eerste gedachten om een dissertatie over 
conflict en economie te schrijven werden 
gevormd tijdens een te zonnige overtocht 
met de veerboot van het Lombok naar Bali, 
eind 2006.  We hadden de afgelopen dagen 
de Gunung Rinjani beklommen en openden 
na maar liefst vijf dagen geen computer te 
hebben gezien vol verwachting onze emails. 
In mijn inbox bevond zich een uitnodiging van 
Philip Verwimp voor een sollictatiegesprek 
over micro-economisch onderzoek naar de 
gevolgen van gewelddadig conflict. In maart 
2007 begon ik mijn promotieonderzoek, 
dankzij Philip, aan het Duits Economisch 
Instituut (DIW) in Berlijn. Philip, graag wil 
ik je bedanken voor het vertrouwen en de 
plezierige samenwerking binnen het Microcon-
project. Tilman Brück wil ik bedanken voor 
de gastvrijheid en de flexibiliteit waardoor ik 
twee jaar lang ongehinderd op en neer kon 
pendelen tussen Wageningen en Berlijn. 
Zoals destijds afgesproken verruilde ik DIW na 
twee jaar voor Wageningen Universiteit om 
bij de leerstoelgroep ontwikkelingseconomie 
mijn proefschrift af te ronden. Ooit had ik 
uitgeroepen dat Erwin mijn gedroomde 
promotor zou zijn en zo geschiedde. Nu het 
proefschrift af is kan ik deze uitspraak nog 
steeds vol overtuiging onderschrijven. Erwin, 
ik heb veel geleerd van jouw creatieve en 
avontuurlijke manier van werken, hetgeen 
spannende en vernieuwende projecten 
oplevert.  Je open, kritsche houding en 
diplomatieke vaardigheden maken je 
daarnaast tot een uitstekend begeleider. 
Ik ben blij dat we de komende tijd zullen 
samenwerken aan het onderzoek in Liberia.
Gonne, dank voor de goede en gezellige 
samenwerking in Burundi. We zetten deze 
moeiteloos voort in Liberia.
Maarten, jij bent mijn onvolprezen collega, 
co-auteur en goede vriend. Na een korte 
ontmoeting in augustus 2007 hebben we elkaar 
beter leren kennen tijdens het eerste veldwerk 
in Burundi, krap drie weken later. Het bleek een 
solide basis voor onze vriendschap. Dank je 
voor plezierig gezelschap, verhitte discussies 
en een nimmer aflatend enthousiasme om 
samen modellen te schatten en artikelen te 
schrijven. 
Fleur, dank voor de vele geruststellende 
adviezen en het lezen van delen van het 
proefschrift. Jacob en Willem bedankt voor 
jullie bijdrage aan de samenvatting tijdens 
een wandelweekend in de Zwitserse Alpen .  
Ik wil mijn ouders en zusje heel erg bedanken 
voor hun onvoorwaardelijke liefde en interesse 
in het onderzoek, ondanks een gezonde 
bezorgdheid om te werken in post-conflict 
landen.   
Dank gaat ook uit naar mijn collega’s in 
Wageningen, Berlijn en Zürich, en naar mijn 
lieve vrienden die direct of indirect hebben 
bijgedragen aan het succesvol afronden van 
dit proefschrift, in het bijzonder Bas, Joppe, 
Lonneke, Marcel, Marije, Peter en mijn beide 
paranimfen Judith en Maarten.  
De (bijna) laatste woorden zijn voor Jasper. 
Zonder twijfel ben je de beste en meeste 
geduldige editor ter wereld. Daarom allereerst 
bedankt voor de eindeloze dagen, avonden 
en nachten die we samen aan de keukentafel 
achter onze laptops hebben doorgebracht. 
Naast de  editor van dit proefschrift ben 
je echter vooral mijn lieve, inspirende en 
avontuurlijke vriendje. Met jou is geen 
wandeltocht te lang, geen skitocht te koud en 
geen fietsroute te bergachtig. Ik ben zo blij dat 
we samen zijn. 
Tot slot, een groot deel van het proefschrift 
is geschreven op basis van primaire data 
uit Burundi. Meer dan 1000 respondenten 
hebben bijgedragen aan het ontstaan 
van deze unieke data. Zonder hen had dit 
proefschrift niet geschreven kunnen worden. 
De mensen van ISTEEBU en Ligue Iteka 
(Bernadette, Bernard, Égide, Emmanuel, 
Erneste, Eric, Gertrude, Raphaël, en Seconde) 
zijn van onschatbare waarde geweest bij 
het uitvoeren van de experimenten en het 
afnemen van de interviews. Graag wil ik ook 
hen hier bedanken.
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